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Politics and Petroleum Development in
Argentina, 1916-1930
(May 1973)

James E. Buchanan, B. A., SUC at Potsdam, New
York
M. A.

,

University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Dr. Robert A. Potash

During the Radical Period (1916-1930), Argentina's
first experiment with middle class democracy failed to

provide channels for meaningful political participation on
the part of the nation's lower and middle classes.

Symp-

tomatic of this larger failure was the inability of

Argentina's political leaders and parties to provide the
country with a much needed oil law prior to 1930.

Subsequent to the 1907 discovery of a commercially
exploitable oil deposit in Comodoro Rivadavia (Territory
of Chubut)

,

the nation's leaders faced a problem born of

the fact that the 1886 Mining Code's provisions made no

allowance for the peculiarities of the petroleum industry.

New legislation was needed to decide whether ownership of
the deposits would remain with the provinces or be trans-

ferred to the national government, to dictate precisely

who would exploit the oil (the state, private interests,
or some combination of the two)

,

and, in the case of pri-

vate exploitation, to prescribe the exact conditions for

concessions.
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Between 1907 and 1930, two general positions
developed
on this issue.

That of the oil nationalists was based on

the assumptions

(1)

that Argentina possessed vast oil re-

serves which were the key to industrialization,
economic

independence and national defense, and

(2)

that the "world

oil trusts" were intent upon controlling Argentina's oil
for their own purposes, even if it meant disrupting the

nation* s internal peace to do so.

The nationalists, there-

fore, supported the extension of federal control over oil

deposits, state exploitation through Yacimientos Petro-

liferos Fiscales (YPF)

,

and closely-controlled, small-scale

private operations and/or mixed companies involving state
and private capital.

By 1927, the most ardent nationalists

were demanding an integrated and exclusive state monopoly
over domestic oil development.
The opposing view, held by domestic conservatives and

prospective foreign and national oil investors, was based on
the assumption that Argentina might have important petro-

leum resources, and that it was necessary to allow large

private firms to work under liberal conditions in order to
reveal whether the alleged oil wealth was myth or reality.

That no compromise was reached between these two
positions can, in large part, be attributed to the Radical

Party which held national political control from 1916 to
1930, and particularly to the Yrigoyenist wing.

The

Vlll

Yrigoyenists consistently pursued an oil policy
designed
to elicit electoral support, rather than one
aimed
at

producing the necessary national legislation.

The most

blatant manifestation of this tendency occurred in 19271928 during and after the only major oil debate before

Instead of seeking a compromise solution which

1930.

would have conciliated all parties and still protected the
nation's interests, the Yrigoyenists stood unalterably for
an exaggerated nationalist policy.

They and the Indepen-

dent Socialists pushed through the Chamber of Deputies a

bill calling for federalization of oil deposits and a
complete state oil monopoly.

While the proposal had no

chance of gaining Senate approval, the Yrigoyenists and
the Independent Socialists used their nationalist stance

effectively in the 1928 national elections.
Under this legal cloud, the oil industry developed
slowly.

The private sector adopted a "wait and see"

attitude while at times devoting considerable energy and
resources to speculation in exploration rights.

The state

enterprise, YPF, made some remarkable advances under the

guidance of the energetic and talented nationalist, General

Enrique Mcsconi (1922-1930)

,

but it too was hindered by

the absence of a clearly defined national oil policy. As a

consequence, not even the combined efforts of the public
and private sectors were sufficient to keep pace with the

nation's expanding demand for oil and oil
products.

X

INTRODUCTION

Passage of the Saenz Pena electoral reform law in
1912 ana Hipolito Yrigoyen's election as President four

years later were events hailed by Argentines and foreigners
alike as giant strides toward harmonizing theory and practice in the nation's political system.

Fourteen years

later, however, Yrigoyen was the victim of a military coup,

an act whose repercussions for Argentina's political evolution were to prove far more influential than those of the

Saenz Pena law.

Broken and defeated, the mysterious

caudillo bore. with him to Martin Garcia Island the extrava-

gant hopes entertained by many of his coreligionists in
1916.

Argentina's experiment with Western-style middle

class democracy failed to provide a political environment

conducive to solving or even confronting effectively the

nation's social and economic problems.
experiment
The urgent need for understanding why the
postfailed becomes apparent after glancing at Argentina's
1930 political record.

In forty-three years, only two

a full six-year
elected presidents have managed to complete
and three
while six Chief Executives (three civilians

term,

office by military coups.
military) have been ushered out of

xi

Amidst this chaotic political setting, Argentina has been
unable to mobilize her human and natural resources to battle chronic social and economic problems.

Although the

origins of the country's political difficulties do not lie

exclusively in the Radical Period (1916-1930)

,

it is log-

ical to expect that a firm understanding of those years

will facilitate our understanding of Argentina's contemporary maladies.

Despite the need for research, the Radical years have

remained somewhat in the shadows while historians have pre
f erred to

shed light on 19th century and post-19 43 Argen-

As a result, our knowledge of the 1916-19 30 era

tina.

rests heavily on the work of "official" historians and

polemicists.

A trend toward filling this information gap

can be discerned in some recent monographs which deal with

several aspects of the Radical Period, including Robert A.
Potash's The Army and Politics in Argentina
(Stanford:

,

1928-1945

Stanford Univ. Press, 1969), Samuel

L.

Baily's

Labor , Nationalism , and Politics in Argentina (New BrunsRutgers Univ. Press, 1967), Peter Smith's Politics

wick:

and Beef in Argentina (New York:
1969)

,

Columbia Univ. Press,

and Peter Snow's Argentine R adicalism (Iowa City:

Iowa Univ. Press, 1965).

While none of thses studies

treats exclusively with the Radical Period, Potash, Smith,
Baily, and Snow have all contributed to an understanding o

Xll

those years by providing new information and fresh in-

terpretations based on scholarly investigations.

It is

only from many more studies of this type that a meaningful

synthesis of the Radical Period will emerge.

Among the topics deserving detailed study, petroleum
must be accorded high priority.

Since 1907 when oil was

discovered in Comodoro Rivadavia, it has been an explosive
ingredient in the Argentine political formula.

From the

viewpoint of the national politicians, the problem has

been one of agreeing on a philosophy for oil development
and then mapping out the specific conditions under which

exploration and exploitation must be conducted.

Argentina had no organic petroleum law.

In 1916,

Exploration and

exploitation were subject to the provisions of the 1886
Mining Code which simply lumped oil together in a category

with other important mineral resources.

Since the amount

of capital and time and the degree of technology demanded

by the petroleum industry clearly distinguished it from
other mining operations, the need for special legislation
was evident.
The central focus of this study is an analysis of the
groups
proposal;' offered by political parties and interest

political
to fill the legislative void, and the related

controversies.

Two key issues dominated the debate which

in 1927:
culminated in a prolonged Congressional battle

xiii

1)

Ownership - Should the provinces maintain control over

their petroleum deposits as the Mining Code dictated, or

should all oil reserves be placed under exclusive federal
jurisdiction?;

2)

Exploitation - Who should undertake ex-

ploitation, the state, private companies, or some combination of the two?
The political parties whose petroleum policies are to

be examined include:

1)

the Radical Party (Union Civica

Radical) which split after 1924 into the personalis tas who

supported Yrigoyen and the antipersonalistas led by
Yrigoyen's successor, Marcelo T. de Alvear;

2)

the Con-

servative group which was not a party but a loose coalition
of provincial organizations with no permanent national

structure;

3)

the Socialist Party which splintered into the

Independent and Orthodox wings in 1927.

Argentina's

political map during the Radical Period was dotted with

provincial and regional parties whose names do not appear
here.

The Congressional debates, however, reveal that

representatives of these marginal parties generally aligned
themselves with one of the five major political groups on
the petroleum issue.

It is, therefore, not necessary to

deal with each of the smaller organizations individually.
Several interest groups became involved in the policy
debate, particularly after 1926 when the matter was one of

widespread public concern.

Among the major participants

xiv
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were:

1)

•.

Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF)

state oil firm;

2)

,

the

private oil investors whose opinions

were sometimes expressed through a special section of the
Union Industrial Argentina;

3)

the Comite Universitario

Radical, formed by Radical sympathizers in the academic

community; and

4)

the Alianza Continental, a continent-

wide group formed to combat imperialism in Latin America.
The Alianza spearheaded the attack on foreign oil invest-

ment in Argentina.

With respect to these organizations,

the issues of interest to the present study are not only

their individual proposals, but also their respective

propaganda techniques, and their effectiveness as pressure
groups insofar as it can be determined.
As might be expected, the petroleum debate consis-

tently involved the themes of economic nationalism, British
and United States imperialism, and the protection of

national sovereignty.

A strong ideological undercurrent

was unavoidable when many Argentines considered domestic

petroleum as the key to industrialization and economic
independence, and the ideological content of the debate

intensified in direct proportion to the increasing
,

politicization of the issue during the 1920 s.

It reached

a point where some groups chose to ignore completely prac-

tical considerations as they made intransigent opposition
to foreign oil interests the touchstone of national loyalty.

XV

How and why the discussion became
sidetracked in this
manner will be one of the major themes
analyzed with the
Great Petroleum Debate in 1927.
Information on the growth of the petroleum industry,
in both the private and public sectors, has
been provided

insofar as it is necessary to keep the political
debate in
perspective.

Since the records of the private companies

operative between 1916 and

19 30 are

not available, sta-

tistical material has been drawn almost exclusively from

official sources.

There is no reason to believe, however,

that the government figures are unreliable.

Except for Chapter I, this study is organized chronologically around the three Radical presidential administrations that span the period 1916-1930.

The first chapter

examines the petroleum situation in the years from the

Comodoro Rivadavia oil discovery in 1907 until Yrigoyen
assumed the presidency in 1916.

Considerable space has

been devoted to this background era because the existing
literature on the subject is inadequate and/or misleading.
Yrigoyen' s first terra is treated in Chapters II and III

with 1919 as the dividing line.

This division, while

admittedly arbitrary, coincides with the presentation to
Congress of Yrigoyen' s first major petroleum bills in

September 1919 and separates the 1916-1919 period of relative inactivity on the petroleum issue from the latter part

xvi

of Yrigoyen's presidency when increased activity
culminated

in the creation of YPF in 1922.

The Alvear administration

is likewise the subject of two chapters.

Chapter IV deals

with the 1922-1926 period, highlighting the work of General
Enrique Mosconi as YPF's Director General, while Chapter V
covers the remaining two years, focusing on the Great

Petroleum Debate.

Chapter VI treats Yrigoyen's abbreviated

second term (1928-19 30)

,

and the conclusions appear in a

final chapter, Chapter VII.

xvii
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CHAPTER

I

AN INDECISIVE BEGINNING

The discovery of extensive petroleum reserves near

Comodoro Rivadavia (National Territory of Chubut) was one
of those fortuitous events in a nation's history which

provoke visions of unexpected wealth and power, and, at the
same time, challenge the abilities of national leaders to

develop policies which will maximize the benefits of the
new found resources. 1

Argentina's oil windfall came on

December 13, 1907 at the hands of a government team drilling for potable water near the isolated Patagonian pueblo.

Although this was not the first petroleum discovery in the
country's history, December 13th is commemorated by Argentines as National Petroleum Day.

For if the Comodoro

Rivadavia strike was not the first, it was the discovery
that initiated the development of petroleum as an economic

resource and as a political issue.
By 1930, the petroleum industry still had not ful-

filled the dreams awakened in 1907.

*See map, Frontispiece.

1

It did not eliminate

2

the need for importing fuels by that date, nor did
it

become the basis of a burgeoning industrial complex.

Pe-

troleum did grow in a political sense, however, into something few if any Argentines anticipated in 1907.

The

question of who would exploit this vital resource and under

what conditions became a political storm center of considerable magnitude, a subject for heated debate in Congress,
in lecture halls, and on street corners.

So highly politi-

cized and so emotionally charged did the issue become that

economic and financial aspects at times became strangely
irrelevant.

Argentina's experience with domestic petroleum exploitation prior to 1907 had not been particularly rewarding.

Between 1865 and the end of the century, several firms

which were organized to exploit petroleum deposits in the
provinces of Mendoza, Salta and Jujuy met with failure.

Insufficient supplies of capital and machinery combined with
the lack of scientific knowledge and technological expertise
to defeat these early experiments.

Viewed from a wider perspective, the petroleum industry from 1865 to 1907 was the victim of the economic

policies pursued by the ruling elits.

Insofar as any

background on 19th century petroleum exploitation,
see Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Comercio y Industria,
Las fuentes del petroleo argentino (Buenos Aires: Direccion
Nacional de Miner ia, 19 57) , 6; and Sadi H. Mozo, El petroleo
2 For

.

3
*

attachment to doctrinaire concepts can be discerned,
laissez-faire and multilateral trade dominated the thinking
of Argentina's leaders.

This group of notables, nurtured

on French culture and British capital, rested their political supremacy on an agricultural export economy.

Argentine

wheat, meat, and wool were exchanged in transatlantic markets for the output of Europe's factories.

Economic prior-

ities were ordered according to the demands of this trade
and not according to any plan for developing the economic

potential of the nation as a whole, and especially that of
the interior provinces.

Deposits of petroleum and other

minerals often lay in remote areas, and their exploitation

would have required sizable investments at considerable
risk.

While fortunes still could be made in land, cattle,

railroads, and other fields which buttressed the existing

economic framework, mineral exploitation was not an attractive field for domestic and/or foreign capital.

In the

short run, it was easier, and probably cheaper, to continue

depending upon imported fuels and minerals.
Given the prevailing economic philosophy, no Argentine

government before 1907 had perceived petroleum as an issue.

Petroleum was a mineral like all others, and, as such, its
exploration and exploitation were subject to the dictates

argentino en el siglo XIX (Bahia Blanca:
Rodriguez y Cia.
1950rT~9-123
,

Martinez,

4

of the 1886 Mining Code.

The circumstances surrounding the

Comodoro Rivadavia discovery, however, altered that situation and forced the government of President Jose Figueroa

Alcorta to face the question of what Argentina should do

with her oil resources.

Not only had government workmen

been responsible for the find, but under Article

7

of the

Mining Code, the national government was the legal owner of
the deposits by virtue of the fact that they were located

on land under its jurisdiction. 3

The fate of the Comodoro

Rivadavia deposits obviously lay in the hands of Figueroa
Alcorta' s administration, and, undoubtedly, the policy

decided upon would weigh heavily as a precedent in the
event of future discoveries.

While deliberating their course of action, the President and his advisors had to consider the significance of a
plentiful domestic petroleum supply for the present and
future development of the nation.

They must have realized

that the "Petroleum Age" was fast dawning, and that through

the Mining Code of 1886, Argentine mineral resources were the property of the national or provincial
governments according to where they were located (Art. 7)
Private interests were granted the right to search for and
exploit mineral deposits under the regulations of the Code
(Art. 8) , and the State was prohibited from exploiting or
otherwise disposing of mines except as the Code dictated
Eduardo A. Pigretti, comentador, Codigo de
(Art. 9).
mineria y_ legislacio'n de hidrocarburos (Buenos Aires:
22-31.
Cooperadora de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, 1964)
For the regulations referring to exploration and exploitation rights see Ibid ., 45-115, 140-315. A detailed
3 Under

,

5

its application to the internal combustion engine, petro-

leum would become a vital fuel source.

If this was

accepted as axiomatic in coal-producing countries like the

United States and England, how much more significant was it
*

for Argentina which had no domestic fuel supply and annually paid a considerable sum abroad for imported coal? 4

Eco-

nomically, however, a national petroleum supply meant more
than possibly escaping the annual outlay for foreign fuels.
It was one of the essential elements for Argentine indus-

trial development and, therefore, for the attainment of

economic independence, something which nearly a century of

political independence had not produced.

In terms of

national defense, the value of a secure domestic fuel

analysis of these provisions as they applied to petroleum
may be found in Carlos E. Velarde's Las minas de petroleo
Imprenta y
en la legislacion argentina (Buenos Aires
Casa Editora "Coni" , 1922) , 33-178.
:

1907 and 1909 Argentina paid an average of
16,968,932 $oro a year for an average of 2,424,133 tons of
This represented an average of 5.9% of the total
coal.
value of Argentina's imports. When crude petroleum and petroleum products are added to coal, the figures go up to
23,012,493 $oro and 8.0% pe,r annum. Republica Argentina,
Direccio'n General de Estadistica (hereinafter cited D. G.
de Estadistica) , Anuario de la direccion general de
estadistica , correspondiente al alio 19 07 (Buenos Aires:
Compania Sudamericana de Biiletes da Banco, 1908), I,
pp. XIII, 288; also Anuario , 1908 , I, pp. XVII, 338;
Anuario , 1909 , I, pp. XIX, 356-357; and Jorge Newberry and
Justino C. Thierry, El petroleo (Buenos Aires: Vaccaro,
1910) , chart facing p. 1.
4 Between

6

supply was obvious.

Given these potential advantages, there were serious
problems which had to be confronted.

As yet, little was

known about Argentina's petroleum wealth.

One accidental

discovery proved nothing as to the extent of the deposits
or their quality.

Even if vast high-grade deposits could

be assumed, experience had demonstrated that the nation
lacked the willing capital, heavy machinery, and trained

personnel necessary for petroleum exploitation.
there was a legal problem to be faced.

Finally,

The Mining Code was

approved in 1886 when neither the economic significance of

petroleum nor the problems of its exploitation were understood.

While the physical properties of oil deposits and

the time, money, and risk involved in their development

clearly distinguished the petroleum industry from other extractive enterprises, the standards for granting exploration and exploitation rights were the same for petroleum as
for other minerals.

In addition, it appeared that the

government's latitude for decision making was curtailed by

Article

9

of the Code which prohibited the State from ex-

ploiting or otherwise disposing of mines except as the pro-

visions of the Code dictated. 5

In other words, they had to

be granted to private interests for development.

5 Pigretti,

Co'digo de mineria ,

28.

,

The policies adopted by the Figueroa
Alcorta government in response to the oil discovery were
not definitive
in the sense of laying down a path
from which there would
be no future deviation. Nevertheless, that
administration

established a lasting precedent when it promptly
displayed
its preference for at least some measure of
state partici-

pation in and control over the petroleum industry.

December 14, 1907, the Executive Power issued

a

On

decree

signed by Figueroa Alcorta and his Minister of Agriculture,

Pedro Ezcurra, which prohibited the granting of mineral
rights in a 200 000-hectare reserve centering on the town o
,

Gomodoro Rivadavia. 6

This area was set aside for further

exploration by the National Bureau of Mines.

There having

been no provision in the Mining Code for the creation of
such a reserve, the decree was based on the 1903 land law
(Law 4,167).

Article 15 of that statute permitted the Ex-

ecutive Power to exclude private interests from territories

being explored by government agencies.^
In his address opening the 1908 Congressional sessions

6 Republica

Argentina, Ministerio de Agricultura,
Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (hereinafter cited YPF)
/
Recopilacion de leyes , decretos y_ resoluciones sobre
materia potrolera (Buenos Aires: L. J. Rosso, 1938)
I,
,

7 Ibid.,

6.

5.

8

the President explained the reasons for the decree,

This discovery, which can transform the
economic fortunes of the region, demanded
a halt to the granting of private exploration rights in the area around the well
in order to study the deposit's extension,
importance, yield and application, and
consequently, the form of exploitation
most advantageous to the public interest. 8
It is obvious from his remarks that the President was

thinking only in terms of the Patagonian region and not of
the nation as a whole, and that the decree was intended to

serve as a holding action rather than a permanent policy.

Private interests were to be denied access to the area
around the discovery on a temporary basis while the govern-

ment compiled the information necessary for formulating its
policy.

From a more positive point of view, the fact that

the decree strayed from the accepted laissez-faire outlook

and created for the government an active role in the eco-

nomic sphere was a measure of the importance attached to
the petroleum industry by the Figueroa Alcorta administra-

Here was a clear indication to private capital that

tion.

the government was willing to intervene and protect what it

considered to be the public interest.

Though Figueroa Alcorta'

s

term expired without any

SRepublica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, Camara de
Senadores, Diario de sesiones (hereinafter cited Senador^s,
Imprenta del Congreso de la Nacion,
Diario) (Buenos Aires:
1908)

,

1908, I, 36.

9

*

decision on the best approach to oil exploitation in
Coraodoro Rivadavia, another step was taken in the form of

Law 7,059.

As promulgated on Septeinber 6, 1910, this

measure opened to private interests 97.5% of the 200,000hectare reserve in Comodoro Rivadavia and left the govern-

ment with a 5,000-hectare reserve that was to be divided
into lots of 625 hectares each.

The right to exploit pe-

troleum on these lots was to be assigned through public
auction, and the Executive Power was authorized to withhold

one or more of them for direct state exploitation.

The sum

of 500,000 $m/n was allocated to the Ministry of Agricul-

ture to cover the expenses of the law.

9

While the Congres-

sional debate had revolved around the relative merits of

private and state exploitation, the law left the issue un-

resolved.^

It was the Executive's choice as to whether

the State would reserve the entire zone for its own work or

leave all or part of it open to private capital.
If national petroleum policy was slow to develop dur-

ing these years, 1907-1910, activity in the Comodoro

Rivadavia proceeded at the same pace.

Work in the area was

9yPF, Recopilacion , I, 7.
10 For the debates see Senadores,

Diario , 1909, 569-582;
and Republica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, Camara de
Diputados, Diario de sesiones (hereinafter cited Diputactos,
Imprenta del Congreso de la Nacion,
Diario) (Buenos Aires:
1910) , 1910, II, 244-247.

10

the responsibility of the Bureau of Mines until the first

specialized petroleum agency assumed its duties in April

A total crude oil production of 8,119 m 3 (cubic

1911.

metres) testifies to the fact that operations were more

exploratory than exploitative in nature. 11

Even then

serious difficulties arose because of the scarcity of drilling machinery and technical personnel, the lack of public

confidence and support, and, above all, the insufficiency of
funds.

From December 1907 until April 1911, the government

invested 290,651 $m/n in petroleum development. 12

hardly a sum designed to produce startling results.

This was
Rather

it was a reflection of the uncertain and perhaps indifferent

attitude which characterized the Figueroa Alcorta administration, an attitude that allowed it to step down without

having formulated a definitive petroleum policy.
On October 12, 1910, incoming President Roque Saenz

Pena inherited a national petroleum policy still in embryo.
It was known that Argentina possessed oil deposits, and it

la cuestio'n petro'leo
(Buenos Aires, 1921) , 18; and Boletin de Inf ormaciones ,"Petroli feras (hereinafter cited BIP) , No. 9 (April 1925)

^Enrique Hermitte, El estado

d,e

755:
12 Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Agricultura,
Direccion General de Explotacio'n de Petroleo de Comodoro

Rivadavia (hereinafter cited D. G. de, Explotacion) , Memoria
de la direccion general de explotacion de petroleo de
ComocToro Rivadavia cof>espondiente al aflos 1912 / 1913
(Buenos Aires: Compania Sudamericana de Billetes de Banco,
,

1914)

,

66-67.

11

was assumed that they were extensive.

Yet it was not

clear whose task it would be to develop this vital resource.

The national government had given notice it would

not step aside and deal private capital a free hand, but it

had not spelled out clearly what its objectives were or

what role it would play.
/

m»

Saenz Pena began with a burst of energy as manifested
in an Executive Decree issued only two months after he took

office.

Through this December 24, 1910 decree, the Presi-

dent and his Minister of Agriculture, Eleodoro Lobos, exercised the option left open to the Executive Power in Law
7,059 and set aside the entire 5,000-hectare tract in

Comodoro Rivadavia for state exploitation.-^

it is proba-

ble that the impetus for this measure came from Enrique
Hermitte, the French-trained engineer who headed the Bu-

reau of Mines, for the considerations set forth in the

decree are nearly an exact reproduction of the arguments he

presented on this matter in his department's Memoria for
1910. 14

The considerations constituted a reasoned brief for

13yPF„ Recopilacion , I, 9-13.
14 Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Agrici^ltura,

Direccio'n General de Minas, Geologla e Hidrologia ^hereinafter cited D. G. de Minas) , Memoria de la division de
minas , geologia e hidrologia , coyespondiente ai ano|910
(Buenos Aires: Oficma Meteorologica Argentina, 1912)#
31-35.

state exploitation of the reserve.

While conceding that

this was a novel practice, alien to the traditions
of

Argentine mining legislation and economic policy, the
decree noted that the Executive Power was encouraged by
reports from the Bureau of Mines on the quantity and quality
of the Comodoro Rivadavia deposits.

Petroleum production

was of vital importance to a coal- importing nation since it

held out the promise of relieving Argentina from economic
and industrial subordination to fuel exporters.

State ac-

tivity would prevent monopolies while at the same time at-

tracting private capital by proving the Argentine petroleum

industry was a profitable venture.

An ample area outside

the reserve lay open to private firms which, in any case,

would not be likely to invest in the reserve itself since
their rights would be guaranteed for only five years under
the provisions of Law 7,059.

Thus far, the considerations seemed to indicate a

long-term commitment to state exploitation as a matter of

government policy.

Such was not the case.

The prefatory

remarks also pointed out that when the five-year limit

expired the State would be free, if it were advisable, to
invite private investment into the reserve.

Meanwhile,

government activity would reveal the worth of the zone and
enable the State to obtain for exploitation rights a sum in
accord with their true value.

In short, though the

13

Executive branch felt there was reason to pursue the
state's activity in Comodoro Rivadavia over the next
five
years, it would be on an experimental basis only.

There

was clearly an unwillingness to say without reservation
that direct state exploitation was the proper course of
action.
In contrast to the lengthy introduction, the operative

part of the decree was brief and precise.

It provided for

the creation of an honorary Petroleum Commission (Direccion

General de Explotacio'n del Petroleo de Comodoro Rivadavia)

under the Minister of Agriculture and charged it with responsibility for the industrial and commercial exploitation
of the federal reserve.

^

Before ill health forced his retirement from the presidency in October 1913, Saenz Pena and his Minister of Agriculture, now Adolf o Mujica, issued another decree of major

significance for petroleum development.^

Dated May 9,

1913, it was a response to a situation that had evolved

under the terms of Law 7,0 59.

That legislation had reduced

the original 200 , 000-hectare reserve to 5,000 hectares,

thereby placing extensive stretches of potential petroleum

ordinance spelling out ^he powers and duties
of the Commission see YPF, Recopilacion , I, 13-15. Honorary
is used in the sense of unsalaried.
l 5 For the

l 6 Ibid.

,

20-21.
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land within the reach of private interests.

Rights to ex-

plore the land were avidly sought after, but no actual

exploration was taking place, nor was any petroleum being
produced.

The rights were being acquired for speculative

purposes, either by individuals who intended to sell them
at a lucrative profit, or by large companies attempting to

monopolize petroleum territories for subsequent sale or
exploitation. 17
In responding to this situation, the May 9th decree

stated that it was the Executive Power's duty to insure the

legitimate exploitation of public wealth, and, to that end,
it was ordering an in-depth exploration of the reserve

described in the decree and recommending passage of legislation to regulate petroleum development.

The decree defined

a reserve of some 167,000 hectares in Comodoro Rivadavia

within which mineral rights would not be granted until it
1
had been fully explored by the Ministry of Agriculture.

As with previous petroleum measures, this decree did not

17 One of the best official accounts of this phenomenon
can be found in D. G. de Explotacid'n, Memoria, 1912 / 1913 ,

70-72.
18

The reserve created by this Decree was later decreased in size because it was based on the land law of
Since that law referred exclusively to
1903, Law 4,167.
public lands and the 167,000 hectares included private
properties, a Decree issued on October 8, 1914 exempted the
latter from the provisions of the 1913 measure. YPF,
Recopilacion I, 30-31.
,

.
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constitute a definitive policy statement,

it was designed

to meet a particular set of circumstances,
and more to

deter speculation than to promote
exploration,

if state

exploration and exploitation had been hampered
in the past
by the lack of funds, where was the money
to
come from for

the exploration of an area 30 to 35 times
the size of the

federal reserve?
The Saenz Pena administration did take steps to
obtain

operating funds for the Petroleum Commission, submitting
bills to Congress in 1911 and 1913.

On both occasions, the

Minister of Agriculture had received long reports from the

Petroleum Commission detailing the need for financial
support.

In 1911, the Commission sought 2,000,000 $m/n

while in 1913 the target was a more ambitious 15,000,000
$m/n. 19

In an effort to satisfy the requests, the Executive

Power simply placed the Commission's case before Congress in
the form of legislative proposals. 20

Unfortunately for the

Commission's labors, neither bill was approved by Congress.

l^For copies of the reports justifying the requests for
funds, see D. G. de Explotacion, Nota f undando su pedido de
2.000 .000 $m/n pa,ra proseguir los trabajos (Buenos Aires:
Oficina Meteorologica Argentina, 1911)
and Petroleo de
Comodoro Rivadavia Memorandum de la direccion generaT~rela tivo a~Ta explotacion f utura de los yacimientos de petroleo
de Comodoro Rivadavia con programa de trabajos y_ presupues to
de gastos, del acta del 8 de abril de 1913 (Buenos Aires:
Imprenta "De Su Conf ianza"7~1913)
;

;

20 Diputados, Diario ,

604-605.

1911, II, 820-821; and 1913, II,

16

Sixty- two years old and the victim of a fatal disease,
Saenz Pena was forced to delegate his powers to his Vice

President in October 1913.

For three years, the Saenz Pena

administration had lent a measure of support to the state
industry by translating the Petroleum Commission's requests
into decrees and legislative proposals.

But it cannot be

said that he and his advisors were committed as a matter of

long-range policy to direct state exploitation.

Such ac-

tivity was viewed as an experiment to help decide upon the

best method of handling the nation's vital fuel source.
Sa'enz

Pena

'

s

Vice President and successor was

Victorino de la Plaza, a native of Salta and a cultured and
experienced public servant in the oligarchic tradition.

Holding to the tenets of laissez-faire economics more
rigidly than Figueroa Alcorta or Saenz Pena, De la Plaza
favored handing over the federal reserve to private investors.

On July 16, 1914, he and his Minister of Agricul-

ture, Horacio Caldero'n, sent Congress a bill authorizing the

Executive Power to sign contracts with private firms empowering them to administer and exploit the area heretofore
21
reserved exclusively for the State.

21senadores, Diario 1914, 145-147. There can be no
doubt that responsibility for the bill lay with De la Plaza
and Calderon, because the Petroleum Commission had recommended continued state exploitation in^he Comodoro
Rivadavia reserve. D. G. de Explotacion, Memoria 1912 / 1913
77-80.
De la Plaza's Anglophile sympathies were no secret,
,

,

,

17

The message accompanying the bill was phrased in the

language of 19th century economics.

It pointed out the

State's lack of capital, technicians, and experience with
the petroleum industry, and, in general, called into ques-

tion "the State's aptitude for commercial activity of the
type, extension, and autonomy necessary for performing

efficiently in the marketplace." 22

It was De la Plaza's

opinion that exploitation should be entrusted to private
initiative with the government playing its traditional role
as an observer safeguarding the public interest.

When World War

I

cut off the influx of foreign capital

upon which the Executive's 1914 bill depended, De la Plaza
and Calderon reversed their position and, in June 1916,

initiated legislation intended to strengthen state exploitation. 2 ^

This bill sought to provide a firm legal basis

for the government sector of the industry and to authorize

an investment of 16,000,000 $m/n in the expansion of its

activities.

The administration now chose to support direct

state exploitation because, as the accompanying message

and it is possible English oil interests encouraged him in
his plan for opening the reserve to private investment.
There is no evidence, however, of undue pressure having been
applied or of collusion between De la Plaza and English
investors.
22 Senadores, Diario , 1914, 145.
23 Diputados, Diario , 1916,

I,

376-378.
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stated,
the present circumstances demand the setting
aside of doctrinary beliefs and theoretical
preconceptions which, despite their undeniable worth, do not provide the basis for
satisfying the nation's pressing economic
and industrial needs. 24

De la Plaza was, in all probability, referring to the
fuel

shortage caused by the war.

Coal imports, which were more

than 90% English in origin before the war, had declined

from 3,421,526 tons in 1914 to 1,884,781 tons by 1916. 25
De la Plaza's concern over the fuel crisis was evi-

denced in a second bill submitted to Congress in June 1916. 26
Refusing to give up the possibility of attracting private
investment, he proposed a complete reform of the process for

granting petroleum exploration and exploitation rights.

It

was an apparent attempt to clarify the rights and duties of

private capital and thereby create a stable atmosphere conducive to investment.

Both of the Executive's 1916 bills

died in Congress, however, without ever being debated.

At

this late juncture, the Chamber's Special Committee on

Petroleum Legislation preferred to await the initiatives
of the incoming Radical administration before sending any

24 Ibid.

,

377.

25 D. G. de Estadistica, Anuario, 1914
1916 , 342.
26 Diputados, Diario, 1916, I,

,

378-383.

347; Anuario,
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bill to the Chamber floor. 27

Despite these failures, the De la Plaza administration
did supply some practical support for expanding the
system
of state exploitation.

Through a Ministerial Accord of

October 30, 1914, it authorized the Petroleum Commission to
sell crude petroleum and its by-products in the public mar-

ket and to invest the profits in future exploitation. 28

It

was tantamount to declaring that the government enterprise
was now established, and that commercialization of its

product was to begin.

The authorization to reinvest profits

was of utmost importance, since it provided the Commission

with an independent source of revenue. 29

In fact, profits

would become the only source of funds after 1916 when
Congress terminated the practice of making annual budget

allocations for petroleum development.

It is understandable

why General Enrique Mosconi, head of the state industry during the 1920'

2 ? Ibid .

,

s

and a legendary figure in the history of

1916-17, V, 4932, 4952.

28 YPF, Recopilacion
I,
,

31-32.

29 Since both production and sales were still low, this

authorization did not mean the immediate injection of large
amounts of capital into state exploitation. At the same
time, however, income from the sales of crude petroleum
between 1914 and 1916 totaled 6,027,400 $m/n, while during
those same years the Petroleum Commission received only
3,500,000 $m/n in government financing. YPF Desarrollo de
la industria petrolifera fiscal , 1907 - 1932 (Buenos Aires:"
Jacobo Peuser, 1932), 78, 389.
,

20

Argentine petroleum, once described this Accord as the true
beginning of state exploitation. 30
As we have seen, none of the Executive's legislative

proposals from 1910 to 1916 won Congressional sanction.
was not a case of Congress displaying any favoritism.

It

Dur-

ing these years, apart from the yearly budget appropria-

tions,^ the only bill related to petroleum which received
approval was a 1915 enactment extending for an additional
five years the time limit imposed on the federal reserve by

Law 7, 059. 32

Such meager results were obviously not due to

a paucity of proposals.

Many public figures realized that

the 1886 Mining Code was ill-equipped to handle the problems

presented by the petroleum industry.

President De la Plaza

himself had referred to the dilemma when submitting his

30 Enrique Mosconi, El petroleo argentino , 1922-1930

,

y la ruptura de los trusts petroliferos ingles y_
norteamericano eT"T° de agosto de 1929 (Buenos Aires:
Ferrari Hnos., T936T, 32.
31 YPF, Desarrollo de la industria , 78.
In 1912, the
allotment was 1,000,000 $m7n, in 1913 it was 1,500,000,
1,500,000 in 1914, 1,000,000 in 1915, and 1,000,000 in
These sums combined with the 500,000 $m/n appropri1916.
ated through Law 7,059 and a total of 2,155,240.90 $m/n
appropriated through Ministerial Accords in 1915 for the
purchase of two petroleum tankers, add up to 8,655.240.90
by the national government in petroleum ex-

$m/n invested
ploitation through 1916.
32 Law,

9,664,

See YPF, Recopilacion , I, 48.
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1916 bill on the regulation of petroleum concessions:

Our Mining Code did not take petroleum into
account when it was sanctioned, and, therefore, the Code's provisions on exploration
and exploitation of substances in the first
category, among which are included mineral
oils, are not applicable to the latter without grave danger for the general economy. 33

The various proposals which entered Congress reveal
two common characteristics:

first, the tendency of all but

one of the bills to grant the State some degree of direct

participation in petroleum exploitation; and second, a
limited geographical scope.

In terms of the first charac-

teristic, the bills can be arranged along a continuum

according to the degree of state activity advocated.

At one

extreme was the De la Plaza proposal for terminating state

exploitation and handing over the Comodoro Rivadavia reserve to private enterprise.

It was the only bill during

this period which proposed an outright halt to state indus-

trial activity. 34

33 Diputados, Diario, 1916, I,

378.

34 De la

Plaza later referred to this bill as one
(Diputados, Diario
designed to create "mixed companies".
However, his message introducing the
1916, I, 376-377.)
bill clearly indicates that the role he envisioned for the
State was not that of a partner to private capital but that
The bill itself is of no help in clarifying
of a watchdog.
this point since it did not describe the contracts to be
signed with prospective investors.
,

22

State involvement in its most limited form,
mixed companies, was proposed in bills authored by Deputies
Adrian c.

Escobar (1913) 35 and Alfredo Demarchi (1914) 36

Their con-

cept of a mixed company was that of a partnership
between
state and private capital.

Their specific formulas varied,

but generally the State was to contribute the land of
the
federal reserve along with existing installations and all

geological and scientific studies of the region at its
disposal.

The private investors were to supply the capital

and technical expertise while a directorate composed of

representatives of both groups controlled operations.

In

each case, the State was granted the right to appoint a

majority of the directors.
In 1914, Deputies Nicolas Repetto 37 and Tomas de Veyga 38

introduced bills calling for more substantial state partici-

pation in the petroleum industry.

These legislators advoca-

ted concurrent but separate exploitation by the State and

35 Diputados, Diario, 1913, II, 1034-1038.

Escobar was
a member of the Conservative Party representing Buenos
Aires Province.
36 Ibid .

Demarchi was a member of
the Radical Party representing the Federal Capital.
37 Ib d
r .

,

1914, I, 777-780.

1914, III, 681-688.
representing the Federal Capital.
38 Ibid .

,

Repetto was a Socialist

De Veyga was a member of
the Radical Party representing the Federal Capital.
,

1914, IV, 41-48.
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private companies.

The former would operate within the

5,000-hectare reserve, and the latter could take advantage
of lands oucside that zone. 39

Finally, at the other extreme

of the continuum, in 1916 Deputy Carlos F. Melo introduced
a bill which provided for a complete state monopoly over all

oil exploitation in Argentina. 40
The fact that the government industry was already oper-

ative in Comodoro Rivadavia probably influenced the prefer-

ence shown for state activity.

The deciding factor, how-

ever, was the concern, shown in nearly all the bills, over
the need to protect Argentina's oil resources from monopoli-

zation by the world oil trusts. 41

Essentially, the argument

jy Repetto's proposal referred specifically to the land

outside the 5,000-hectare reserve but within the boundaries
described by the May 9, 1913 Executive Decree. De Veyga's
bill itself referred only to the federal reserve, but his
introductory remarks show that he intended the remaining
lands for private exploitation. De Veyga's bill actually
called for domestic private capital to cooperate with the
State within the reserve. In the event such funds were not
forthcoming, the State was to proceed alone. Had the bill
been passed, it is probable that domestic capital would not
have rushed into this venture, and the State would have continued as before in Comodoro Rivadavia. Therefore, this
proposal has been included here and not with those calling
for mixed companies.
40 Diputados, Diario, 1916, II, 1032-1033.

Melo was a
Member of the Radical Party representing the Federal
Capital.
41 Deputy Melo showed no particular concern for this
problem when introducing his bill. He was less interested
His comments upon
in petroleum than in financial reform.
submitting his bill indicate that the revenue from a state
petroleum monopoly was to be one of the keys in his planned
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as set forth in these proposals began with the
assumption

that Argentina possessed vast petroleum deposits
which, if

properly safeguarded, would become the basis for industrial
ization and eventually economic emancipation.

If, however,

the trusts were allowed a free hand, they would extract the

fuel at their own convenience, set prices as their greed

dictated, and remit the profits to foreign stockholders.

Though the case was seldom recited in such a cut-and-dried
manner, examples of this kind of thinking are clear and
frequent.

Deputy De Veyga voiced the common apprehension

regarding the trusts when he claimed to have designed his
bill to ensure that
the large capital investments that have to
be made and the immense profits which must
be earned would strengthen the country,
placing it on the road toward economic independence, and could not be an incentive
to the greed of the trusts,....

It may seem strange that the trusts were so feared in a

country which had had no practical experience with Standard
or Royal Dutch Shell or Anglo-Persian, but Argentines knew
the names and the reputations which went with them, and they

were taking no chances.

Risks could not be afforded with the

fuel supply which might reorient the economic future of the

reogranization.
42 Diputaods, Diario , 1914, IV, 43.
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nation.

Thus, the legislative history of the 1910-1916

period shows a clear tendency toward some sort of state

participation in exploitation along with a willingness to
permit private investment so long as trusts were excluded.
Earlier it was noted that the bills under discussion

were limited in their geographical scope.

Only the Melo

bill in 1916 approached the petroleum issue as a national
one.

Among the other bills, Repetto's alone referred to any

area beyond the

5

,

000-hectare federal reserve, and Repetto

stayed within the borders set by the May
Decree.

9,

1913 Executive

A glance at the timing of the bills helps to ex-

plain not only their limited scope but their raison d'etre.
The five-year limit imposed on the reserve by Law 7,059 was
due to expire in 1915.

Four of the bills entered Congress

the preceding year (Demarchi, De Veyga, Repetto, and De la
Plaza)

,

and a fifth appeared in 1913 (Escobar)

.

It is

probable, therefore, that the measures were motivated at
least in part by the desire to clarify the future of the

reserve before the time limit lapsed.

If this was true, it

also helps explain why Congress did not act on the bills,
for Law 9,664, passed in 1915, removed the source of dis-

content by guaranteeing the reserve's existence for another
five years.

Whatever the reason, it seems that the Execu-

tive's penchant for acting in a practical, pragmatic manner

was shared by Congress.

Despite the fear of the trusts, the

26

petroleum problem was not being treated as a national one
deserving high priority and a comprehensive solution.
Rather the trend was toward patchwork proposals designed to
resolve immediate circumstances.

While Congress dragged its feet on petroleum legislation, there were signs by 1916 of growing interest in the

public-at-large.

For a time after the 1907 discovery,

state exploitation was conducted in an atmosphere of general

public ignorance of the petroleum industry and doubt as to
the value of the Comodoro Rivadavia deposits.

Even the few

who supported state exploitation posed a problem because of
their impatience for tangible success.

As a result, the

Petroleum Commission felt obliged to extract petroleum instead of applying its meager funds to vitally needed ex-

ploration in the hope that production would convince the
doubters and satisfy the impatient. ^3

Enrique Hermitte, who

was connected with state exploitation throughout this
period, dates a change in public attitude from the early

months of 1915.

He explained the shift by the fact that the

European war promised to be a long one, and the price of
coal had begun to rise.

Now the great demand for national

43For comments on this topic see D. G. de Explotacicta,
Memoria , 1912/1913 , 69-70; also Informe de la direccion
general a S.E. el senor ministro de agricultura de la
nacibn , Teb"rero~d~e 1916 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta^e Gmo.
Kraft, 1916) , 10; Hermitte, Estado de la cuestion petroleo ,
5-6.

6
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fuel arose, bringing in its wake mounting criticism of the

Petroleum Commission when that body was unable to meet the
sudden demands placed upon it. 44

Hermitte's views as to the reasons for, and the timing
of, the change in public opinion are confirmed by petitions

to Congress, university studies, and the writings of

publicists.

Once late during its 1914 sessions and three

times during its 1916 ordinary meetings, the Chamber of

Deputies received formal petitions requesting petroleum
legislation. 45

In the academic world, petroleum exploita-

tion, particularly that in Coraodoro Rivadavia, was the

topic of a seminar directed by Dr. Ricardo Davel in the

Faculty of Economic Sciences of the University of Buenos
Aires in 1916. 4

Among the publicists, two names stand out,

Ricardo Oneto and Enrique Hermitte.

* 4 Hermitte,

Oneto was a journalist

Estado de la cuestion petroleo , 20.

45 Diputados, Diario, 1914, III, 899, from "La
Asociacion latinoamericana" ; Ibid . , 1916, I, 605, from more
than 80 residents of Comodoro Rivadavia; Ibid . , 1916, II,
1342, from the "Comite Radical de la circunscripcidn 13a de
la Capital Federal"; Ibid . , 1916, III, 2476, from 1000
citizens of La Plata, B.A. Prov.
46 Two of the theses which resulted from this seminar
and which will be referred to later are Carlos Arguero's
Petroleo s argentinos (Buenos Aires: f N.p., 1916), and
Jose Mendez's El petroleo en la republica argentina

(Buenos Aires:" N.p., 191677
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who became known as the "Centinela" of Argentine petroleum
for the campaign he began in 1915 and pursued over 25 years
to defend the nation* s interests in its oil resources. 47

Hermitte, as we have seen, was chief of the National Bureau
of Mines throughout this period as well as a member of the

Petroleum Commission from its inception in 1910. 48
As of 1916, the petroleum issue had not yet been

politicized to the point where organized groups took up the
banner on one side or the other.

Nonetheless, among the

scattered sources cited above, there is evidence of the
same consensus in behalf of state participation in petroleum

development already noted in Congressional bills.

Of the

four petitions to the Chamber, the one submitted in 1914

supported the state industry in Comodoro Rivadavia, and the
remaining three were specific requests that Deputy De

Veyga's bill be sanctioned. 49

Out of Dr. Davel's 1916

47 For the best summary of Oneto's views up to 1916, see
his El centinela , una camp an a de veinticinco arfos en defensa
del petr61e o argentino y_ de yacimientos petroliteros
fTscales , 1915 - 1941 (Buenos Aires: Editorial "El Ateneo"
1941) , 64-145.
48 A good summary of Hermitte' s position may be found in
his Estado de la cuestion petr^leo , 5-33.
49 The fact that three of the four petitions supported

but
the same bill suggests some sort of organized movement,
The petitions
I have no evidence beyond this one fact.
carried
could have been a result of the propaganda campaign
proposal.
on by Ricardo Oneto who favored the De Veyga
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seminar came two theses which recommended the mixed-company
formula to protect the nation's interests and avoid prej-

udicial action by the trusts. 50
Oneto was the most prolific propagandist favoring state
exploitation.

In newspaper articles and pamphlets he urged

upon his readers the economic significance of having a

domestic petroleum supply, both for the savings it represented as a substitute for imported coal and as the basis
for industrial development.

Oneto maintained that the

foreign trusts were the immediate threat to be countered,
and that the best solution was state exploitation in the
federal reserve in accordance with the De Veyga proposal. 5 ^

Hermitte, likewise, promoted state exploitation within the

reserve zone and private activity without.

Before the First

National Congress on Engineering in 1916, he argued that
state exploitation would yield financial profits as well as
a direct role in solving questions related to the utiliza-

tion of oil produced, the creation of reserves, and the
52
avoidance of monopolies.

50 Arguero, Petroleos argentinos

,

63-66b; Mendez, El

petroleo , 113-123.
51 0neto, Centinela , 64-145.
Oneto' s connection with the
De Veyga cited Oneto as the
De Veyga bill was a close one.
source of the ideas it contained. Ibid . , 56.
52 Hermitte, Estado de la cuestion petroleo

,

15-26.

While the Argentine Congress and public
opinion thus
began to show an awareness of the problems
and possibilities
presented by petroleum development, the state
industry
was

trudging along at an agonizingly slow pace.

Statistics

show a substantial increase in crude oil production,
from
3,293 m3 in 1910 to 129,890 m 3 in 1916. 53 Still, the
latter
figure represented only about 5% of the amount estimated
as

necessary to dispense with imported coal. 54

Obviously,

this often cited goal was far from fulfillment.

Meager though the results seem to be, they are not inexplicable.

The problems facing the Petroleum Commission

when it took over in April 1911 were sufficient to try the
expertise of a well-financed and experienced firm, let
alone that of an honorary commission with 500,000 $m/n at
its disposal.

Every phase of the industry had to be organ-

ized, outfitted, and manned; exploration, extraction, storage, transportation, distribution, and even the provision of

drinking water.

To further complicate the task, the

Commission had to work under less than ideal conditions; an

uncertain Executive policy, little or no Congressional
support, and a cloud of public doubt and mistrust.

53 BIP, No.
54 D.

G.

9

(April 1925)

,

Above

755.

de Explotacion, Informe, febrero de 1916, 9.
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all, however, was the lack of money.

Time and again the

Commission's pleas for funds fell on deaf
ears in the
Congress. As the Commission's President
explained in 1916,
if the State wants results from the
work in Comodoro
Rivadavia,
it should endow the exploitation work

with the resources necessary to develop
it in accord with the needs of the
country and the value of the deposit....
We do not hesitate in stating that if
any of our requests had been fully
satisfied, production would be two or
three times greater than it now is. 55

Scant allotments forced the Commission to delay acquisitions and prevented commercially significant production

until 191^. 56

Even the European war which created an interest in and
a need for national fuels raised difficulties for the state
agency.

The arrival of machinery on order from Europe was

delayed, and prices on materials from that part of the

world generally rose.

More importantly, the war forced up

freight rates and seriously impeded the purchase of

55ibid.

,

8-9.

5 6 Ibid.

,

11-12

i

also Memoria

,

1

912/1913, 55-56.
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petroleum tankers. 57
Despite the unimpressive record of the state industry,
the picture should not be regarded as completely
negative.

That the firm survived this initial period with the difficulties it faced was an accomplishment in itself.

By

February 1916, there were 21 actively producing wells in
the reserve zone and a dozen more being drilled.

Storage

facilities had been installed in the fields and in Buenos
Aires.

Two tankers, one rented and the other on loan from

the Naval Ministry, supplied transport while two ships were

on order from United States firms.

State-produced petroleum

was being used by the Naval Ministry and other government
agencies, by the Municipality of Buenos Aires, and by

several private concerns. 58

In short, the Petroleum

Commission had proven that exploitation in Comodoro
-

Rivadavia was a feasible and potentially profitable undertaking given proper guidance and capital investment.

Whatever the record of state operations, it did not
suffer in comparison to that of the private sector.

After

the 1907 discovery, there was no private petroleum produc-

tion until 1916 when two companies in the Comodoro Rivadavia

57 D. G. de Explotacio'n, Informe , febrero de 1916 ,

12-13.
58 Ibid .

383-388.

,

3-5; and YPF, Desarrollo de la industria ,
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region managed a total output of 7,771 3 59
m .

Some

observers then and later attributed this
fact to speculation
by private interests, and there is some truth
to
this prop-

osition. 60

However, there are other factors which were in-

fluential in determining the attitude of prospective
investors, factors which suggest why speculation may
have been a

more attractive venture than industrial activity itself.
The traditional reticence of domestic capital toward

mining activity has been mentioned.

One commentator has

pointed to the lack of public confidence in the importance
of the deposits and perhaps in the quality of the petroleum
as the key consideration. 61

It would seem, however, that

the uncertain legal climate was the essential deterrent to

private investment.

Capital in the amounts demanded by the

petroleum industry requires a stable atmosphere wherein the
investor's rights and duties are clearly understood, and the
chances of profit outweigh the risks involved.
tions were absent in Argentina at that time.

Such condi-

Existing

legislation was unsuitable, and there was no certainty about

59 BIP, Dec.

1936, 19-20.

60p or a strong statement of this thesis, see Marcos
Kaplan's E conomia y_ pol^tica del petro'leo argentino , 1939 1956 (Buenos Aires: Praxis, 1957), 17-18.

^Carlos Velarde, "El fomento de

la explotacio'n del
yacimiento petrolifero de Comodoro Rivadavia," La
Ingenieria , No. 388 (July 1914), 226.

the direction reform would take.

State exploitation was

proceeding without an exact statement of its
aims.

Private

investors did not know, for instance, whether
state production was intended principally for supplying the
State's
needs, or whether the State would enter the market
in active

competition with private producers.

Pleas for legislation

to correct this situation and encourage private investment

emanated from several informed sources, including the Petroleum Commission, but they met with no response. 62

Under

these circumstances, private capital could hardly have con-

sidered the Argentine petroleum industry a worthwhile risk.

When Hipolito Yrigoyen entered the Casa Rosada at the
head of the triumphant Radical procession in 1916, his ad-

ministration encountered a petroleum question similar in

many respects to that which faced the Figueroa Alcorta administration in December 19 07.

Comodoro Rivadavia was still

the only site where petroleum had been brought to the sur-

face by drilling.

Nine years of experimentation and patch-

work policy-making had left unsolved the essential question
as to who was to exploit the deposits and under what condi-

tions.

Clearly, the new government

whatever formula it desired.

v/as

free to implement

Only the budding national

62 D. G. de Explotacion, Memoria , 1912 / 1913
4; also
Informe, f ebrero de 1916 , 15; Velarde, "El fomento de la
explotacion," 226-22 8; Hermitte, Estado de la cuestion
petroleo , 16-17, 23-31; Mendez, El petroleo , 112-130.
,
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consensus on state participation imposed
limits on the
Radical's freedom of choice. Even here,
there was considerable latitude, since there was no agreement
on exactly
how the State should intervene. A complete
state withdrawal,
leaving the industry to private capital under
existing
legislation, was the sole avenue apparently closed on

October 12, 1916.

If the Radicals intended new directions

for Argentine economic development, petroleum policy was
one

area for relatively unrestricted action.

CHAPTER
YRIGOYEN It

II

A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT A POLICY

Argentina's 1916 presidential election was unique in
the nation's post-1880 political experience.

Thirty-six

years of conservative incumbency in both the national and

provincial governments had turned the election of a President into a perfunctory affair which served to legitimize
the elite's monopoly over choosing Chief Executives.

In

1916, matters were different for two related reasons.

First, it was the first presidential election conducted

under the 1912 electoral reform law (Law 8871)

;

and

secondly, because the provisions of that enactment largely

fulfilled the long-standing demand of the Union Civica
Radical (UCR)

for guarantees against electoral fraud, that

party nominated candidates for President and Vice President
and, for the first time, went to the polls in their behalf.

On April 2, 1916, the Radicals successfully contested the

oligarchy's stranglehold over the presidency, and on
October 12, they triumphantly escorted their caudillo, the
inscrutable Hipolito Yrigoyen, into the Casa Rosada.

Few if any Argentines knew what to expect from the new
administration.

Past declarations from the party were of no
36

37

help, since the only objectives ever referred
to were
,

suffrage reform and some vague utterances about fulfilling
the 1853 Constitution.

The party's electoral platform in

1916 typified the lack of clarity with which the UCR

spelled out its intentions.

Despite demands from within

the party, and from the opposition press, for concrete

proposals, 1 the national nominating convention approved a
simple reaffirmation of party principles and declared the

Radical's intent to govern "according to the high purposes
of the Constitution justly implemented in its spirit and

letter,..." 2

Petroleum policy was characterized by the same lack of
definition which made the Radical Party's program a subject
of speculation.

On this issue, three years of UCR control

would prove that the enigma of October 1916 stemmed from the
absence of a coherent, long-range policy on the part of the

new administration.

Though confronted with both the need

and the opportunity to formulate new legislation and revi-

talize the existing state enterprise, Yrigoyen did not

clarify his government's policy until September 1919 when

^For comment from the opposition press, see La Prensa
March 29, 1916, p. 7; La Vanguardia February 4, 1916, p. 1,
March 28, 1916, p. 4, March 29, 1916, p. 4. For dissent
within t^he party, see Isaias R. Amado, "Contribucion para la
redaccion de y un programa de partido," Revista Argentina de
Ciencias Politicas , XII (1916), 91-110.
,

,

2 La

Prensa, March 22, 1916, p. 12.
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he presented two bills to Congress.

Meanwhile, three

precious years slipped by without
progress in either of
these critical areas.
Prior to 1916, the Radical record
on petroleum was an
inconsistent one. Three UCR Deputies
submitted petroleum
bills before Yrigoyen's election,
and each put

forth a dif-

ferent framework for exploitation.

Alfredo Demarchi

supported mixed companies in his 1914 bill.

Toma's de

Veyga

focused on eliminating foreign capital in
1914, and Carlos
F. Melo, in 1916 opted for
federalization of
all oil

.

deposits and a state monopoly over their exploitation. 3

While there was an obvious lack of agreement here,
these bills indicated that at least some Radicals were
con-

cerned about the need for petroleum legislation.

This fact

was emphasized, by a draft proposal for a party program presented to the 1916 Radical nominating convention as a minority report from the Platform Committee.

Section VI of the

draft called for numerous legislative changes, including

reform of the Mining Code and, particularly, special legislation on petroleum exploitation.

4

The road was open for Yrigoyen to introduce whatever

policies he favored concerning either legislation or the
state oil company.

3 See

The Chamber's special committee assigned

Chapter I, 22-23.

^Amado, "Contribucion, " 104.
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to study petroleum legislation postponed
making a recommen-

dation during the 1916 sessions, preferring
to await the
president-elect's initiatives. The members of the
Petroleum
Commission likewise sought to facilitate the
new government's activity by tendering their resignations
shortly
after Yrigoyen's inauguration.

5

The fact that the Radicals

controlled neither house of Congress until they gained

a

majority in the Chamber in 1918 was a problem to be
reckoned
with, but it in no way prevented Yrigoyen from making
his

plans public.

If the administration was going to run into

Congressional opposition, that could be faced after placing
concrete proposals in the legislators' hands.
Given the opportunity to adopt new policies, it was im-

perative that Yrigoyen and his advisors do so immediately,
because a growing fuel scarcity arising out of WW
taking its toll in Argentina.

I

was

During the early years of the

war, a severe decline in coal imports from England was

partially compensated for by increased imports of coal,
crude oil and petroleum by-products from the United States.

When the U.S. also became embroiled in the European conflict and, like England, sharply reduced fuel exports, the
fuel supply problem reached crisis proportions.

5

^

The

La Prensa, October 20, 1916, p. 11.

^Argentina imported over four million tons of coal in
(Ernesto Tornquist &
1913, and in 1917 only 707,700 tons.
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price of coal shot up at an alarming rate, and
eventually it
became unavailable at almost any price. By winter's
end in

1917, coal commanded 90 $m/n a ton, or five times as much
as

before the war. 7

Nearly every phase of national life was affected by
the fuel shortage.

Home owners, industries and public

service enterprises, railroads and farmers and cattlemen

whose produce traveled to market by rail, and the Naval
squadron were among the sectors hardest hit.

8

The Buenos

Aires press constantly referred to the "fuel crisis",
and President Yrigoyen, in his message opening the 1917

Congressional sessions, assured the nation that the fuel
supply was a primary government concern, and that every-

thing possible was being done to find domestic sources
of coal and wood.^

Cia. , Business Conditions in the Argentine Report 143
(December 30, 1918) , 23 .
Similar declines were recorded
with respect to other fuels, as coke imports descended from
21,317,500 kilos in 1913 to 3,903,900 kilos in 1917.
Finally, crude oil imports slid from 120,700 m in
( Ibid .
1916 to 10,800 m3 in 1918.
La Prensa , October 15, 1969,
p. 7 (Centennial supplement)
,

)

)

7 La

Epoca

,

August

8,

1917, p. 1.

^United States, Department of State, Records Relating
to the Internal Affairs of Argentina, 1910 - 1929 (hereinafter
National Archives Microcopy 514, Dearing to
cited RRIAA)
Johnson, October 5, 1918, 835.50/10, enclosure.
,

9

Hipolito Yrigoyen, Pueblo y_ gobierno
Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1956) ,*"lV, 114.

,

2 nd

ed.

(Buenos

Comodoro Rivadavia's allegedly vast
petroleum wealth
would have been the best alternative
to imported coal, but
production was simply insufficient to
cover a significant
share of the national fuel needs. So
heavy did the demand
for domestic petroleum become, that
the Petroleum

Commissior

in October 1917, informed its private
customers that they

would have to find new suppliers because the
state enterprise felt compelled to concentrate on provisioning

govern-

ment agencies and public service firms. 10

Despite La Razon'

biting comment that this resembled "a doctor who advises
his patients to employ the services of a quack," 11
the un-

avoidable fact was that the domestic petroleum industry was
unequal to the task of replacing foreign fuels.

While some consumers sougiit relief through the use of

vegetable fuels like corn and wheat bran, 12 the most frequently suggested alternatives were domestic coal and wood.
Unfortunately, there were disadvantages with both which
limited their effectiveness in providing a solution to
the fuel crisis.

In the case of coal, the problem was one

of locating deposits that could be exploited economically.

Efforts by the Naval and Public Works Ministries to unearth

1Q La Razon , October 18,

1917, p.

3.

11 Ibid.
1

5

RRIAA Dearing to Johnson, October
835.50/10, enclosure, 3.
,

5,

1918,

coal in the National Territory of Neuquen and
along the

Atlantic coast near Puerto Deseado and San Julian all
ended
in failure. 13

As for wood, the drawback was one of accessibility.

Most of the nation's forests were located far from the fuel
consuming centers, and the railroads lacked a sufficient

number of cars to transport the wood. 14

Clearly, the only

hope for successful import substitution lay with expanding

petroleum production.

Even if this proved impossible during

the war, the urgency of the task would not disappear with

peace.

As long as Argentina remained dependent upon

foreign fuels, she would be inviting another fuel crisis.

The Yrigoyen administration, early in its career, gave

indications that it planned to institute remedial measures
in the petroleum field.

Honorio Pueyrredon, a distinguished

lawyer, law professor, and long-time Yrigoyen supporter, was
the President's choice for Minister of Agriculture and

therefore responsible for petroleum matters.

In an inter-

view with La Prensa the day after Yrigoyen' s inauguration,
Pueyrredon stated that he considered petroleum exploitation
a question of vital importance and disclosed that he had

i

-)

La Epoca , October 24, 1917, p. 1.

14 La Prensa, November 24, 1917, p.
p.

6.

8;

August

2,

1917,
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just completed a two-month study
of the matter. On the
basis of his investigations,
Pueyrredo'n had formulated a
legislative proposal, but he refused
to reveal its content
until he discussed it with the
President. 15

Yrigoyen reinforced the impression
that petroleum
policy was a top priority issue for his
government,
in
December 1916, when Congress began meeting
in Extraordinary
Sessions, he submitted a bill authorizing the
administration
to issue up to 100,000,000 $m/n worth of
government bonds to
cover:
1) the creation of a national agricultural
bank,

2)

the creation of a national merchant marine,

exploitation in Comodoro Rivadavia. 16

3)

petroleum

Although no message

accompanied the bill to explain the administration's objectives or even the specific amounts destined for each of
the three areas, Pueyrredo'n later informed the Chamber that
the government would continue exploiting the federal reserve

15 La Prensa, October
13, 1916

After assuming
charge of his new duties, Pueyrredon pursued his study, canvassing the opinions of informed parties connected with both
the private and public sectors of the petroleum industry.
Among others, he spoke with the Naval Minister, Vice Admiral
Saenz V^liente, the secretary of the Petroleum Commission,
Dr. Ramon Videla, Socialist Deputy Nicola's Repetto, and two
legal representatives of private firms, Dr. Manuel Agusto
Montes de Oca of Mexical Oil and Dr. Santiago O'Farrell of
Standard Oil.
(La Epoca , January 23, 1917, p. 1; La Prensa ,
October 20, 1916, p. 11; Nicolas Repetto, Mi paso porT a
politica, de Roca a Yrigoyen (Buenos Aires: Santiago Rueda
Editor, 1956), 270-271; Arturo Frodizi, Petroleo y politica
Vol. XI of Pueblo y_ gobierno , 91.)
f/

p.

12.

,

16 Diputados, Diario,
1916, IV, 2791.

on its own, and that the requested funds
would be used
primarily for extending exploration. 17 The
Radical Minister
further promised the legislators that the
Executive Branch
would present to Congress a comprehensive bill
on petroleum
exploration and exploitation during that body's
1917

meetings. 18

Yrigoyen repeated Pueyrredon's promise of forthcoming

legislation in his message opening Congress on May
11, 1917,
and, at the same time, made revealing comments on the
sub-

ject of petroleum.

Dwelling upon the relationship between

oil and Argentine industrial growth, he sketched out the
role he envisioned for the nation's petroleum resources:
[The Executive Power] believes that
[Argentine oil] must be utilized for

the development of national industries,
but rejects the notion of accelerating
production for the purpose of exportation.
This wealth is more useful to the
country as fuel than transformed into
foreign exchange. 19

Without clarifying who would be responsible for exploration
and exploitation, Yrigoyen thus made it clear that the

petroleum itself was destined for use within the nation
and not for export.

17 Ibid

On the subject of legislation governing

1916-1917, V, 4962-4963. The Chamber career
of this bill is described later in this chapter.
. ,

18 Ibid., 4960.

19 p ue blo

y_

gobierno , IV, 114
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exploitation, the President went on to state that he would
soon be seeking Congressional approval for a measure

destined to promote industry in all
regions of the country where evidence
of oil deposits has been discovered,
and guaranteeing, at the same time,
the exploitation and preservation of
this great wealth. 20
Despite this initial burst of verbal enthusiasm, the
Radical administration failed to support its words with
deeds.

The bill Pueyrredo'n had prepared in October 1916 was

rejected by Yrigoyen, because it proposed exploitation by

mixed companies, a concept unacceptable to the President. 2 ^
While refusing his Minister's counsel, however, Yrigoyen
did not offer any general petroleum proposal of his own

until the last days of the 1919 Congressional period.

Neither, as we shall see, were any effective steps taken to
increase production in Comodoro Rivadavia.

With the exception of the money bill submitted to
Congress in December 1916, the only overt evidence of executive concern for petroleum matters prior to September 1919

consisted of a presidential tour of the Comodoro Rivadavia
installations on May 18 and 19, 1918.

20 Ibid.

,

La Epoca , the

115.

21 Frondizi, Petroleo y_ politica , 91.
I know of no
published version of the Pueyrredon bill. Frondizi's is
the only reference I have found to the bill's content, and

Frondizi cites no source.
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semi-official UCR paper, reported that since
his inauguration, President Yrigoyen had been anxious
to undertake a

personal fact-finding excursion as a preliminary
step to
drafting a program for expanding exploitation. 22

Published reports on the trip glowed with optimism
about the future of Argentine petroleum.

According to La

Epoca, Yrigoyen was convinced that the petroleum wealth of
the South was destined to transform the nation's industry,

provide work for thousands of men, and supply the govern-

ment with incalculable resources,
if the government takes the necessary
steps and provides the resources which
are indispensable to taking advantage
of the veritable fortune that nature
lavishly offers to the efforts of the

nation. 2 3
As a result of the President's visit, La Epoca assured its

readers, the necessary measures would be taken to produce
a "radical transformation" in state exploitation. 24

No such transformation materialized, and it is doubtful that Yrigoyen 's trip was designed to produce one.

More

likely, the venture was intended to dramatize the adminis-

tration's concern for petroleum development and to impress

upon the public that new policies were under study.

22 La Epoca , May 16, 1918, p. 1.
2 3 ibid .

,

May 21, 1918, p. 1.

24 Ibid.

,

May 22, 1918, p.

1.

By so

doing, the government probably hoped to take some of the

sting out of the criticism leveled at it for failing to

formulate a constructive petroleum policy.

The most persistent critic of the Radical administration was the influential Buenos Aires morning paper, La

Prensa .

Even before Yrigoyen took up residence in the Casa

Rosada, La Prensa had been an ardent advocate of domestic

petroleum development as the key to national industrial
growth and eventual economic independence."

Insofar as

the framework for exploitation was concerned, the paper was

on record as an opponent of a state monopoly and as a parti
san of state exploitation within the federal reserve com-

bined with private work in all other areas. 26
During the first year of Yrigoyen' s presidency, La

Prensa

constantly badgered the government to act on the

question of petroleum exploitation, to clarify
its thinking on this matter and eliminate
once and for all the indecisiveness and
vacillating standards which until now
have dominated this issue.... 27

The most interesting aspect of La Prensa'

campaign was the

While calling for

position taken on private capital.

legislation sufficiently liberal to attract private

25 La Prensa , June 5, 1916, p.

June 16, 1916, p.

5;

26 Ibid.

,

September 21, 1916, p.

2 7ibid.

,

November 27, 1916, p.

6;

9.

6.

June 16, 1916, p.

6
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investment, La Prensa emphasized that the capital should be

Argentine and not foreign.

Though believing that Argentina

should try to lure foreign capital and technology to simulate industrial development, La Prensa cautioned against

such a policy with respect to petroleum because of "the

nature of the business" with its unique "financial
organization." 28

In short, La Prensa was anxious to avoid

the consequences of intervention by the foreign oil

trusts. 29

As one year of government inaction stretched into two

and then nearly three, La Prensa continued to protest,

hoping that petroleum exploitation

would cease being a matter of routine,
and be included in the forefront of
those activities whose development must
be supported by the State. 30

No amount of printer's ink, however, was able to shake the
administration out of its lethargy.

28 Ibid .

,

November 27, 1916,

p.

9.

29 0neto, the publicist and supporter of Deputy De
Veyga's petroleum bill, maintained a position identical to
In a 1918 pamphlet he explained; "It is
that of La Prensa .

not, then, the intervention of foreign capital that we are
fighting, but its invervention in this particular case, because the oil business is monopolized on the world stage by
a powerful syndicate which would endanger the future of that
(Oneto, "Estudio comparativo, " printed in
public wealth."
El centinela, 160.)
30 La Prensa, May 18, 1919, p. 9.

The episode which best typifies the government's
petroleum policy, or lack thereof, prior to September
1919,

was its handling of the administrative phase of
the state
enterprise.

The Petroleum Commission's decision to resign

in October 1916 was greeted by silence from the
Minister of

Agriculture.

Only when the members reiterated their inten-

tions did Pueyrredo'n request that they continue serving until the government had time to make a full inventory of the

petroleum situation.

President Yrigoyen thought it advis-

able to maintain temporarily the existing administrative

machinery while, at the same time, declaring

a

moratorium

on new expenditures by the petroleum agency.

1

When the

president of the Commission, Alberto Schneidewind, and one
of the technical chiefs from Comodoro Rivadavia protested

that such a policy would produce

a

damaging paralysis in the

state industry, Yrigoyen relented and authorized new

spending.

a*
o
J

Even with this authorization, the members of the Petroleum Commission could not have been overjoyed at the

prospect of continued service.

Its interim status weakened

the Commission's authority and discouraged long-range

planning.

And to make matters worse, the Commission was

31 Ibid .
3

p.

9.

Ibid.

,

November 21, 1916, p.

6.

,

November 21, 1916,

6;

p.

November 27, 1916,
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under heavy fire for failing to increase state oil production.

In March 1916, La Prensa charged that the state

enterprise had for nine years been in the hands of incompetent administrators whose good reputations covered up the
errors they committed and the harm they did to national
interests. 33

On February 2, 1917, the Petroleum Commission met at
the behest of one member who felt the Commission should in-

sist upon its resignation because of remarks recently made
34
in the Chamber of Deputies.

The Commissioner was probably

provoked by a speech delivered on January 31 by one of the
leading Radical Deputies, Horacio B. Oyhanarte, who

presented a critical analysis of the development of state

exploitation since 1907.

Oyhanarte ascribed responsibility

for the lack of greater progress
to the inefficiency with which the work had
been executed, to the lack of scientific
methods, and to the fact that the commission
in charge of these matters appears neither
to have gotten beyond the trial and error
process [of the early years of state
exploitation] nor to have been much concerned
with its assigned task. 35

33 Ibid .

,

March 21, 1916, p.

6.

34 Republica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, Camara de

Antecedent
Diputados, Yacimientos petrolif eros fiscales
Imprenta de la Camar
sobre su explotacion (Buenos Aires:
dT"DlpuTados, 1924) , I, 784-785.
;

35 Diputados, Diario, 1916-1917, V, 4697.
represented the Province of Buenos Aires.

Oyhanarte

Three weeks prior to Oyhanarte's comments, the

Commission had also been under attack on the floor of the
Chamber.

During the deliberations on the budget for 1917,

the Chamber had voted to strike out the

4

8,000 $m/n alloca-

ted to pay the members of the Commission. 36

The discussion

preceding this vote elicited considerable criticism of the

Commission's conduct, particularly from the Socialists. 37

Enrique Dickmann (Socialist - Capt. Fed.), whose motion led
to the budget cut, insisted that the Minister of Agriculture

had a host of well-paid functionaires capable of handling

petroleum exploitation without the Commission which he
termed "Coraodoro Rivadavia's fifth wheel." 38
Under these circumstances, the Petroleum Commissioners

undoubtedly would have welcomed a legitimate excuse to
make their resignations irrevocable.

On September 10,

1917, President Schneidewind retired for personal reasons

and was succeeded by Enrique Herraitte.

Hermitte and the

remaining members, Gustavo Sundblad Rosetti, Juan Abella
and Adolf o Villate, continued at their posts another two

months until labor problems in Comodoro Rivadavia prompted

36 The Petroleum Commission was originally an honorary
body, but it began receiving compensation for its services

in 1914.
37

Diputados, Diario , 1916, IV, 3270; 1916-1917, V,
4084-4087.
38 Ibid.,

1916, IV, 3270.
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the acceptance of their year-old resignations.
In September 1917 there were about
1,400 laborers in

the state oil fields, 96.7% of then foreign
born. 39

Forced

to work from 10 to 14 hours daily under the
notoriously bad

climatic conditions of the Patagonian coast, living in
substandard housing, and feeling the pinch of the rising
cost
of living during the war years, the petroleum workers

followed the lead of thousands of their Argentine contem-

poraries and went on strike. 40
On September 27, 1917, the workers presented a list of

demands to the administrators in Comodoro Rivadavia which

included an eight-hour day for all workers, a 25% salary increase for those receiving less than

4

$m/n a day and a 15%

pay hike for the rest, and time-and-a-half for overtime and
Sundays. 41x

Two days later, in the face of management

silence, the work stoppage began.

The employees of the two

39 The bulk of the foreign workers, 49.8% of the total

work force, was of Spanish, Portuguese or Russian origin.
The remainder was drawn from eighteen other non-Argentine
nationalities. The administrative staff was markedly more
Argentine in origin with 78 of 161 positions filled by
natives. La Prensa , October 4, 1917, p. 8.
40 For information on labor conditions, see La Vanguardia
,
November 1, 1917, p. 1; La Prensa , November 1, 1917, p. 8;
Asencio Abeijon, H Las palmer as huelgas petroleras , " printed
in Medio siglo de petroleo argentino (Comodoro Rivadavia:
Editorial "El Rivadavia", 1957) , 41-4 3
41 La Epoca September 29, 1917, p. 2,
,
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private companies then operative in
the region immediately
joined the state workers, and petroleum
production throughout the area was effectively halted.
Despite official fears to the contrary,
the strike was
not marred by serious outbreaks of 'violence.
At the request
of the Petroleum Commission and the
management of the private
firms, naval personnel supplemented the
efforts of
the small

local law-keeping force to patrol the oil fields
and maintain order. 42

The strike lasted through October and into mid-November

before the workers' persistence paid off in the form of
a
favorable settlement.

Meetings in Buenos Aires between

a committee of strikers and the Minister of Agriculture

produced agreement by November 10 on an eight-hour day for
all personnel-, a pay raise of 20% for those earning less

than

4

$m/n a day and a 15% hike for all others, and 30%

extra for overtime.

42

In addition, the government promised to

La Prensa , October 4, 1917, p. 8. At various times
throughout the strike, sailors from three vessels aided the
police. There were definite indications that the strikers
were not pleased with the conduct of the military personnel.
On one occasion, the government felt obliged to conceal the
destination of one Naval ship headed for Comodoro Rivadavia
for fear that if the strikers found out it would provoke an
uprising.
(La Epoca , October 24, 1917, p. 1.)
Early in
November, a committee of strikers in Buenos Aires to discuss
a strike settlement with government officials protested to
the Naval Minister about the conduct of the military police,
and, particularly, about the practice of positioning machine
guns around the petroleum fields.
(La Prensa , November 3,
1917, p. 5, November 5, 1917, p. 8; La Razon, November 2,

set up a consumer's cooperative in the oil fields, enforce
the law governing work accidents in Comodoro Rivadavia, and

improve the workers' living quarters. 43
It was the manner in which the strike was settled

rather than the provisions of the agreement which led to the

Executive Decrees of November 14, 1917, accepting the resignations of the Petroleum Commissioners. 44

When the strike

dragged into late October with no solution in sight,

Minister of Agriculture Pueyrredon undercut the Commission
by entrusting the matter to a three-man committee composed
of the commanders of two Naval vessels then in Comodoro

Rivadavia and the administrative chief of the state oil
fields, Leopoldo Sol. 45

It was under the guidance of this

group, and through direct negotiations between the committee

of strikers and the Minister of Agriculture, that the

strike was finally settled.

1917, p. 1; La Epoca , November 2, 1917, p. 1.)
43 La Prensa , November 10, 1917, p. 10; La Razon ,
November 10, 1917, p. 3.
44 YPF,

Recopilacio'n , I, 74-75.

45 La Prensa , October 25, 1917, p. 5; La Epoca , October
27, 1917, p. 1, October 30, 1917, p. 1.
46 From available evidence, it appears that Yrigoyen
himself played a significant role in bringing the strike to
On November 7, a messenger arrived in the Capital
a close.
from the Commander of the "Rivadavia", Capitan de Navio

Darieaux, who was presiding over the three-man committee
appointed to settle the strike. Darieaux' s report on

55

If there had been any doubt about the
Petroleum Com-

mission's fate before the strike, there could have
been none
once Pueyrredo'n had removed negotiations from its
hands.

The Minister's action amounted to a public disavowal of
his

subordinates in charge of petroleum exploitation.

Having

suffered heavy criticism while forced to work with limited
funds and reduced authority, the Commissioners probably

welcomed the acceptance of their resignations.

Leopoldo

Sol, the administrative chief in the oil fields, completed

the sweep of upper level officials responsible for state

exploitation when he too resigned. 4 ^
The man chosen to replace Sol, first temporarily then
on a permanent basis, was Capital de Fragata Felipe Fliess.
There was nothing in the background of the thirty-nine year

old Fliess which indicated a particular competence for his

new post.

He had compiled a distinguished record at the

Naval Academy (1906)

,

progressed regularly through the

officer ranks, and served recently, from 1914 to 1916, as a
professor and subdirector at the Naval Academy.

Fliess 's

conditions in Comodoro Rivadavia was delivered to an
audience of President Yrigoyen and his Ministers of Agricul
ture and Navy. According to La Prensa after hearing the
report, Yrigoyen gave instructions for ending the conflict.
Two days later t/ on November 9, an agreement was reached be(La Prensa
tween Pueyrredon and the strike committee.
November 8, 1917, p. 9.)
,

,

47 YPF, Recopilacio'n , 75-76.

appointment apparently resulted from his service as the

Commander of the "San Martin" which was sent to Comodoro
Rivadavia in April 1917 to protect the coastline of the petroleum installations.

During his month in the area,

Fliess compiled and submitted to the Naval Minister a confidential report on conditions in the oil fields.

Fliess

stated to La Epoca that he felt the report had influenced
his selection as the new Comodoro Rivadavia chief. 48

Whatever Fliess' s personal qualifications for the
position, his appointment was a manifestation of the Navy's

interest in domestic petroleum development.

Understandably,

the Navy considered the Patagonian deposits as a valuable

fuel source for its fleet.

In fact, Law 7,059 which

authorized state exploitation in 1910 stipulated that one of
the objectives was to provide fuel for the squadron.

Dur-

ing the 1917 strike, naval personnel not only policed the

state fields, but they also submitted a steady flow of

reports on the strike's progress to the Naval Minister.

49

His offices were as involved as those of the Minister of

Agriculture in eventually ending the dispute.

48 La Epoca , November 13, 1917, p.

Fliess 's

3.

49 It is interesting to note La Epoca'
justification
for the use of naval officials in seeking a solution to the
strike. When La Prensa questioned the wisdom of this idea,
La Epoca responded saying that La Prensa knows "that it is
tHe duty of the military authorities to intervene in such

matters when all possible attempts at peaceful settlement

appointment, therefore, consummated the long-standing
naval
concern with petroleum matters, and, further, it
established
a precedent for military leadership of the state
petroleum

agency which continued unbroken until 19 32.

After the dismissal of the Petroleum Commission, La
Razon reported assurances from the Minister of Agriculture
that a thorough reform of the state petroleum agency was

under consideration, 50 and La Prensa commented that Fliess's

appointment was temporary, and that a definitive reorganization would result from a personal fact-finding mission to

Comodoro Rivadavia by President Yrigoyen. 51

These stories

were more wishful thinking than accurate reporting.

There

was no major overhaul of the state company in 1917, nor
indeed would there be any until Yrigoyen* s term had nearly

expired five years thence.
Instead of filling the vacant seats on the Petroleum
Commission, the Minister of Agriculture assumed direct

responsibility for state exploitation.

Officials in

Comodoro Rivadavia and Buenos Aires, all of whom were

have failed. M
(La Prensa
October 27, 1917, p. 1.)

,

October 26, 1917, p.

50 La Razon, November
15,
.

—~

1917, p. 1.

'

51 La Prensa, November
14, 1917, p. 9.

8;

La Epoca ,

58

directly responsible to the Minister
shared the administrative duties of the enterprise. With
Fliess
in charge in

the South, the Buenos Aires offices
were entrusted to a
"gerente" appointed by the Minister. Enrique
V. Plate
served briefly in this capacity until he
was replaced by
Sebastian L. Flores in December 1917.
Essentially, the

"gerentes" were discharging the duties formerly
handled by
the Petroleum Commission. 52
In short, instead of grasping the opportunity
to place

state exploitation under the direction of an autonomous

bureau of technically competent men prepared to advance the
government industry, the Yrigoyen administration resorted to
a jerry-built structure ill-designed to produce anything

but stagnation.

Argentina's pastoral economy burdened the

Minister of Agriculture with too many problems to allow him
to exercise effectively direct responsibility for petroleum

exploitation.

When Colonel Enrique Mosconi assumed control

of the state petroleum concern in 1922, he singled out the

post-1917 administrative structure as the source of many of
the difficulties experienced by the firm:

This original framework of Minister and
Director General in one is, in my judgment,

2 The

best summary of the administrative changes made
during this period is presented in a report drawn up by the
"gerente" of the state agency in 1922 and printed in
y
Diputados, Yacimientos petrolif eros fiscales Antecendentes
I, 162-163.
->

;

,

59

the cause of all the difficulties and
the source of all the deficiencies and
confusion that can be seen in state exploitation, ... . As is logical, the
serious error committed in Buenos Aires
had to have repercussions in Comodoro
Rivadavia. 53
Thus, by September 1919, nearly three years after

Yrigoyen's inauguration, there was no marked change in the
status of domestic petroleum development.

Despite promises

of reform, it is clear that Yrigoyen led his party to power

with no precise program for immediate implementation.

He

and his advisors formulated no long-range policy, but simply

acted on a day-to-day basis, adjusting to situations as
they arose.

While it is not intended here to justify the government's apathetic attitude, certain considerations make it
at least understandable.

First, in order for domestic pe-

troleum production to have expanded significantly, Argentina

would have had to acquire machinery, pipelines, transport
tankers, and other industrial equipment, and to attract

heavy investment into the private sector of the industry.
But Argentina lacked the metallurgical industry to provide
the necessary heavy machinery, and the war made it all but

Mosconi's comment was part of a report
641.
he submitted to Minister of Agriculture Tom^s Le Breton on
February 23, 1923.
5

Ibid.

,

impossible to secure it from abroad. 54

with respect to

private investment, the war nearly eliminated
new foreign
capital as a factor in the Argentine economy,
and domestic
savings shied away from industrial ventures.
Most of the
unusual profits earned by the rural and industrial
sectors
because of the wartime situation were invested in
government paper, bonds, and treasury notes, and served
to pay

current government expenses rather than to stimulate
industrial growth. 55

Given these conditions, the administration

may have felt that any attempt to stimulate oil production
was futile until the war was over.
Indirectly, the war contributed in a second way to de-

laying action on petroleum policy.

When Yrigoyen's Foreign

Minister, Dr. Carlos Becu, resigned in February 1917, his
duties were assumed on an interim basis by Minister of

Agriculture Pueyrredon who filled both offices until September 1918.

Undoubtedly, the responsibilities of the

Foreign Office during these war months severely taxed

54 Government publications prior to 1919 consistently
referred to this problem as a major stumbling block to in-

creasing production. Republica Argentina, Ministerio de
Agricultura, (hereinafter cited M,. de Agric.) , Memoria
1917 (Buenos Aires: Talleres Graficos del Ministerio de
Agricultura, 1920) , 291; D. G. de Explotacion, Memoria
1918 , 4-5; Memoria 1919, 3.
,

,

,

55 Joseph S. Tulchin, "The Argentine Economy During the
First World War," The Review of the River Plate , No. 3750
(June 19, 1970), 901-903, No. 375T~(June 30, 1970) , 965967, No. 3752 (July 10, 1970), 44-46.
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Pueyrredon's time, diverting energies which otherwise

might have been devoted to clarifying the government's
petroleum policy. Furthermore, the ministerial change
through which Alfredo Demarchi succeeded Pueyrredo'n
deprived the Agricultural Department of the continuity
which
is essential to effective policy formulation.

A third inhibiting factor was Yrigoyen's highly personal manner of conducting governmental business.

Relying

little on his Ministers, and much less on his lower subordinates, he ran the government with the same authoritarian

hand that ruled the UCR.

Working at the same slow and

cautious pace which marked his conspiratorial days,

Yrigoyen often delayed the transaction of government business
by insisting that he directly oversee all matters.

Petro-

leum policy would be defined when he, personally, had time
for it. 56

Though the Executive Branch cannot be exonerated for
its failure to formulate a petroleum policy, Congress too

must share the blame for the lack of petroleum legislation

S^Manuel Galvez, Vida de Hipolito Yrigoyen
El hombre
del misterio (Buenos Aires
Editorial Tor, 1945), 182,
200-201 211 . Galvez attributes both Yrigoyen's slowness
to act ana his authoritarian bent to a basically introverted
personality. He relates an incident which is indicative of
Yrigoyen's concept of his role as President. When asked
why he had chosen so many lesser lights for Ministers,
Yrigoyen allegedly replied, "Because I was the President, I
Ibid
was the Vice President, and I was the Cabinet."
;

:

,

(

182.)

.
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and for the limited funds with which the state industry
was
forced to function.

The same pressures which demanded

results from the national executive - the need for an im-

mediate increase in petroleum production and the obvious
inadequacy of existing petroleum legislation

-

dictated that

the legislators apply their collective talents to solving
the problem.

While it was advisable for Congress to delay passing

legislation until the President's opinions were known, it

was neither necessary nor prudent to wait three years.

By

taking the initiative and presenting the Casa Rosada with
a fait accompli in the form of an enactment embodying its

own designs, Congress could have forced the issue on
Yrigoyen, placing him in a position of having either to

accept their plan or offer an alternative.
ever, chose to remain silent.

Congress, how-

The Senate, displaying a

lack of sensitivity to public needs incredible for a repre-

sentative body, never even discussed petroleum legislation.

And the Chamber, while showing more awareness of the precarious national fuel situation, did not sanction the sorely

needed general bill on exploration and exploitation of

petroleum resources.
The absence of partisan control over the legislative

machinery was one factor which militated aginst prompt
and productive attention to petroleum or any issue.

servative domination in the Senate was unchallenged.

Con-

63

Before 1920 , the Socialists could claim
one and the
Radicals never more than four of the
thirty seats in the
Upper House. 57 In the chamber cofttrol
,
shifted as a CQn _
sequence of the 1918 Congressional elections.

The anti-

administration forces held the upper hand prior
to 1918
with 67 votes to 48 for the Radicals. After
the 1918

elections, the new alignment showed the Radicals
ascendant
with 61 seats to 50 for the Conservatives
(44)

and the

Socialists (6). 58
The prospects for any one group or party guiding

legislation through this political maze were slim at best.
The Radicals could rely on stiff Senate opposition to

almost any measure bearing the UCR label, and the

57 Roberto Etchepareborda, "Yrigoyen
y el congreso,"
printed in Pueblo y_ gobierno , IV, 62-63.

58 The

figures presented here do not total 120, the
legal size of the Chamber during these years, because
seats left vacant have not been included. The Radicals
improved their position slightly between 1918 and 1919 by
electing two more members to the Chamber in off-year contests, while the Conservatives gained one more seat. The
figures on the composition of the Chamber have been compiled
on the basis of election statistics published by the Argentine Ministry of the Interior in 194 6, Las fuerzas armadas
restituyen el imperio de la soberania popular Tomo I
(Buenos Aires:
Imprenta d~e la Camara de Diputados, 1946).
The Conservatives are referred to with an upper case "C M
despite the fact that there was no national Conservative
Party, but a coalition of provincial representatives from a
variety of local political organizations that shared
roughly the same political views and cooperated on a
national level when circumstances demanded it, such as in
the case of presidential elections.
,

Conservative-Socialist anti-administration
bloc could not
be counted on to cooperate
on anything save opposition
to
the Radicals.
Only if partisan considerations
were transcended could Congress have been
expected to approach its
law-making task productively.
The Chamber's only debate on
petroleum legislation
prior to 1919, and indeed the only
major petroleum debate
before 1927, stemmed from the bill
introduced by Radical
Deputy Carlos F. Melo in July 1916.
At that time, Melo
proposed federalization of the nation's
oil deposits,
creation of a state monopoly over their
exploitation, and
the expropriation of all oil
concessions previously made by
the national or provincial governments.
On August

1

of the following year, Melo and a Conser-

vative Deputy, Rodolfo Moreno (Buenos Aires Prov.)

,

sub-

mitted what was essentially a revised version of the
1916
bill.

The new proposal included iron ore and coal deposits

along with petroleum and provided for the federalization
of
all three.

Their exploitation would be regulated by special

legislation to be passed later.
was to be retained, and Article

The expropriation clause
9

of the Mining Code which

prohibited mineral exploitation by the national or
provincial governments would be declared null and void. 59

59 Diputados, Diario, 1917, III, 45-47.

The term "federalization" will be used throughout this study to mean the

Displaying an efficiency which is seldom
characteristic of Congressional committees,
perhaps because Melo himself was a member, the Committee on
Legislation reported
the bill out just nine days after it
was introduced. 60

Other matters occupied the Chamber's attention
during the
waning weeks of the 1917 sessions, however,
and the bill
did not reach the debate stage.
After going back to the Committee, the measure
again
was sent to the floor on June 12, 1918, 61 and
was debated
intermittently over the next several weeks.

The bill was

not identical to the Melo-Moreno proposal since the
Radical

dominated Committee stipulated that the special legislation
on exploitation would guarantee to the provinces a share of
the profits made from any development of the three minerals

within their respective borders, and that all concessions
made before July 1, 1918 would be respected. 62
The debate was inconclusive since the 1918 sessions

closed before the bill could be brought to a vote.

Yet, in

view of the fact that the discussion focused on the

extension of federal legal jurisdiction over provincial
oil deposits. The term "nationalization" is not being
employed because the extension of federal jurisdiction did
not mean the national government actually would exploit the
petroleum deposits.
60 Ibid.,

296.

61 Ibid., 1918, I,
6 2 ibid.

,

636,

382.

One member of the Committee, Francisco

66

constitutionality of federalizing mineral
deposits, a key
and controversial issue, it cannot be
argued that the Chamber
wasted its time. With Deputies Antonio
de Tomaso (Socialist - capt. Fed.) and Carlos Melo arguing
that federalization was within constitutional limits, and
Deputies Alberto
Arancibia Rodriguez (Conservative - San Luis) and
Matias

G.

Sanchez Sorondo (Conservative - B.A. Prov.) holding

forth in opposition, the cases were presented
clearly on
both sides.
Sanchez Sorondo and Arancibia Rodriguez contended that

federalization would constitute an affront to provincial
autonomy, robbing the provinces of control over their

mineral resources.

While supporting this proposition, the

two Conservative Deputies posed as the defenders of pro-

vincial rights against incursions by the national government.

Their position was that the Argentine provinces

preceded the nation as legal entities, that the Constitution
of 1853 was written by provincial representatives, and
that, in the Constitution, provincial sovereignty was

protected by reserving to the provinces those powers not
delegated to the national government (Article 104)

.

This

sovereignty, they argued, was inextricably tied to

Uriburu, a Salta conservative, refused to sign the bill and
presented his own proposal to the Chamber instead.
(Ibid., 1917, V, 264-272.)

67

territorial integrity, because, as Arancibia
Rodriguez
put it,

without territory there wouid be no
provinces,..., [and] because it is
impossible to conceive of either a
political entity or an autonomous
government that controls its territory through foreign laws or authorities other than those who represent
the sovereignty itself. 63
From these premises, it was but a short step to the

conclusion that since federalization of mineral deposits
involved interference with provincial territorial integrity,
it also impinged on provincial sovereignty and was, there-

fore, contrary to the Constitution. 64

The two Conservative Deputies further argued that

federalization violated the spirit as well as the letter of
the Constitution.

Such a measure, they contended, was more

suited to the tastes of the 19th century "unitarious" than
the federalists who drew up the basic charter.

Sanchez

Sorondo warned the Chamber that federalization was another
in the series of laws passed in the last three decades which

had established a dangerous trend toward centralization of

power in the hands of the national government.

It was a

trend he abhorred

63 Ibid,,

1918, I, 653.

^4

For the constitutional arguments of Arancibia
Rodriguez and Sanchez Sorondo, see Ibid. 647-657.
,

68
»

because it leads us astray from wise
practices, because it disrupts the
federal balance, [and] because [these
laws] accustom us to considering the
Constitution as a dead letter, leaving
us, therefore, without protection in
times of danger
65

Against this argument, which could have been drawn
almost verbatim from the treatises of 19th century
Argentine federalists, Melo and the brilliant young De Tomaso

posed the more modern concept of increased governmental
interference in the economic sphere.

They did not deny the

political autonomy of the provinces, but simply contended
that, under Article 67, Section 11 of the Constitution, the

national Congress was empowered to dictate the national

Mining Code,

This being the case, it was illogical to

assume, as De Tomaso pointed out, that
this Congress could have the power to establish
the basic legislation and then could not,...,
decide at any time on what it may consider to be
more consistent with the country's interests in
the matter of ownership of mineral deposits. 66

Melo hastened to remind the Chamber that sovereignty can be
either complete or partial, and that the national govern-

ment was the only totally sovereign entity in Argentina.
The provinces enjoyed partial sovereignty, exercising legislative autonomy within the limits fixed by the Constitution.

65 ibid .

,

652.

66ibid., 639.

69

In the case of mineral matters, Article
67, Section 11 left
no doubt that responsibility lay with
the national government, 67

Where their opponents hewed almost exclusively
to the
constitutional issue, Melo and De Tomaso strengthened

their

case by arguing that the practice of placing
vital mineral

resources under the protection of the national government

was a current world-wide trend.

It stemmed in part from the

mounting importance of minerals like coal, iron ore and oil
for industrial development and national defense, and from

the protective measures adopted by the belligerent powers

during WW

Melo maintained that the trend reflected a

I.

changed concept of the government's function in the economic
sphere.

No longer was the state viewed in 19th century

liberal fashion as an impartial arbiter and, when necessary,

coercive agent.

The contemporary concept, according to

Melo, was that of "the defender of the collective rights and

interests... and the representative of all sectors of the
society." 68

On a more practical plane, De Tomaso argued that,

given the importance of the minerals under consideration
and the eagerness of foreign capital to exploit them, it was

67 ipid .

,

1918, IV, 144-145.

68 Ibid., 1918, II, 179.

70

unwise to rely for protection on fourteen
separate policies
pursued by the provinces as they enforced
the Mining Code.
Without saying as much, he was implying that
the provincial
governments, either by choice or by circumstance,
might not
prove equal to the task of safeguarding the nation's
vital

mineral wealth. 69
Melo, on the other hand, sought to convince the
Chamber

that under the Mining Code as it stood, private interests

alone benefited since all mines had to be turned over
to

them for exploitation.

If, however,

the bill under dis-

cussion were passed, the provinces would share in the profits

reaped from the development of petroleum, coal and iron ore,
and they would be free to undertake any other mineral ex-

ploitations they considered advisable. 70

Although on theoretical as well as practical grounds,
De Tomaso and Melo presented the more convincing arguments,

no vote was taken to test their persuasiveness on the

Chamber.

Still, the debate did provide some indications as

to the thinking of the three major political groups on pe-

troleum legislation, and, particularly, on federalization.

Given the strict internal discipline of the Socialist Party,
it can be assumed that De Tomaso'

69 Ibid .

,

70 Ibid.,

s

strong support for the

1918, I, 638, 642.
437; 1918, II, 148, 175, 185-187.

bill accurately mirrored his party's
position.

Also, there

is little reason to suspect that the
majority of the

Chamber's Conservatives disagreed with the
constitutional
views expressed by Arancibia Rodriguez and Sa'nchez
Sorondo.
However, the fact that the original bill was co-authored
by
a Conservative, Moreno, emphasizes the need
for exercising

the basis of this debate.

As far as the Radicals are concerned, the Chamber
disc ussions reveal that while some elements within the party

were willing to back federalization, this was not yet an
established party policy.

Melo co-authored the initial

proposal, and he and four other UCR Deputies signed the

Committee on Legislation despatch.

Yet, what was primarily

a Radical measure in origin was not even brought to a vote

in a Radical-controlled Chamber.

The majority of the UCR

Deputies preferred to wait for the President's initiative

before committing themselves on this question.
In mid-February 1917, the Chamber provided the only

positive item in its petroleum record for the first half of

Yrigoyen's presidency by approving a special outlay of
16,000,000 $m/n for developing the state operations in

Comodoro Rivadavia.

The Executive Power had presented the

original proposal to the Extraordinary Sessions of Congress

which opened in December 1916. 71

71see above, pages 43-44.

The Chamber's Treasury

72

The debate on the petroleum funds centered on
the

question of how the administration intended to invest
the
money.

Several Deputies noted the irregularity of approving

a financial measure without knowing the destination
of the

funds.

Deputy Escobar vividly stated the case when he

said the nation demanded
an end to experiments, to probes and
trials; the country demands purposeful
efforts, carefully considered solutions,
[and] , better said Mr. President, ideas
and action. 73

Minister of Agriculture Pueyrredon addressed the
Chamber briefly on February 9, 1917 to present the administration's policy, but neither he nor the two Radical Deputies

who shared the task of defending the government's request,
Horacio B. Oyhanarte and Alfredo Demarchi, gave convincing

evidence that the government had a carefully thought out

petroleum policy, or that it had a detailed program for the
use of the 16,000,000 pesos.

Pueyrredon informed the

Chamber that the government's primary objective was to
extend exploration.

Without ignoring efforts to increase

Commission combined this bill with another on debt consolidation in its despatch to the Chamber floor. Article 2,
Section 9 alloted 16,000,000 $m/n for the state oil industry.
(Diputados, Diario, 1916-1917, V, 4620-4621.)
72 Diputados, Diario , 1916-1917, V, 4746, 4756, 4876,

4907.
7 3lbid.,

4941.

73

production, the administration, he said, intended
to explore thoroughly the area, demonstrating
to the entire nation whether we actually have
an abundance of oil, or whether, on the contrary, the deposits are limited to that small
corner of the reserve zone. That, gentlemen,
has not been done, and, in my judgment, it is
the true task of the government. 7 ^

According to Pueyrredo'n, this was all the Deputies needed to
know.

The details are not of interest to the
Congress; the Deputies cannot ask the
Executive Power exactly what must be purchased for this exploitation. .. .75

With the Chamber now instructed as to its own limitations, Demarchi and Oyhanarte advocated approval of the

petroleum funds.

They contended that petroleum exploitation

was an expensive business, and that the vast potential of
the Comodoro Rivadavia fields would lie dormant if substan-

tial new investments were not made.

Essentially, they

were arguing that the government should either do the

job

right or not do it at all, that either the funds should be
supplied to raise production to a point where significant
amounts of petroleum were being provided for national use,

or the whole operation should be abandoned.

bluntly put the alternatives,

74 Ibid.

,

4962-4963,

75ibid.

,

4963.

As Oyhanarte

,

74
*

either exploit Comodoro Rivadavia intensively
and scientifically according to procedures
already well known, or cap the wells and stop
pouring money into this matter. 76
On close inspection, a notable lack of agreement

emerges between the remarks of Minister Pueyrredon and
those of the two Radical Deputies.

While the Agricultural

chief spoke of broadening exploration, Demarchi and

Oyhanarte were impressing upon the Chamber the expense of
such equipment as distilleries, tanker transports and

storage facilities, all equipment related to production not
exploration.

And while Pueyrredon urged exploration as a

means to gain the knowledge of Argentina's oil reserves

necessary to formulate the best national petroleum policy,
Demarchi and Oyhanarte had their sights trained on the much

more ambitious objective of supplying the entire nation

with cheap, abundant fuel. 77

The Chamber had to decide

which of the Radical speakers most accurately represented
the government's intentions.

Nicolas Repetto, the 46 year-old surgeon-Deputy,

offered the only opposition during the debate, and his
objective was to have the funds reduced.

The Socialist

leader was unconvinced that the Radical administration

For the remarks of Demarchi, see Ibid .
4949-4959, 5009-5019; and for those of Oyhanarte, 49925009.
7 6 Ibid.

,

5005.

77 Ibid.

,

4959, 4963, 5002, 5004.

75

intended to alter the past policies which
had suffocated
the state petroleum industry. Claiming
that he was anxious
to avoid a national disaster in Coinodoro
Rivadavia, Repetto
urged the government to adopt a cautious
short-range policy
and suggested the Chamber approve 5 , 000, 000
$m/n to finance
•

it.

78

It is probable that the chance to exert a
degree of

Congressional control over the notoriously independent
Chief
Executive also entered into Repetto' s calculations.
In any case, he advised the Radical government
to lay

aside, at least temporarily, the grandiose design of supplying the whole domestic market and concentrate on covering
the needs of the government agencies.

To this end, main-

tained Repetto, the government should exploit its 5,000-

hectare reserve, while releasing the larger government
reserve for private industry. 79

When the state firm could

supply the government's own needs, it could place the surplus in the public market.

For such a moderate and practical

program, Repetto saw no need to vote more than 5,000,000
$m/n.

It is difficult to believe that the Chamber's approval

of the full 16,000,000 $m/n was attributable to the

78 For Repetto's remarks, see Ibid .

,

4947-4948, 4964

4971, 5114-5133.
79 Repetto's reference was to the reserve created by
Saenz Pena in 1913 to check speculative activity in
petroleum concessions. See Chapter I, pp. 13-15.
.

76

persuasive powers of Melo, Demarchi and
Pueyrredo'n.
Rather,
it may be taken as an indication of the
widespread consensus
in favor of state exploitation.

Significantly, not one

Deputy argued that the money should be
flatly refused, or
that the government should pull up stakes in
Comodoro

Rivadavia and leave the petroleum industry in
private hands.
Theoretical considerations aside, the state industry
repre-

sented a sizable investment not only in money but
in national
prestige.

Admitting defeat would have been a blow to

Argentine national pride which the legislators were unwilling
to accept.

The general acceptance of state exploitation was manifested in the Chamber's approval of another bill submitted

by Deputies Melo and Demarchi.

Originally presented as

amendments to the money bill, its articles were passed as a
separate enactment.
firmed the

5

,

As sent to the Senate, the measure con-

000-hectare region in Comodoro Rivadavia as a

permanent reserve for government exploitation, and authorized for that purpose investment of the 16,000,000 $m/n
just voted by the Chamber as well as the profits made by
the state firm until January 1, 1926. 80

80oiputaods, Diario 1916-1917, V, 5191. This bill
was passed on February 16, 1917 immediately after final
approval of the measure containing the 16,000,000 pesos for
petroleum exploitation.
,

The Senate, however, failed to act on either the money

bill or the Melo-Demarchi bill, consigning both to
the

legislative graveyard, 81

On March 5, 1917, President

Yrigoyen, protesting that Congress had delayed too long in

passing either the administration's proposals or substitute

measures of its own, closed the Extraordinary Sessions and

withdrew the bills submitted the previous December.

It is

noteworthy that while the decree closing Congress reserved
to the Executive Power the right to submit any or all of

the withdrawn bills at a later date, the administration did

not again request funds for petroleum development. 82
The failure of national leadership in petroleum matters

whether in Congress or the Casa Rosada, inevitably took its
toll, retarding the growth of the state oil firm.

Enrique

Hermitte, head of the National Bureau of Mines and interim

President of the Petroleum Commission in 1917, alluded to
the situation in his department's year-end report for 1917:

Because of the change in administration,
state exploitation is in a period of
transition and production remains stationary.
The National Government has not spelled out
its policy with respect to the oil works,

81 The Senate met for the final time during the 1916-191
Extraordinary Sessions on February 15, 1917, the day before
the Chamber passed on to it the bill containing the alloca-

tion for petroleum development.
82 For a copy of the Executive Decree closing Congress,
see La Prensa, March 6, 1917, p. 10.
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and, therefore, no significant
alerations
n the development program
i
T^t
established
[before
President Yrigoyen
9 yen

£53m?S

took office]. 83

To complicate matters, two other
problems of major proportions also affected the Comodoro Rivadavia
enterprise,
the difficulty in obtaining industrial
machinery, already
mentioned, and the outbreak of new strikes.
The work stoppage which occurred in October and November
1917 was only
the most serious of a number of labor disputes
which plagued
the state industry.
In 1918, 15 days were lost through
strike activity, and the following year 50 days were
lost. 84

Officials of the state company estimated that production in
1919 would have increased by 8% over 1918 instead of de-

creasing as it did by almost 5% had it not been for the
strikes. 85
In the midst of these difficulties, it is surprising

that the state industry not only maintained its position

from 1916 to 1919, but registered tangible advances in

several areas.

The firm's capital, built up through

reinvesting profits, expanded from less than 12,000,000 $m/n

83 M. de

Agric, Memoria

84 D,

de Explotacion, Memoria, 1918, 9; Memoria,

G,

1919, 3.
85 Ibid.

,

1917, 291.

to nearly 39,000,000 $m/n 86 , while production
rose from

129,890 m 3 of crude oil in 1916 to 188,093 m 3 in 1919. 87

Storage facilities in Comodoro Rivadavia were slowly
ex-

panded from a capacity of 71,675 m 3 to 84,675 m 3 88
and
,
the tanker fleet which transported

9

8,040 tons of crude

oil in 1916, carried over 190,000 tons three years later

with one less ship. 89
Commercially, the firm's record also shows token advances.

The state industry sold 61,174 tons of crude oil

in 1916 and 95,279 tons in 1919. 90

Both government

agencies and private consumers continued to use state oil,

with the price for the latter determined by the prices
charged by private distributors.

Those responsible for

state exploitation felt that selling the limited government
oil supply at a price below the market level would have

meant creating a privileged group of consumers. 9 *

86 YPF, Desarrollo de la industria
,

53,

As state

61.

87 BIP, December, 1936, 18.
88 Diputados, Yacimientos petrolif eros f iscales
;
Antecedentes , I, 306
89 YPF, Desarrollo de la industria , 374.

yu Diputados, Yacimientos petrol
Antecedentes , I, chart facing 348.

ros f iscales;

91lbid., 171-172; M« de Agric, Memoria, 1919, 19.

,

production expanded, the question of
constructing a major
distillation facility to take advantage of
valuable petroleum by-products became increasingly
urgent.

By 1919, how-

ever, a distillery was still in the planning
stage. 92

Outside of Comodoro Rivadavia, some hope for the
future was provided by the 1918 discovery of high
quality

petroleum by the Bureau of Mines in Plaza Huincul (National
Territory of Neuquen) 93

Though the Patagonian deposits

had been worked more intensively than those in Plaza
Huincul, they too supplied more hope for the future than

satisfaction for the present in 1919.

Only the uninformed

could have disputed the statement in the Minister of Agriculture's Memoria for 1919 to the effect that the Argentine

petroleum industry was still in its nascent stage. 94
The private sector of the petroleum industry showed
no more of a tendency toward rapid expansion than the

public sector.

While production more than doubled between

1917 and 1919 - from 10,667 m 3 to 23,188 m 3 - the latter

figure represented the work of only two companies and was

92 Ibid.

,

17.

93 The best short account of the discovery at Plaza
Huincul appears in Enrique Mosconi's El^ petro^leo

argentino , 28-29.
94 M. de

Agric, Memoria, 1919, 15-16.
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insignificant in terms of the national fuel
market. 95
That private exploitation was starved

for a lack of

capital has already been noted.

Had there been willing in-

vestors, foreign or domestic, it is unlikely
they would
have encountered any government hostility.
On May 24, 1918,
an article appeared in the semi-official La
Epoca touting

the oil industry as a promising field for
private invest-

ment. 96

Seven months later, on December 30, the same

source reported that exploitation in Comodoro Rivadavia
had

been discussed in a Cabinet meeting, and that
it is the intention of the government
to maintain the state industry, without, however, excluding the concurrence
of private capital that would be able
to expand exploitation. 97

In 1919 Yrigoyen himself stated in his message opening

Congress

Legislating on state-financed petroleum
development is necessary in order to
clear the way for private participation
in the exploitation of deposits located
outside the State reserve. 98
On a rhetorical level then, the government welcomed

95 BIP, December, 1936, 19, 20.

96 La Epoca
97 Ibid .

,

98 Pueblo

,

May 24, 1918, p. 24.

December 30, 1918, p.
y_

gobierno

,

IV, 179.
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private investment in the petroleum industry.

What the

government failed to provide was effective follow
through
on its declared policy. Absent was any forceful
effort to
enact a petroleum law that would have cleared up
the un-

stable legal atmosphere surrounding' private exploitation
and, in so doing, would have provided a powerful
stimulus
to private investment.

A discrepancy between words and deeds provided the
leitmotif of the petroleum policy pursued by the Radical

government from October 1916 to September 1919.

Yrigoyen

had no well-defined petroleum policy when he became President, and three years of experience proved that the vague

concept of "reparacion"

,

while rhetorically appealing,

provided no answers for practical questions.

I

While the

President and other Radical leaders like Pueyrredo'n, Melo,
Demarchi and Oyhanarte frankly acknowledged the need for a
law which would define the nation's objectives in terms of

petroleum development and place both the public and private
sectors of the industry on a firm legal basis, there

was no sustained effort to secure the law.

Congress, like

the President, refused to take the initiative.

The

great majority of the Radical Congressmen, as befitted

well disciplined Yrigoyen subordinates, were willing to

wait indulgently for their caudillo to take the first step,
and the Conservative and Socialists seemed content to sit

back and watch the Radical
administration strain, and
hopefully buckle, under the weight
of government responsi
bility.
Thus, by default, the domestic
petroleum situation
remained essentially unchanged from
the pre-Yrigoyen
years.
If the nation's industrial future
and economic

independence rested on domestic petroleum
development,
then it also rested on the ability of
strong, purposeful
national leadership to transform Argentina's
petroleum

potential into reality.

CHAPTER III
YRIGOYEN II:

A POLICY OF WORDS NOT DEEDS

After nearly three years of unfulfilled
promises, the
Yrigoyen administration finally presented
its proposals

for

petroleum legislation to Congress in September
1919.
The
two bills clarified the government's
position on both the
public and private sectors of the industry, but
subsequent
events demonstrated that the Radicals still
preferred words
to deeds, Yrigoyen «s oil bills proved to be simply
another

well-timed nationalistic note from the Radical's political
trumpet.

They were never brought up for debate in a

Chamber dominated by his own party, and when he left the
Casa Rosada in 1922, national oil legislation still re-

mained a matter of speculation.

As a consequence, the

state oil enterprise advanced slowly, constantly hindered

by the lack of either a sound legal basis or purposeful
leadership.

And while private investors displayed a

quickening interest in Argentine petroleum after 1920,

many continued hesitant in the face of the legal vacuum
which masqueraded as Argentine petroleum law.

When in

June 1922, four months before the end of his term,

84

Yrigoyen belatedly took substantive
action in petroleum
matters, it was for distinctly negative
reasons.

Despite the failure of the legislature
to act,
Yrigoyen »s petroleum bills throw light on
administration
thinking and deserve careful analysis. The
first bill,

which entered the Chamber on September
24, 1919, called for
the federalization of the nation 's oil
resources,
granted

the national government the right to explore
and exploit

petroleum deposits on its own behalf, and prescribed
the
conditions under which petroleum rights would be issued
to

private interests. 1
In the accompanying message, Yrigoyen and Agricultural

Minister Demarchi argued for federalization on the basis
of
the financial as well as the social
benefits which result from the many
uses of that fuel. 2

With all deposits under the exclusive control of the
national government, their argument continued, the State
could oversee petroleum exploitation and

prevent private interests from wasting
[the oil]
or damaging it through
ignorance or impulsiveness, or rendering
[the deposits] improductive through
,

•-Diputados, Diario , 1919, V, 480-485.
2 Ibid.

,

480.
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negligence or financial incapacity,.... 3
Given this framework, the National Executive was willing to

promote private participation in the petroleum industry
"within prudent limits and under certain conditions," and,

particularly, to encourage private operations in areas as

yet unexplored. 4
The nationalistic tone of the measure established by
the call for federalization likewise pervaded the articles

governing private concessions.

The regulations recommended

by the administration obviously were intended to produce
small-scale, closely-checked private operations which

would surrender a share of any profits to the national
treasury.
The guiding concept for granting private rights was

adopted from the Rumanian oil law of 1906.

Basically, it

involved dividing the nation's territory into three
categories:

1)

recognized petroleum lands,

unknown petroleum potential,

3)

2)

lands with

lands reserved for state

The terms of each concession depended upon

activity.^

3 Ibid.
4

Ibid.

,

481,

three areas were not precisely defined in the bill
There was no indication, for instance, of how far from a
producing well an area had to be located to be classified
Had the bill passed,
as a "recognized petroleum zone".
such determinations apparently would have been left to the
discretion of the National Bureau of Mines.
5 The
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whether the land in question was
classified under category
one or two, and every grant of
category-

two lands eventual-

ly added to the government's reserve.

From the investor's point of view, the
one significant
new advantage offered in the government's
proposal was an
extension of the time period allowed for
completing exploration work. Under the Mining Code,
concessionaires
had only 300 days to complete their search,
with possible
short extensions under special circumstances.
Because of
the necessary drilling operations, this was an
extremely
abbreviated period for oil exploration.

The government's

bill alloted private investors a full five years for
this

critical and complicated task.
On the other side of the ledger, there were numerous

provisions guaranteeing strict federal control over all
facets of private operations.

Every concessionaire had

to supply proof of his financial capacity to undertake

exploration and/or exploitation, and each was required to
execute certain field activities to maintain his rights. 6

Out of each 2000-hectare exploration plot, 500 hectares

6 When

the government's bill went to Congress, concessionaires were required to actively work the lands
granted in an exploration permit, but once an oil discovery was made they could maintain their rights by paying
an annual fee to the government.
(See the provisions otf
Law 10,273, Jeronimo Remorino, ed., Anales de legislacion
argentina , complemente affos 1889-1919 (Buenos Aires:
Editorial La Ley, 1954), 1042-1044; Velarde, Las minas
,
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automatically were to become part of the federal reserve,
and in the case of a discovery, the concessionaire was

obliged to divide his land into three equal parts from

which the government would choose the one it preferred.
The National Executive was empowered to dictate the manner
in which oil companies constituted their capital, the

accounting procedures to be employed, and the method of

calculating profits.

Government inspectors were to keep a

watchful eye over the technical conduct of all private
operations, and the land, the production and the profits
of private companies were subject to a series of taxes. 7

On the commercial side of the industry, the Executive's
bill empowered the national government to fix the sale

price for petroleum to both private and government consumers, to control exportation of oil, and to exercise a

preferential right to acquire all the oil necessary for

The administration's bill demanded
de petroleo , 4 8-50.)
ten exploratory wells within five years for each 1500hectare exploration permit (Art. 14) , and the production of
5000 tons of crude oil within five years from each 100hectare exploitation grant (Art. 15). This was not an excessive demand, but it was insurance against a concessionaire capping his wells and holding his deposits in reserve.

Article 24, the concessionaire was required to
pay in annual taxes to the national government: 1) 100 $m/n
for each hectare of exploitation land, 2) 8% of his gross
production of crude oil, either in kind or in value as the
government saw fit, 3) 25% of all profits in excess of 35%
If the deposits were
of the company's invested capital.
located on provincial lands, the Province would receive
profits
50% of the production tax and all of the excess
7 Under

government agencies and for stockpiling,

m

addition,

both the transfer of petroleum rights
and the association
of two or more concessionaires
for exploitation purposes
was prohibited without permission
from the National Executive
Finally, the administration's bill
included a catchall article, Article 34, designed to
repair any loopholes
in the scheme to exclude the feared oil
trusts from

Argentina.

Every concession of oil rights was to be

subject to any future measure enacted
for the purpose of combatting attempts to
corner or monopolize the production, transport, storage, refining and commerce of oil
and its by-products. 9

Amidst all this detail, the outstanding characteristic
of the government's bill was the absence of anything
novel
in its provisions.

The system of concurrent and separate

state and private exploitation already existed in fact, if

not in law.

Federalization had been discussed at length in

the Chamber in 1918, and several previous petroleum bills

had proposed adoption of the Rumanian model as the basis for

levy (Art, 25)
p

Barring extraordinary circumstances, concessionaires
could not pool assets which totaled more than 6000 hectares
of exploitation lands (Art. 37) . Any transfer of exploitation rights required payment to the government of 30% of
the transfer price, an amount which could not be less than
one-fifth of the value of the average annual production
over the past two years (Art. 35b).
9 Diputados,

Diario, 1919, V, 485.

.

granting private concessions. 10

What the Yrigoyen admin-

istration was offering for petroleum legislation was

essentially what nationalists had been advocating since oil
had become an issue of public concern.

The second of the administration's oil bills dealt
exclusively with the public sector of the industry and
was presented to the Chamber on September 27, three days
after the first bill. 11
new.

Again, there was little that was

Had the measure been written into law, it simply

would have supplied a legal foundation for the already
operative state petroleum enterprise.
The bill authorized the national government to create

petroleum reserves within which the State could explore
and exploit oil deposits either on its own or in conjunction with the provincial governments.

The authorized

capital for state operations was set at the current level
of capitalization of the state firm, and procedures for

making new capital investment and for distributing profits

were outlined.
Article

7

was the only innovative part of the

proposal, calling as it did for the creation of the

lOpor previous bills which incorporated the Rumanian
1916, I,
model see Ibid . , 1914, III, ,681-688 (Repetto)
378-384 (De la Plaza-Calderon) ; 1917, V, 264-272
;

(Uriburu)
11 Ibid., 1919, V, 664-666.
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"direccio'n general de los yacimientos petrolif eros

fiscales" to administer the publicly-financed petroleum
industry.

Projected as a division of the Ministry of

Agriculture, the powers and duties of the new bureau were
to be defined by the Executive Power.

This article

represented the government's first attempt at a permanent
solution to the problem created by the resignation of the

original Petroleum Commission in November 1917.
An immediate question raised by the administration's
bills is their timing.

Why did the Yrigoyen government

choose to clarify its petroleum policy in September 1919,
three years after coming to office and less than a week

before the close of the 1919 Congressional sessions?
Possibly, Yrigoyen and his aides were anticipating
an influx of foreign capital after WW

I

and wanted oil

legislation both to stimulate and to regulate investment
in the petroleum industry.

In addition, Law 7,059, which

provided the existing legal basis for state exploitation,
was due to expire in 1920. 12

Yrigoyen may have wanted to

erect a new and permanent basis for the state industry to
serve in place of the 1910 measure.

If, however,

these

considerations made petroleum legislation a priority matter

12 Law 7,059, passed in 1910, was valid for five years,
and was extended for another five years by Law 9,664,
passed in 1915.

for the administration, it is difficult
to understand why

Yrigoyen did not include such legislation
among the topics
designated for Congressional attention during the
1919-1920

Extraordinary Sessions 13

,

or why the Executive took no

action to replace Law 7,059 when it expired, or why,
finally, the administration, as we shall see, made
no

concerted effort at any time to secure Congressional sanction of its oil proposals.
In truth, the Executive's new found urgency to secure

petroleum legislation probably stemmed from the political
needs of the Radical Party rather than the economic needs
of the nation.

Yrigoyen and his advisors were, in all

probability, looking forward to the national Congressional

elections scheduled for March

7,

1920 and calculating the

polling-booth profits which a nationalistic petroleum
policy could be made to yield.

Special importance was

attached to these elections because of the number of seats
at stake.

On the basis of the 1914 census, the lower

house was to be expanded from 120 to 158, and the additional 38 seats were to be filled in 1920 along with the

customary biennial renovation of one-half of the Chamber's

13 Subjects which Yrigoyen chose for treatment during
these sessions included loans to France, England, and Italy
so they could purchase Argentine products, public health
For a copy of the Execu
laws, social laws, and the budget.
tive Power decree, see La Epoca , October 20, 1919, p. 1.
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membership.

Shortly after the administration's bills entered
Congress, the pro-administration La Epoca admitted that
the Radicals were thinking about the upcoming elections.

Denying an accusation by the conservative daily La Nacion
that Yrigoyen was flooding Congress with legislative

proposals in September 1919 to beef up the Radical record
prior to the elections, La Epoca explained:
There is no substance to "La Nacic-n's"
charges of petty politicking. On the
contrary, [the bills] not only bear
witness to the Executive's desire to
provide the legislation the country
demands, but they provide the electorate
with the chance to express itself indirectly on the bill's merits or
demerits.
Thus, the series of proposals, with the petroleum bills

among them, were presented not simply to attract votes,

but to make of the 1920 elections a referendum on the
policies defined.

Had the Radicals followed their victory

in 1920 with a sustained effort to obtain petroleum legis-

lation, La Epoca

'

statement would now appear more

convincing.

The Radicals did not make the government's oil

policy the pivotal issue of the 1920 campaign, but it is
clear that administration backers used it in their efforts

14 La Epoca , October 1,

1919, p. 3.

s
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to win votes for UCR candidates.

On several occasions,

Radical spokesmen in the Federal
Capital praised the
party's support for federalizing oil
deposits and emphasized
the benefits of such a policy for
national economic development. 15

Politically, it was an astute maneuver.

For a party

which generated much of its electoral
support through
nationalistic appeal to the nation's middle and

a

lower

classes, the mantle of protector of the country's
natural
resources was tailor made. The stark contrast
between this

policy and the public land giveaways indulged in
by
"regimen" governments made a convincing argument for
the

Radical cause.

Presentation of the administration's oil bills in
September 1919, then, was motivated, at least in part, by
electoral considerations.

Apparently, the Radical's

instinct for political survival was at least as strong a

motivating force as the dream of Argentine industrial
development and economic independence.

Periodically over the next three years, Yrigoyen
approached Congress on the subject to oil legislation,

15 Ibid .

December 17, 1919, pp. 4-5; January 12, 1920,
p. 6; January 19, 1920, p. 5; January 21, 1920, p. 5;
February 8, 1920, p. 3; February 27, 1920, p. 6. La
Epoca
reports on campaign speeches are sketchy, often
pointing out only general areas commented upon. Therefore,
petroleum may have been mentioned much more often than the
'

,

encouraging passage of his proposals. 16

His efforts were

seconded by the Minister of Agriculture
in his department's
1919 Memoria.
Demarchi noted the importance of special
petroleum legislation as a stimulant to both
the public
and private sectors of the industry
and impressed upon the
legislators the urgency of either approving
the administration's bills, or drafting a law of their
17
own.

Congress remained passive despite this persistent
prodding.

It sanctioned no law governing either the
private

or public sector of the oil industry and authorized
no new

investments in the state enterprise beyond the profits

which that firm could show.

A distinguished Argentine

scholar of the Radical period, Roberto Etchepareborda, cites

obstructionist

tactics on the part of the Socialists and

the Conservatives to explain not only the failure of

Congress to pass petroleum legislation, but the general
lack of legislative success which plagued Yrigoyen's administration. 18

Exonerating the Radicals on this basis,

instances cited here.
16 Senadores, Diario, 1921-1922,
17; Diputados, Diario,
II,
1921,
211; Senadores, Diario , 1922, 88.
17 M. de

Agric, Memoria

,

1919, 3, 18.

18 Etchepareborda, "Yrigoyen
y el congreso," 58-62.
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however, fails to take into account
the overpowering
majority enjoyed by the President's
party in the Chamber of
Deputies. Undoubtedly, the opposition
Deputies had no
qualms about blocking proposals originating
from the Casa
Rosada, and the Senate stood as a
conservative-dominated

bulwark to the ultimate approval of any
Radical measure. 19
Yet the question remains as to why the
UCR did not push
its priority measures, and particularly
Yrigoyen's oil

bills, through the Chamber where it enjoyed
an almost two
to one advantage over the combined
opposition from 1920 to

Even the Chamber committees to which the petroleum

1922.

proposals were directed for study were controlled by
Radical chairmen and Radical majorities. 21

As La Vanguardia ,

the Socialist mouthpiece, pointed out, given these

In 1920 and 1921, the Senate was composed of
servatives, 1 Socialist and 8 Radicals, one of whom
dissident Radical from Santa Fe Province. In 1922,
servatives sat in the Senate along with 1 Socialist
Radicals, and again one of the latter was the Santa
dissident.
Ibid . , 63.

15 Con-

was a
12 Conand 9
Fe

20 In

1920, the Radicals held 102 seats in the Chamber
as compared to 10 for the Socialists and 4 6 for the Conservatives.
In 1921, 100 Radicals sat along with 10 Socialists and 4 5 Conservatives, and in 1922, there were 102
Radicals, 10 Socialists and 40 Conservatives.
21
x The bill on
private concessions went to the Committee

on General Legislation while the one on state exploitation
went to the Committee on Agriculture. Only twice was the
pattern of Radical domination of these committees broken.
In 1920, Nicola's Repetto, the Socialist, chaired the
Committee on Agriculture, and in 1922, the Radicals were
outnumbered 4 to 3 on the Committee on General Legislation.

circumstances, Yrigoyen's repeated requests
that Congress
pass his oil bills had a hollow ring, 22
The course pursued by the administration
subsequent to
the introduction of its petroleum bills,
therefore, was
marked by the same penchant for words rather
than deeds
that had characterized Yrigoyen's oil policy
prior to 1919.
It might seem fair to conclude, then,
that the Radicals
were mere political opportunists, their objective
having
been to drain the oil issue of all the political
capital

possible, while doing nothing to develop or protect
the

nation's petroleum resources.

While this conclusion is essentially correct, the
explanation of the government's motives is incomplete.

For

it could be argued that if the Radicals were seeking poli-

tical advantage, their best strategy would have been to

promote passage of the national petroleum law which was
recognized as a desirable end by Argentines of all political
persuasions.

To understand fully the government's choice of

inaction over action we must consider the internal situation of the Radical Party,

It is evident that while there

was political leverage to be gained by talking about

petroleum legislation, there was a good deal more to be
lost by actively seeking passage of a law.

22La Vanguardia

,

May

5,

1920, p. 1.
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Yrigoyen's primary political
objective during the
latter years of his tenure was
to insure victory for
the
Radical candidate in the 1922
presiaential election. Only
in this manner could he
guarantee continuation
of the

"reparacio'n" and prevent restoration
of the "regimen".

Threatening success in 1922 was the
possibility that
internecine conflict would sap the
Radical Party's voting
strength. From its inception, the
party had been a
strange conglomeration of potentially
antagonistic elements,
and during the second half of
Yrigoyen's term, dissatisfaction among some Radicals with the
President's dictatorial
control over party affairs neared schismatic
proportions.

By 1921, radicals opposed to Yrigoeyn's
methods were
meeting to discuss ways of preventing the
President from

personally controlling the party's 1922 nominating
convention.

And in Congress, Yrigoyen did not enjoy the

degree of control which the numerical alignment
suggests.

Out of the 1922 Radical contingent, at least
Senators and

28

6

of the

9

of the 102 Deputies were either already in

open opposition to the party chief or would join the

anti-Yrigoyen ranks with the definitive party split in

23 RRIAA

White to Hughes, August 16, 1921, 835.032/44;
White to Hughes, September 15, 1921, 835.00/244; White to
Hughes, February 13, 1922, 835.00/279, enclosure 1.
,
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Under these conditions, it was incumbent
upon

Yrigoyen to discourage the discussion of any
issue which
might have aggravated an already tense situation

and pre-

cipitated an irreparable party rift before the
elections.
Oil was not in 1920 or 1922 the dominant and
explosive

issue it would become by 1927, but the question of
federal-

ization was a sensitive one.

If the administration had

forced a vote on its oil bills and a sufficient number of
Radical Deputies had voted against federalizing the oil
deposits, party solidarity and with it the Radical's

chances for victory in 1922 would have suffered. 25
Thus, Yrigoyen and the Radicals acted consistently on

the issue of petroleum.

Following a course dictated by

political expediency, they offered a nationalist policy

when it was convenient to do so, and ultimately opted for
inaction for the same reason. 26

^ q Ibid

Gabriel del Mazo, El radicalismo Notas sobre
su historia y doctrina (1922-1952T (Buenos Aires: Editorial
Raigal, 19 55), 36, 4 3-46; Federico Pinedo, En tiempos de la
republica Vol. I (Buenos Aires: Editorial Mundo Forense,
. ;

,

,

1946)

,

49.

"Charge Francis White reported from Buenos Aires that
Congressional approval of Yrigoyen' s oil bill was unlikely
because of opposition among provincial representatives to
federalization.
RRIAA , White to Hughes, November 30, 1921,
835.6363/95.
26 Although the case presented here is admittedly
hypothetical, Yrigoyen 's choice of Marcelo T. de Alvear as

;

100

As was the case during the 1916-1919
period, the

failure of Yrigoyen's government to provide
constructive

leadership for national petroleum development was
reflected
also in its handling of the state oil company.
From

September 1919 until its reorganization in June 1922,
the

administration of the state enterprise followed the pattern
of improvisation established after the dismissal of the

Petroleum Commission in November 1917.
The three ranking officials in 1919 were Capitan de

Fragata Felipe Fliess, field chief in Comodoro Rivadavia;
Sebastia'n Flores, manager in charge of the Buenos Aires

offices; and Joaquin Spinelli, head accountant and financial

watchdog of the bureau. 27

Fliess continued to direct field

operations until mid-September 1921 when he resigned and
was replaced by Capitan de Fragata Antonio Abel on an

interim basis and then by the new permanent head, Capitan
de Fragata Francisco Borges.

Flores also resigned in 1921,

and Spinelli assumed his duties as well as retaining his

position as "contador inspector".

As a result, until

June 1922, one man, Spinelli, was responsible for directing

his successor supports this interpretation. The elevation
of one of the party's leading "Blues" was intended to
cement the diverging Radical factions.
27 Spinelli's title was "contador inspector".
For the
Ministerial Resolution appointing Spinelli, and defining his

duties, see Diputados, Yacimientos petrolif eros
Antecedentes , I, 203-204.
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the Buenos Aires offices, advising himself
on financial

matters, and overseeing the bookkeeping operations
of the
company.

The issues which provoked Fliess's resignation provide
some insight into the situation produced by the firm's

haphazard management structure.

After nearly four years

of patient service, he was worn down by the frequent lack
of Ministerial leadership, the consequent disharmony among

subordinate personnel, and, particularly, the constant

bickering between the officials in Comodoro Rivadavia on
the one hand and those in Buenos Aires on the other. 28

Spinelli singled out this lack of harmony and coordination
for special comment in a report to Minister of Agriculture

Demarchi early in 1920.

With the sole exception of the "drilling
and extraction division"
the functioning
of the departments of the bureau, including
its bookkeeping division, was subject in
practice to the standards, aptitudes and
personalities of the separate department
heads. That is to say, there was an
absence of rules, regulations and practices which would have systematized and
harmonized the functioning of the individual
departments with that of the bureau as a
whole. 29
,

In May 1922, Spinelli pointed out another of the basic in-

adequacies in the administration of the state oil agency.

28ibid.

,

642.

29 Ibid.

,

164.
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In a note to the Minister of Agriculture, he lamented the

fact that since 1917 such a vital task as the systematic
study, preparation and authorization of the bureau's annual

budget had been treated as a matter of secondary importance? 0
Added testimony to the Yrigoyen government's mis-

handling of state exploitation was given by Col. Enrique

Mosconi following his appointment as Director of state
operations in October 1922.

After inspecting his new

charges, Mosconi submitted two reports to Minister of

Agriculture Tomas Le Breton in which he analyzed the factors
hindering expansion of the state industry and recommended
reforms. 31

According to Mosconi, the primary obstacle facing the
state enterprise was the absence of a national petroleum
law clearly defining the objectives of state exploitation.

Without first establishing these objectives, argued
Mosconi, it was difficult to draft guidelines for the

expansion of exploration and exploitation activities.

Another debilitating factor, second in importance only

30 Ibid .

,

444.

^Mo'jconi's two reports were submitted on November 18,
1922 and February 23, 1923. Copies may be consulted in
Ibid . , 545-556 (November 18, 1922), 636-720 (February 23,
Further comments attributed to Mosconi are drawn
1923) .
from these reports unless otherwise indicated. Only direct
quotes are footnoted.
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to the legislative void, was

the absence [since 1917] of a
directorate
or administrative commission which
operates
with the autonomy that is indispensable
to
the efficient management of the industry,
and which, being immune to petty
political
influences, can guide its efforts by a concern for only those things which promote
the bureau's prosperity , .... 32

From these two basic deficiencies, contended
Mosconi, arose
many of Lhe problems which had characterized
state operations from 1917 to 1922 - low production at high
costs,
in-

adequate storage and transportation facilities, excessive

numbers of administrative employees, and inconsistent
if
not arbitrary price-setting policies.
Some of Mosconi* s most severe criticisms were leveled
at the financial conduct and the bookkeeping practices of

the state firm.

On November 18, 1922 after his initial in-

ventory of the company, he reported to Le Breton that,
the financial condition of this bureau
can, beyond any doubt, be termed extremely
bad.
Lacking a budget that would guide
its development, [the firm's] expenditures
have increased extraordinarily in relation
to its income,.... 33
So badly disorganized were the firm's books, that it took

over four months of intensive work to straighten them out.

Antonio F. Molinari, the government accountant saddled

3

Ibid.

,

638-639

33 Ibid.

,

546.
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with that task, informed Mosconi that
There is no doubt that there have been
deficiencies in both the system used and
in its implementation, deficiences
which eventually can be corrected. It is
also clear that there has been an absence
of an established financial policy relative to long-term expenditures required by
oil exploitation, a lack of control over
such spending, and, therefore, as can be
easily proven, a waste of public monies
which must be checked in order to defend
the interests of the state. 34

Even admitting that it was to Mosconi' s advantage to
emphasize the negative aspects of state exploitation, there
can be no doubt that the government enterprise was in a
sad state of repair by 1922.

It is not surprising that

the Yrigoyen administration, as we shall see, consistently

rebuffed efforts by opposition forces to publicize the
facts about the post-1917 evolution of state oil exploitation.

Quite naturally, the government's handling of both
the legislative and industrial aspects of the petroleum

question aroused considerable criticism.

Outstanding

amidst the published commentary was a tendency to urge

private investment as the key to increased production.
This trend did not result from a flagging of the wide-

spread nationalistic zeal for safeguarding the country's
oil resources, but from the failure of state exploitation

34 Ibid.,

698.
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to produce oil on a scale commensurate
with the nation's
needs. As Rear Admiral M. J. Lagos
(Ret.) informed his

audience on July

7

,

1922:

It is time that it v/as understood that
a mine is of value when it is producing,
that it is of no value while it lies unexploited, and that if every time capital
proposes to exploit the mine, the owner
tries to maximize his own profits (taking
advantage of the gringos) , it is clear
that, generally speaking, the results
will be unsatisfactory, and the mine will
continue unproductive with the nation
being the first to suffer for it. 3 5

Among the major Buenos Aires dailies, La riacion

branded the public industry a failure and stated that the
•future success of Argentine petroleum development depended

upon the contribution made by private investors. 36

La

Razon and La Prensa also counselled reliance upon private
capital, but, unlike La Nacion

foreign investment.

,

they wanted to exclude

La Razon advocated what it termed

"a practical nationalism".

In practice, this meant

private investment by Argentines only, provision of new
capital for expanding state operations, an autonomous

bureau to run the state's interests, and the training of
more Argentine nationals as petroleum technicians. 37

3 ^M.

Lagos, La politica del petroleo Contribucion
Underal estudio (Buenos Aires:
L.J. Rosso, 1922), 110.
TTned words italicized in text.
J.

;

36 La Nacion November 17,
,
37 La Razon, November 1,

1919, p. 4.

1919, p. 1; December 20, 1919,
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La Prensa continued its campaign against
government inaction, emphasizing the need for oil legislation
and

encouraging increased investment to expand production. 38
Reversing its former stand, however, it now supported
the
idea of combining state and private capital for developing
the federal reserve in Comodoro Rivadavia.

Leaving aside

the question of the innate capacity of any government to

administer an industrial enterprise, La Prensa argued in

August 1922 that,
The Executive Branch has not been organized
to act as an industrial entrepreneur, and
the treasury does not hold the funds necessary
for the [oil] business. For these two reasons,
consideration should be given, as soon as
possible, to a mixed enterprise employing
state and private capital. 39
La Vanguardia joined the chorus of critics demanding

that the Yrigoyen government adopt a petroleum policy

designed to increase the flow of domestic petroleum to
the marketplace.

Although approving of Yrigoyen* s mainte-

nance of Comodoro Rivadavia as a reserve for state activity,
La Vanguardia compared the government to a miser who so

carefully guarded his treasure that it was of no practical

p.

4.

p.

38 La Prensa , January 5, 1920, p.
6; August 6, 1922, p. 5.
39 Ibid.

6;

September 10, 1921,

August 8, 1922, p. 7. Another La Prensa
article published on January 5, 1920 (p. 6) made clear
that paper's preference for domestic over foreign capital.
,
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value to him or anyone else. 4 °

if state control over the

nation's oil deposits meant that
they would remain unexploited, stated the Socialist organ,
we would not hesitate to support
any other system of exploitation
that would permit taking advantage
of that wealth now. 41
Public discontent with the government's
oil policy
found another outlet through Congressional
channels. On
August 24, 1920, Nicola's Repetto introduced
a resolution
requesting that the Minister of Agriculture come
before
the Chamber prepared with information on
state oil

exploitation. 42

In so doing, the articulate Socialist

spokesman touched off extended discussions which
occupied
the Chamber's attention intermittently until the
following

April. 43

At the outset, Repetto 's thinly disguised intention
was to engage Minister of Agriculture Demarchi in an open

discussion of the government's petroleum policy on the
floor of the Chamber.

Sensing this, the Radical Deputies

40 La Vanguardia July
,
7, 1920, p. 1.

41 Ibid.
42 Diputados, Diario,
1920, IV,

452,

43 For the
Chamber discussions which stemmed from
Repetto's resolution, see Ibid . , 1920, IV, 452-463, 698711, 770-791, 838-873, 948-965; 1920; V, 410-413, 448-455,

482-483, 548-577; 1920; VII, 18-21, 351-369, 371-432, 435470, 481-507, 510-538, 550-565, 572-596, 600-645, 650-693,
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employed their numerical superiority to
delete from
Repetto »s proposal a request for information
concerning the
"definitive mode of exploitation to be employed
in the

Comodoro Rivadavia fields/' while lending
their approval
to a more innocuous application for
statistical
data on

the state firm. 44

When Demarchi refused to attend the Chamber and
instead
sent a written reply, Repetto resorted to an alternate

plan of attack.

He confronted the Chamber with a series of

allegations to the effect that Finance Minister Domingo E.

Salaberry had used his official position to gain advantages
for the Astra petroleum company in which the Minister had
an active financial interest. 45

Originally, Repetto

699-722, 804-809.
44 Specif ically

Repetto requested information on the
number of wells in the federal reserve, the monthly production, transport and sale of petroleum, and the contracts in
existence for the sale of state oil.
45

,

Salaberry was a partner in the firm of Salaberry and
Bercetche, which held shares in the Astra oil company which
had producing wells in Comodoro Rivadavia. Repetto alleged
that Astra was being allowed to use the State's machinery,
laborers and police, and that the crude oil which Astra
sold to the State contained up to 30% water when the maximum tolerance level was 2%. He further charged that state
owned shipr, were transporting Astra's oil to Buenos Aires
for a minimal fee while Astra's own tanker was transporting
frieght back and forth from Brazil for rates considerably
above what the company paid the State to transport oil.
Finally, Repetto charged Salaberry with malfeasance in connection with the transfer of some property in the Dock Sur
region of the Capital where government permission to build
a depository for inflammables was involved.
For the intro-
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probably intended to explode these charges on the head of
the Minister of Agriculture had Demarchi come to the

Chamber, but now he settled for the appointment of an in-

vestigating committee.
Though the Radical Deputies put up
their position was untenable.

a

stiff resistance,

Had they voted down an in-

vestigation of Repetto's charges, the presumption of guilt

would have lain as a heavy burden on both Salaberry and the
administration.

Left without recourse, the Radicals did

They approved an investigating com-

the next best thing.

mittee and staffed it with a majority from their own party.
The committee's majority report, which was signed only by
the three Radical members and approved by the Chamber,
46
completely exonerated Salaberry.

duction of Repetto's charges, see Diputados, Diario
IV, 847-850, 956.

,

1920,

46 Both the majority and the minority reports are
printed in the Diario 1920, VII, 18-21. On the basis of
the Chamber debates, and in the absence of any documentation on the Committee's work, it is fair to conclude that
the charge involving the Dock Sur lands was totally unfounded (see Delfor de Valle's refutation, Ibid . 1920,
,

,

guilty
IV, 852-853, 951.), and that, at best, Salaberry was
while
of indiscretion for maintaining private oil interests
Salaberry' s position was not ena government Minister.
hanced by the fact that his dealings in the sugar industry
which
were also under investigation, arid tne same committee
handled the petroleum charges was assigned to look into
allegations that Salaberry had participated in import-export
revenues
dealings designed to defraud the government of duty
report
These latter charges were the subject of the minority

from the committee.
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The significance of the prolonged and often heated

Chamber exchanges lay not so much in the success or failure
of Repetto's maneuvering as in the Radical's hesitancy to

disclose information regarding the government's petroleum
policy.

The Radical Deputies were on the defensive through-

out this affair, constantly back peddling in the face of
the onslaught led by Repetto.

When challenged on a matter

of primary public importance, neither the UCR Deputies nor
the administration came forward with evidence of a care-

fully considered policy designed to maximize the nation's

benefits from its oil resources.

The consistent badgering of the government over its

management of petroleum matters and the chaotic administrative condition of the state oil firm combined to pro-

duce the only positive and enduring contribution of

Yrigoyen's first presidency to national petroleum development.

Through an Executive Decree issued on June

3,

1922,

Yrigoyen and his Minister of Agriculture created the
"Direccion General de Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales"
(YPF)

to administer the state industry. 4 7

what would eventually become

a model

In establishing

government agency,

however, Yrigoyen was reacting to events rather than

shaping them.

In particular, he was responding to mounting

47 YPF, Recopilacion , I, 95-97.
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pressure for a full scale inquiry into the
post-1917
record of the state oil firm which arose after
the

resignation of Demarchi as Minister of Agriculture in

March 1922.
Following Demarchi" s departure, Foreign Minister
Pueyrredo'n doubled as Agricultural Minister until
the

appointment of Eudoro Vargas Gomez to fill the post
on
April

8.

Vargas Gomez, a native of Corrientes, had pre-

viously served the Yrigoyen government as a federal inter-

vener

in Mendoza and was the Second Vice President of
the

Radical Party.

Before holding office one month, the new Minister
focused government and public attention on the state oil
company.

He stopped payment for goods and services deliv-

ered to it by domestic and foreign concerns, pending an

investigation into alleged irregularities in the conduct
of the firm's affairs which had been brought to his

attention.

AO

While no specific charges were made public,

La Prensa reported from an extraof f icial source that in

a

May 5th Cabinet meeting Vargas Gomez discussed a cutback in
production in Comodoro Rivadavia due to insufficient storage
and transportation facilities, the lack of a uniform market

48 La Prensa May
2, 1922, p. 9, June 1, 1922, p. 10;
,
La Nacion , June 2, 1922, p. 4; RRIAA , Riddle to Hughes,
May 10, 1922, 835.00/298.
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price for state oil, irregularities in the firm's bookkeeping, and the increasing number of highly-paid administra-

tive personnel in Comodoro Rivadavia. 49

In addition,

questions were being raised about the management of the

government-run store in Comodoro Rivadavia and the system
used to pay laborers. 50

In short, Vargas Gomez was con-

fronting essentially the same questions which would be

treated later in Mosconi's reports.

Despite the seriousness of the charges, Vargas Gomez

was unable to win support for an investigation from either
the Cabinet or the President.

While some Ministers backed

his demand, others preferred simply to intervene the petro-

leum administration and place control in the hands of a

committee similar to the one which existed prior to

November 1917."^

Lacking the executive support which was

crucial to his designs, Vargas Gomez attempted to apply

pressure through a personal boycott.

Beginning on May 22,

he refused to enter his office or to perform any of his

duties as Minister of Agriculture,

While officially

pleading illness, he closeted himself in his La Plata home,
emerging only to discuss the oil question with Yrigoyen

49 La Prensa , May 6,
50 Ibid

. ,

51 Ibid.

,

1922, p. 11.

May 4, 1922, p.
May 10, 1922, p.

8.

7.
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and/or the Cabinet. 52

Pressure for prompt executive action

mounted with the report that when the 1922 Congressional
sessions opened, Rodolfo Moreno Jr.
B.A. Prov.)

(Conservative Party,

intended to introduce a motion requesting de-

tailed information from the Executive Branch on the affairs
of the state petroleum enterprise.

3

Yrigoyen could delay no longer.

At the same time,

he was not about to sanction Vargas Gomez's investigation

since it would disclose, if not malfeasance, at least the

negligence and incompetence with which the state oil firm
had been handled since 1917.

His answer was the June

3

decree creating YPF. 54

Aside from the first two articles which provided for
the creation of YPF within the Ministry of Agriculture and

placed the Plaza Huincul installations under YPF's jurisdiction, the decree clearly reflected the spate of charges

which led to its issuance.

Article

3

empowered the Minister

of Agriculture to fix periodically the price for state oil

52 La Raz^n, May 31, 1922,
p. 1, June 3, 1922, p. 1;
La Prensa , June 1, 1922, p. 10, June 2, 1922, p. 11; La
Vanguardia , June 2, 1922, p. 1; RRIAA , Riddle to Hughes,

June

8,

1922, 835.00/302.

53 La Prensa
May 3, 1922, p.
,

The regular 1922
CongressTonal sessions did not open until July.
11.

-^1 have no information on why Vargas Gomez yielded

and signed this decree. Given Yrigoyen' s attitude toward
ministerial advice, however, the outcome was not surprising
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products, and Articles

4

through

7

minutely detailed the

procedures YPF was to follow in making
all purchases.
Most interesting of all, however, was
the final provision,
Article 8:
The Ministry of Agriculture will authorize
the payment of the accounts contracted
by
the present Petroleum Administration, [and]
the Executive Power hereby approves the
investments, accounts and activities
authorized to date by the Ministry of
Agriculture. 55

Here was Yrigoyen's answer to the proposed
investigation.
He summarily wiped the slate clean and decreed
a new

beginning.
The outstanding characteristic of the June

3

decree

was the extent to which ultimate control over state ex-

ploitation was left to the Minister of Agriculture.

Not

only was he empowered to set market prices, but his

authorization was required at every stage of the process
through which YPF was to make its purchases.

This tendency

toward exaggerated ministerial control was re-emphasized
in Vargas Gomez's Ministerial Resolution on June 8, 1922

which spelled out the steps for implementing the decree. 56

55 YPF,

Recopilacion , I, 97, The section of this
article referring to approval of the accounts of the petroleum agency was contrary to Article 16 of the National Budget
which provided that the^ureau's accounts had to be submitted to the "Contaduria General de la Nacion" for review.
56 YPF, Recopilacion
I, 98-102.
,
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The new bureau, as it emerged from
these two documents, was an advisory rather than a
decision-making one.
YPF was to function as a clearing house,
gathering information on pertinent matters for presentation
to the Minister
of Agriculture. Particularly because of
the lack
of

autonomy, there was little to distinguish YPF
from the Petroleum Commission of pre-1917 days.

Yrigoyen's creation of YPF understandably drew
fire
from the opposition press.

La Vanguardia described the new

oil agency as "an absurd bureaucratic mechanism"
whose

only purpose was to spread "a pious cloak over such an
ugly
matter,- 57 while La Prensa charged that Vargas Gomez
had sponged off the slate of petroleum
administration, a slate whose picture
shocked him, and which [the administration] considered it expedient to write
on anew without worrying about past
incidents. 58

Both papers criticized YPF's lack of autonomy, 59 but
frustration was the keynote in their comments - frustration

born of the knowledge that Yrigoyen had outmaneuvered the

opposition and successfully whitewashed five years of

mismanagement in the state petroleum firm.

As La Vanguardia

57 La Vanguardia , June 8, 1922, p. 1.
58 La Prensa , June 5, 1922, p.
59 La

5.

Vanguardia June 4, 1922, p. 1; La Prensa
June 5,~T922, p. 5, June 21, 1922, p. 6.
,

,
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put it,
For all the noise made, something else
should have happened. We confess that
our thunder has been stolen. 60

One last, anticlimatic attempt to force the adminis-

tration into a public disclosure of the facts surrounding
the development of the public oil industry followed the

opening of the 1922 Congressional sessions on July

6.

Two weeks into the sessions, five Conservative Party

Deputies, all from Buenos Aires Province and led by

Rodolfo Moreno

Jr., requested Chamber approval of a list

of 51 questions addressed to the Executive Power on the

subject of state exploitation. 61
in the list.

There was nothing novel

In fact, it was nothing more than a restate-

ment of past allegations about the Radical government's
conduct of the public's petroleum company.

From July 20 to July 28, Moreno, ably seconded by
Nicola's Repetto,

fought for approval of the questions in

a debate frequently marred by heated exchanges.

62

Their

bU La Vanguardia , June 4, 1922, p. I.
61 Diputados, Diario , 1922, II,

39-41.
For the ensuing
debate, see 42-72, 214-251, 368-399, 442-451.
62 So heated did the discussions become that five
challenges for duels were issued and two were actually
fought. La Prensa , July 29, 1922, p. 11, July 30, 1922,
p. 12, July 31, 1922, p. 7; RRIAA , Riddle to Hughes,
August 16, 1922, 835.00/360.
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efforts, however, had little chance for
success.

Optimism

beyond all reasonable bounds plus a large
measure of
political naivete' were necessary to believe

that the

Yrigoyen administration, less than three
months from its
termination, was going to divulge information
which might
tarnish its reputation. Radical Deputies loyal
to the

President used their voting power to emasculate the
proposal,
reducing the original 51 questions to 11 innocuous
queries

which could have been answered by reading the newspapers.
Still, the administration was taking no changes.

Not until

February 1, 19 23, long after Yrigoyen had left the Casa

*****

Rosada, did the Chamber receive a reply to its inquiries. 63

Viewed as an industrial venture, the state oil company
displayed amazing resilience under chronic mismanagement.
Few private businesses could have survived under similar
circumstances.

The firm's energies, however, were

apparently dissipated in the fight for survival, for its

63 Diputados, Diario , 1922, VI, 128-129.
The text of the
reply was not printed in the Diario, but a copy may be consulted in Diputados, Yacimientos petrolif eros f iscales ;
Antecedentes I , 137 -544 . This, document is dated Augus t 2 3,
,

1922 and was prepared by Joaquin Spinelli.
It was, therefore, at Yrigoyen' s disposal had he chosen to submit it to
the Chamber.
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productive capacity expanded slowly from
1920 to 1922.
In April 1919, Fliess, then the head
man in Comodoro
Rivadavia, presented the Minister of
Agriculture with a
five-year plan for increasing production
in the federal
reserve. He offered both a maximum 'and
a minimum

program,

each to be financed from the sales of
state oil.

The

minimum plan was based upon the continued use
of the same
number of drilling machines employed in 1919
and projected
a yield of 300,000 m 3 of crude oil in
1920, 380,000 m3
in

1921, and 430,000 m3 by 1922.

The maximum plan presupposed

additional drilling apparatus and forecast the extraction
of 650,000 m 3 of crude oil by 1922. 64

in reality, the

Comodoro Rivadavia fields produced 226,554 m 3 in 1920,
277,807 m 3 in 1921, and 343,910 m 3 in 1922. 65
In terms of domestic oil consumption, Comodoro

Rivadavia supplied less than one-third of the national

market in 1922, and the demand was expanding faster than

64 M

de Agric, Memoria 1919 , 18; Felipe Fliess,
"El petroleo de Comodoro Rivadavia," Boletin del Centro
Naval , XXXX (November-December 1922) , 439-446.
,

V

65 BIP

December 1936, 18. The Plaza Huincul installa
tions remained under the control of the National Bureau of
Mines until the June 3, 1922 decree creating YPF. YPF
actually took over in December of that year. Production
from these deposits was still minimal - 611 m 3 in 1920,
919 m 3 in 1921, and 4,978 m 3 in 1922.
Ibid., 29.
,
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the production capacity of the state enterprise. 66

Furthermore, Argentina imported well over
2,000,000 tons of
coal in 1922.
in short, Argentina was becoming
less

rather than more self-sufficient in terms of fuel
supply.

Although problems with the acquisition of industrial

machinery 68 and labor unrest 69 continued to hinder the
state' firm's development, the best tonic for its lagging

growth rate would have been competent, efficient leadership
in the top administrative positions.

As far as private exploitation was concerned, Yrigoyen

66 BIP, May 1927,

In 1922, Argentina consumed
1,073,599 tons of crude and fuel oil as compared to the
state company's production in Comodoro Rivadavia of
320,863 tons. Private companies made up only a fraction of
the difference with their 97,972 tons, while the remainder,
654,764 tons, was imported. Between 1921 and 1922, consumption rose nearly 150,000 tons, and the government firm
increased its output by 65,420 tons; the figures for
1922-1923 were 170,000 tons of increased consumption as
compared to an increase of 61,005 tons in state production.
6

471.

Ibid.

68 D.

G. de Explotacion, Memoria,
agency's 19 21 Memoria explained that,

The petroleum
in contrast to the war
years, the problem of acquiring new machinery was not availability but inflation in the most prominent manufacturing
countries which weakened the purchasing power of Argentina's
foreign exchange. Memoria, 1921, 12-13.
1920, 67.

69 For comments on labor conditions in the state company,
see Ibid., 1919 , 5; Diputados, Diario , 1920, IV, 846
(Repetto) ; La Vanguardia , April 1, 1921, p. 1, March 20,
1922, p. 4, June 10, 1922, p. 1; RRIAA , Riddle to Hughes,

June 6, 1922, 83 5.6363/14 6, enclosure 1. The major oil
strike of this period occurred between December 1919 and
March 1920 in the Comodoro Rivadavia fields. La Vanguardia'
daily reports on the strike's progress provide the most
complete, if biased, account of this incident.
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maintained his policy of welcoming both foreign
and
domestic capital, while doing nothing to make
petroleum
investment an attractive proposition. Most

importantly,

the national oil law which had been promised
since 1916

was still nonexistent.

The administration's 1919 bill on

oil concessions was prompted, according to Yrigoyen,
by
the desire to promote private production.™

However, as we

have seen, the Radicals made no serious effort to win

Congressional sanction of that measure.
In the resulting legislative void, as one American

official commented, the advisability of investing in

Argentine oil depended upon whether or not
the Argentine Government, through its Bureau
of Mines, is going to so supplement, and
construe, and apply the provisions of the
existing general Mining Code as to make it
as easy and as favorable as possible for
petroleum mining operation. 7 ^-

The security of invested capital, therefore, depended as

much upon the attitude of government officials as it did
upon legal statutes.

Even given the fact that the National

Bureau of Mines, the department responsible for granting

mineral rights, consistently pursued an "exceedingly
liberal policy" with respect to oil concessions during the

70 Diputados, Diario,
7

1919, V, 481.

^RRIAA, Robertson to Hughes, June 1, 1922,
835.6363/147.
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Yrigoyen years, 72 conditions were less than ideal
for
petroleum investment.
Among prospective investors, North Americans proved

more hesitant to accept the prevailing legal situation
than their European counterparts.

Stanley C. Herold, a

mining engineer experienced in the Argentine petroleum
arena, explained what American investors were looking for.

We do not ask for unbounded liberality,
nor do we seek special favors. We only
want definite, practical regulations by
which we can clearly abide without recourse to technical evasion of the law,
and which will give our capital a chance
of producing proper returns. Technical
evasion of the law has a very bad taste
to the oil capitalist, for he is aware
of the risk involved. We may not accuse
him for being an angel, but we may safely
consider him a good business man.... 73
Specifically, the inducements Americans were seeking in-

cluded larger land grants for exploration and exploitation,

more time to conduct geological studies and drill test
wells, assurances against prohibitive production and export
taxes, and the exemption from import duties of necessary

industrial equipment. 74

7 2ibid.
7

Gibson to Hughes, December 29
835.6363/100, enclosure 2.
Ibid.

,

74 Ibid .

,

,

1921,

White to Hughes, June 22, 1921, 835.6363/65;
A.C. Veatch (Sinclair Exploration Co.) to Hughes,
September 29, 1921, 835.6363/80; A.C. Veatch to Hughes,
October 27, 1921, 835.6363/89; Gibson to Hughes

5
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Without saying so explicitly, U.S. investors preferred conditions which would have permitted petroleum

exploitation on the same large scale to which they were
accustomed to operating in the United States and other
foreign lands like Mexico,

what Yrigoyen did not want.

This, of course, was precisely

Large-scale operations were

impossible under the provisions of the 1886 Mining Code,
and they also would have been out of the question had the

government's bill on oil concessions become law.

Minister

of Agriculture Demarchi emphasized the government's position

on oil trusts in a 1920 interview with Alberto A. Moreno,
a reprensentative of Standard Oil of New Jersey:

As you are no doubt aware, there has
always been a prejudice against the
encouragement of monopolistic tendencies in the development of the resources
of the country, and to be quite candid
with you, the Standard Oil Company has
enjoyed the reputation of favoring those
tendencies to the extent of requiring
Government intervention. You would be
welcome in Argentina only if you adjust
yourself to the laws of the country. 7

North Americans were also handicapped by their ignorance about Argentina, a condition attributable in part to
the relatively recent entry of American capital into that

December 29, 1921, 835.6363/100; A.C. Veatch to Hughes,
February 17, 1922, 835.6363/108.
Wadsworth to Colby, October 30, 1920,
835.6363/38, enclosure 1.
75 Ibid .

,
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part of the world.

An Argentine oil man, explaining
to
Ambassador Stimson why Argentines
preferred to deal with
British rather than American
capitalists, noted that
Americans displayed little knowledge
of Argentina's
Physical characteristics. American
companies often
arrived equipped for work in a tropical
climate when the
latitude of the Comodoro Rivadavia area
was comparable to
that of Maine or North Dakota in the
United States.

Furthermore, he added, Americans demanded
excessive

guarantees for their capital, while the British,
who were
familiar with the country, its people, and its
government,
knew how to operate effectively under existing
76
conditions.

American representatives in Buenos Aires cautioned
that U.S. investors had to overcome their squeamishness
on

pain of being crowded out of the Argentine petroleum

industry particularly by the British and the Germans. 77

Their warning, however, had little effect.

Aside from the

efforts of Standard Oil (New Jersey) to gain control over
oil lands in Neuquen, Salta, and Jujuy, American capitalists

76 Ibid .

,

White to Hughes, June 22, 1921,

835.636 3765".
7

Ibid. , White to Hughes, June 22, 1921, 835.6363/65;
Stimson to Hughes, June 27, 1921, 835.6363/67; White to
Hughes, December 23, 1921, 835.6363/101.
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were content to let Europeans take
the lead. 78
Private and state exploitation remained

separated,

as the government refused to enter
into a mixed company

arrangement.

The most serious offer along these lines

came from the Lord Cowdray interests of
London in 1920.
After first approaching Yrigoyen through the
Argentine

Minister in London, Alvarez de Toledo, Cowdray
sent an
agent to speak with the President about joint
state-private

development of the federal reserve in Comodoro Rivadavia.
Their negotiations broke off when the government refused
to concede full technical control over the proposed
opera-

tion to the private investors. 79

Despite legal and other difficulties, both private

production and speculation in exploration rights increased
significantly between 1920 and 1922.

Crude oil production

rose from 35,372 m 3 in 1920 to 106,609 m 3 in 1922. 80

in

78 For the progress of Standard's
activities in
Argentina, see Ibid . , Wadsworth to Colby, October 30, 1920,
835.6363/38; Warfield (Standard Oil) to Hughes, September
28, 1921, 835.6363/79; White to Hughes, November 30, 1921,
835.6363/95; White to Hughes, January 28, 1922, 835.6363/

111, enclosure 1,
79 La Epoca
July 4, 1920, p. 1; La Nacioji, July 10,
,
1920, p. 4; RRIAA , Bursley to Colby, January 9, 1920,
835.6363/16; Wiley to Colby, July 30, 1920, 835.6363/29.
80 BIP

December 1936, 19-22. Of the four producing
companies in 1922, all were located in Comodoro Rivadavia,
two were formed with British capital, one primarily with
German funds, and one with principally Argentine capital.
RRIAA, White to Hughes, November 30, 1921, 835.6363/95.
,
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absolute terms, the 1922 production level was
not impressive, but due to the relative stagnation of
state opera-

tions, private capital expanded its share of the
total

national production from 13.4% in 1920 to 23.4% in 1922.
More extraordinary was the literal explosion of

speculative activity in petroleum exploration permits.

In

the best known oil districts - Chubut, Santa Cruz, and
Neuque'n - the government registered 322 requests for

mineral exploration rights between 1917 and 1919.

Between

1920 and 1922, 6,926 applications pertaining to those

three areas flooded across government desks. 81

The speculative nature of this activity clearly

emerges from a comparison between the number of applications

which were followed up by the original applicant until an
exploration permit was actually issued, and the number

which were transferred by the original applicant to someone else while the application was still pending government
action.

In the three oil districts mentioned above, the

number of permits issued remained roughly the same for two
periods 1917-1919 and 1920-1922 - 106 in the first case

81 D.

The figures
de Minas, Memoria , 1923 , 20-22.
given above represent the total number of requests submitted for mineral exploration rights, not solely those
which related to petroleum. However, nearly all the
requests for the three regions cited were for oil rights.
Ibid . , 13-14; RRIAA , Riddle to Hughes, April 18, 1922,
G.

835.6363/138.
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and 113 in the second.
sernnH 82

At the same time, the
number of
transfers recorded jumped from
40 in the first period
to

532 in the second.

m

nearly every case, the transfer

involved a request for oil
exploration rights being
processed by the government." i„
short, the objective of
most of the original applicants
was to gain paper rights
over potential petroleum lands and
to sell those rights at
a profit.
So prevalent was this type of
activity that one
American official saw fit to report in
November 1921 that
All the good claims for oil are in the
hands of big petroleum companies or of
persons connected with or directed by
them, with whom negotiation is impossible. When the prospecting permissions now pending with the Government will be granted [they] will form
with the secured concessions the best
of what can be obtained in Comodoro
Rivadavia. 84
The termination of WW

I

and the consequent renewed

flow of capital in international circles was undoubtedly
the prime factor in making funds available for investment
in Argentine petroleum.

In addition, the war experience

magnified the importance of oil in war time and in peace,
and, in so doing, made the petroleum industry and even more

82 D,

de Minas, Memoria, 1923, 20-22,

J,

83 Ibid

. ,

84 RRIAA

835.6363/95.

,

15,

38.

White to Hughes, November 30, 1921,
enclosure 6.
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attractive and potentially lucrative
field of investment.
Beyond this general incentive, the
outburst of private
speculation in Argentina may have been
connected with the
inauguration of Marcelo T. de Alvear as
President in

October 1922.

Private interests may have been jockeying

for position, attempting to gain control
over as much oil
land as possible in the hope that the Alvear
administra-

tion would adopt a petroleum policy to their
liking.

In December 1921, the American Embassy predicted
that
if Alvear were elected, legislation permitting
large-scale

petroleum operations would follow. 85
after Alvear'

s

six mont hs later,

election, the American Consul General

restated the earlier prediction, adding,
the President-elect, Dr. Alvear, is a man
of such family connections and personal
antecedents as to inspire full confidence
in the progressiveness of his coming administration. Accordingly, there would
seem to be reason to feel sure that the
National Government will not impose in the
future an annual tax upon petroleum areas
that would be unjust or confiscatory, and
that it will not impose unreasonable
production taxes upon mines located in the
National Territories, or unreasonable
export taxes upon oil. 86

Another look at the figures on applications for

8

Ibid.

,

White to Hughes, December 23, 1921,

835.63637101.
8

Ibid. , Robertson to Hughes, June 1, 1922, 835.6363/147.
See also, Riddle to Hughes, July 26, 1922, 835.6363/172.
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exploration rights also suggests
that investors were
gambling on Alvear's policy,
of the 6,926 applications
submitted between 1920 and
1922, 65; were submitted in
1922 when Alvear's succession was
assured, and if you
include 1921 when Alvear's choice
as Yrigoyen's replacement was rumored, the figure
reaches 90%. 87

*****

As Yrigoyen's term drew to a
close on October 12,
1922, there was little to distinguish
the Argentine

petroleum picture from what it had been
on October 12 six
years before. On the level of rhetoric,
the Radical
government had ennunicated a nationalist
oil policy
which featured federalization of the nation's

oil deposits,

state exploitation of the Comodoro Rivadavia
and Plaza

Huincul reserves, and closely-regulated, small-scale

private exploitation in all other areas.

However, in

practice it took no effective measures to implement this
policy, and Yrigoyen's first administration bequeathed
a

petroleum record nearly barren of accomplishments.

The oil

question which had presented both a challenge and an

opportunity to Yrigoyen in 1916 was passed to Alvear for
solution.

87 D.

G.

de Minas, Memoria, 1923, 20-22.

CHAPTER
ALVEAR

IV

THE MOSCONI ERA

I:

Marcelo T. de Alvear's election as Yrigoyen
successor was welcomed by interested observers
for varying
and even contradictory reasons. Alvear's

long and close

relationship with Yrigoyen, along with the
superficial
unity which still characterized Radical ranks,
made plausible La Epoca's prediction that Alvear would continue
the

work of the "reparacion"

1

it was expected that Alvear

would seek and execute Yrigoyen' s desires while the Party's
chieftain took a constitutionally mandated six-year respite from the official seat of power.

Meanwhile, those connected with the private sector of
the petroleum industry were looking for change.

Conversant

with Alvear's conservative reputation, they entertained
guarded hopes that the new administration would relieve
the legal uncertainty which had burdened the petroleum

industry in the past and provide a framework which would

^ La Epoca , October 5,

1922, p. 3.
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stimulate rather than intimidate private
investment.2
Both La Epoca and private investors were
to be disappointed
The prediction of the one and the hopes of the
other would
fall victim to a strongly nationalistic petroleum
policy

which few expected from Alvear's government on October
12,
1922.

The overall record of Alvear's administration was no

surprise to those who expected something of a conservative

reaction after six years of Yrigoyenist Radicalism.
Yrigoyen's long-time friend and political lieutenant

directed his government along lines more consonant with
19th century liberalism than with the philosophy of in-

creased governmental interference in social and economic
affairs espoused by Yrigoyen.

Favored with six years of

domestic peace and prosperity, Alvear's term was discreet
and correct.

His biographer, Felix Luna, accurately

sketched the general outlines of Alvear's government,

Certainly during the tranquil years of his
presidency, state interference in national
affairs was at a minimum. .. .Given to
imitating the general principles of the old
European politics within the Argentine
framework, Alvear believed in the virtues
of a liberalism dedicated to preserving
the status quo from afar.

2

RRIAA, Robertson to Hughes, June 1, 1922, 835.6363/
147; Riadle to Hughes, July 26, 1922, 835.6363/172.
3 Felix

1958)

,

64.

Luna, Alvear (Buenos Aires: Libros Argentinos,
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The problem is, however, that the tenets
of 19th century
liberalism provide no clues for understanding
the nationalistic oil policy of Alvear's government and
particularly
the vigorous support afforded YPF's development.

Doctrinal

consistency should have prompted Alvear to phase out
statefunded industrial activity, leaving the field to interested

private firms.

That this failed to materialize can be traced to at
least three sources.

First, state petroleum exploitation

was an ongoing enterprise - part of the status quo - and to

halt it would have aroused stiff opposition among its supporters.

Secondly, as we shall see, during the Alvear

years the case of the oil nationalists became increasingly
popular, and, therefore, a government policy in accord with

their demands was a political asset.

Lastly, and most

importantly, Alvear's conception of the Chief Executive's
role in government made possible and even predictable a

degree of doctrinal diversity in the government's policies.
Unlike Yrigoyen, he viewed excessive presidential

authority as one of the key weaknesses in Argentine

political life.

Drawing perhaps upon his knowledge of

European political institutions gained during long
periods of residence abroad, Alvear preferred the position
of moderator in a government actually run by carefully

chosen and capable Ministers.

This explains why his

5
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Ministerial appointments were all men of outstanding
reputation as opposed to the lesser figures who had
served
in Yrigoyen's Cabinet.

Alvear's implementation of his con

cept of the Executive is reflected in the taunt from
critics that his government was one of "eight presidents
and a secretary general". 4

Given the Alvear approach, his

chief subordinates were in a position to exercise a

decisive influence on policy making.

In the case of pe-

troleum, both Tomas A. Le Breton, Alvear's first Minister
of Agriculture, and General Enrique Mosconi, Director

General of YPF (1922-1930)

,

took full advantage of the

opportunity.

Intensive activity took place on two fronts of the

petroleum question during the early months of Alvear's
administration.

Minister Le Breton, for his part, concen-

trated upon the dual problem of halting speculation in oil

exploration rights and obtaining the long overdue national
oil law.

Mosconi, meanwhile, dedicated his efforts to

reorganizing the state oil industry and turning it into a

major producer of domestic fuel.
Le Breton's expertise lay in agricultural matters,

4 Del

Mazo, El radicalising , 24; Luna, Alvear , 57-58.

5 Mosconi's

rank was that of a Colonel when he took
charge of YPF in 1922, but he was promoted to General in
1926 and will be referred to by that rank in the text.
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but his initial concern as Minister was to
stop the wild
speculation in petroleum exploration rights which
developed
during the final years of Yrigoyen's presidency. 6
He

wasted no time.

His first official act was to instruct the

Director of the National Bureau of Mines to suspend the

processing of all requests for exploration permits and to
conduct

^in

requests.

investigation into the status of all pending
It was an unprecedented action, but one jus-

tified in Le Breton's mind by the need to halt the chaotic

scramble for petroleum rights which threatened to cripple
the industry.

7

Speculators had found the road to profit paved by the

archaic provisions of the 1886 Mining Code.

Le Breton

outlined the speculator's game for the Chamber of Deputies
in October 19 23:

requests exploration
permits and seeks a buyer, but while
he does not find one, he interrupts
and prolongs the processing of his reThus, we find the situation
quest.
where exploration works that should
have been initiated within 30 days [of
the submission of the permit request]
have been delayed for five and one-half
years with absolutely nothing having
[The speculator]

6 See

Chapter III, 125-127.

7 Diputados,

Diario , 1923, VII, 490.
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been done until the day the desired
buyer is found, and then that exploration permit which only cost 10
pesos is sold for 100,000 ptsos
8

Central here is the fact that formal
issuance of the
exploration permit was not necessary to secure
the applicant's claim to the lands concerned. The
speculator's

preferential rights were established with the
registration
of his request and were maintained while it
was being
processed.

Though not absolutely necessary, it was to the

speculator's advantage to sell his rights before the ex-

ploration permit was issued.

If he was unable to do so,

he faced the expense of the official measurement and

marking of his claim, along with the fact that his rights

would then be secure for only the 300-day
permit. 9

terra of the

More importantly, once a permit was issued,

8 Ibid.

Le Breton's reference to 10 pesos was to
the cost of the official paper upon which all requests for
mineral rights had to be submitted to the Bureau of Mines.
,

489.

^Measuring the boundaries of a claim and placing the
markers was one of the final steps before the permit was
granted. Under ordinary circumstances this task was entrusted to the concessionaire, but in the case of valuable
minerals like oil it was done by government employees at
the expense of the concessionaire.
In Chubdt (Comodoro
Rivadavia) and Neuquen (Plaza Huincul) , the areas of
primary interest to speculators, the cost of measuring a
claim was about 1000 pesos. If a large number of permit
requests reached the measuring stage, the speculator faced
a considerable investment if he wanted to maintain his
rights. Velarde, Las minas de petroleo , 41-42.
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exploration work had to be started within 30 days
and sustained for the duration of the grant. Failure to
comply

with these regulations meant the immediate termination
of
the concessionaire's rights. 10

Clearly, therefore, maximum

profit lay in peddling exploration rights prior to issuance
of the actual permit.

The scale upon which some parties

indulged in this activity may be guaged from the fact that
in 1922 one individual had pending before the mining

authorities 242 permit requests involving over 300,000

hectares of land, and another group had submitted over
1000 requests covering about 1,000 ,000 hectares. 11

While there seems to have been little basis for the
fears held in some quarters that speculation was aimed at,

or would lead to, monopolization of Argentina's petroleum
reserves, *2

10 Ibid .

j.t

did create problems for nearly everyone

60-61.
Le Breton suggested that failure to
enforce these regulations in the past had facilitated the
designs of speculators, (Diputados, Diario 1923, VII,
489.) while the Bureau of Mines complained about insufficient funds to adequately inspect private works and enforce the law. D. G. de Minas , Memoria 1923 , 15.
,

,

,

U Diputados,

Diario , 1923, VII, 489-490.

12 Carlos E. Velarde

who served as Chief of the
Inspectior. Division of the Bureau of Mines during part of
the Yrigoyen presidency denied there was any serious threat
If the prospect arose, he claims, it could
of monopoly.
have been quashed simply by enforcing the requirement that
each and every exploration lot be continuously worked. No
company, he maintained, had sufficient resources to fulfill
this condition on enough lots to monopolize any of the
nation's oil districts. Velarde, Las minas de petroleo
,
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connected with the nation's oil industry,

m

the case of

the National Bureau of Mines, the flood
of exploration

permit requests paralyzed the machinery for
processing the
applications. Unable to contend with the
superabundance
of work foisted upon it, the Bureau by 1922
was

paying lit-

tle or no attention to pending applications,
and almost no

permits were issued during the latter half of the
year. 13
Le Breton's order to halt processing of exploration
permits
simply placed the official stamp on an administrative
logjam inherited from the Yrigoyen administration.

Legitimate private investors intent upon developing
oil deposits found their situation doubly complicated.

Those seeking exploration lands were often forced to deal

with speculators who not only received substantial prices
for high-potential areas but frequently demanded a royalty
as well on any oil discovered. 14

Investors who had permit

requests pending before the authorities, either through

original application or through purchase from speculators,

encountered a different problem.

Acting under the

assumption that their requests would be processed in accord

60-61.
13 RRIAA, Riddle to Hughes, May 23,

1923, 835.6363/222,

enclosure.
* 4 B.

Menendez, "Las concesiones de petro'leo y los
propietarios de tierra," La Accion November 30, 1922, p.
,

5.
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with the Mining Code, several companies
had timed the
arrival of exploration equipment and

crews to coincide

with the anticipated acquisition of their
permits. When
their permits were delayed, they went ahead
with operations
anyway and thereby created a new legal problem.
If one of

these companies discovered oil, would the
government deny
the firm exploitation rights on the grounds
that the dis-

covery had been made on land for which no valid
exploration

permit had been issued? 15
Officials of the state enterprise were not happy
about the effects of speculation either.

They were

especially anxious over the possibility that private interests would lay claim to all or most of the nation's oil
lands and leave YPF without room for expansion. 16

Mosconi,

in the light of this danger, actively supported the ef-

forts to ferret out irregularities in the granting of

petroleum rights and advocated the immediate creation of
new federal oil reserves in the Patagonian area and in
the northern and western reaches of the country.

17

15 RRIAA , Riddle to Hughes, May 23, 1923, 835.6363/222,
enclosure; Gibson to Hughes, November 28, 1923, 835.6363/

263, enclosure.
16 Diputados,

Diario, 1923, VII, 492 (from comments
made before the Chamber by Minister Le Breton)

^Mosconi, El petro'leo argentino

,

128-129.
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With speculation responsible for so
many inconveniences, there appeared to be little
reason

for anyone to

oppose Le Breton's attack on the
problem.

Private oil

interests, however, regarded his order
halting permit
processing as an arbitrary and unfriendly
18
act.

One

observer suggested the new Minister was
mistakenly trying
to apply in Argentina theories about government
control
over business to which he had been exposed while
he was

Argentine Ambassador to the United States. 19

From a legal

viewpoint, Le Breton's action may also have been questionable, but the true source of the private investors'

negative reaction was not so much damage sustained as a
general suspicion of any government measure that remotely

suggested close control over or exclusion of private capital
from Argentina's oil industry.
There is no reason to believe Le Breton wanted to

eliminate the private sector.

In May 1923, Bernard S. Van

Rensselaer, a lawyer for Standard Oil of California,

reported being told by Le Breton that
all serious companies which had undertaken work in good faith might safely
proceed with their operations in the

18 RRIAA, Riddle to Hughes, May 23, 1923, 835.6363/222,
enclosure; Robertson to Hughes, September 11, 19 23,

835.6363/249.
19 Ibid.

enclosure.

,

Riddle to Hughes, May 23, 1923, 835.6363/222,

139

assurance that they would be amply
protected and fairly treated by the
Government. 20
Less than two years later, Le Breton confirmed this

position in talks with Teodoro Becu, a lawyer representing

Standard Oil of New Jersey.

He assured Becu that the

Alvear administration had favored private participation in
the oil industry from the beginning, because the national

government lacked sufficient financial resources to explore
all the nation's oil territories. 21

Speculators rather

than legitimate investors were the target of the govern-

ment's policy which Le Breton described as "mines for the
miners" .22

Speculation was a nuisance, but it was merely an
outgrowth of a more fundamental problem, the lack of
adequate national petroleum legislation.

Le Breton himself

is alleged to have expressed amazement at the fact that

2 <>Ibid.

21 Ibid.

Riddle to Hughes f March 25, 1925, 835.6363/284,
enclosure 8. According to Becu, Le Breton cited Comodoro
Rivadavia as the only area where the government was
interested in limiting private activity. Le Breton had also
indicated to Van Rensselaer in 19 23 that he was not pleased
with private companies located hard on the boundaries of
the federal reserve in Comodoro Rivadavia where they could,
without expense, take advantage of exploratory work done
by YPF. Ibid . , Riddle to Hughes, May 23, 1923, 835.6363/
222, enclosure.
,

,

22 Diputados, Diario, 1923, VII, 489.
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*.

foreign firms "dared" enter Argentina
under existing
mineral laws. 23 His first corrective
step ±n

^

was an emergency measure intended to
place petroleum beyond the province of the Mining Code until
a definitive
oil law was passed.
In May 1923, he went before the

Chamber's Finance Committee to request the
insertion of a
rider in the 1924 budget bill which would have
empowered
the Minister of Agriculture to use his own discretion
in

deciding which petroleum concessions would be made and under what conditions.
ed. 24

His proposal was unanimously reject-

Temporarily stymied, Le Breton turned to more con-

ventional means, submitting two bills to Congress in

September 1923 over his signature and that of President
Alvear. 25

The more important of the two measures proposed

RRIAA, Robertson to Hughes, September 11, 1923,
835.6363/249.
24 Diputados, Diario,
1923, IV, 516-517; RRIAA , Riddle
to Hughes, May 23, 1923, 835.6363/222, enclosure.
Romeo
David Saccone, a member of the Finance Committee, paraphrased Le Breton's proposal for the Chamber this way,
"The Executive Branch is empowered to grant concessions
to companies whose interests would coincide with those of
the State." (Diputados, Diario , 1923, IV, 516.)
That Le
Breton chose to present his proposal to the Finance Committee is explained by the fact that since 1915 the annual
budget lav: had contained articles empowering the Executive
Branch to reinvest profits earned by the state oil works,
market state-produced products, etc.

25 Ibid.

,

VI, 244-256.
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alterations in 33 provisions of the Mining
Code, while
the second bill outlined new procedures
for handling
applications for mineral exploration rights.
Strictly
speaking, they were not oil bills since
they referred to
mineral deposits in general. Each contained
a number of
articles which applied only to oil along with
other articles
which either did not apply to oil or did so only
under
special circumstances.

This failure to concentrate spe-

cifically on petroleum is surprising in view of Le Breton's

consistent emphasis on oil problems.
The basic premise of the proposed Mining Code reform

insofar as it related to petroleum was described by President Alvear in a 1925 note to the Chamber requesting consideration of the bill:
It is indispensable to ensure that the
exploitation of national fuel is carried
out under legal conditions which assure
perfect control of the national interests,
and that the benefits of the mineral
wealth fulfill the public needs at the
provincial as well as the national
level. 26

Basic to the bill were two general provisions which would
have federalized all mineral deposits and authorized their

exploitation by the State.

These were not new proposals,

but their enactment would have altered fundamentally the

26 Ibid.

,

1925, IV, 307.
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nation's mineral law, centralizing control
over all
mineral development in the hands of the
national government.
The petroleum provisions would have required
all

private firms to be organized in accord with
Argentine law,

domiciled within the country, and subject to inspection
regulations established by the Executive Power. 27

Explora-

tion concessions were to be issued only to those who
could

prove their capacity to fulfill the conditions of the grant.

Concessions were to consist of a maximum of 2000 hectares
and to last for three years with possible extensions of up
to one more year.

While no limit was to be placed upon the

number of concessions one person or firm might acquire, concessionaires were obliged to begin exploring each lot within
six months of the issuance of the permit, maintain the work
uninterrupted" for the duration of the grant, and pay an

annual tax of 100 pesos on each 500 hectares held plus a

royalty of 20% on any crude oil and derivatives produced
in the process of exploration.
If oil was discovered, the concessionaire was to be

entitled to a 33-year renewable lease over an area ranging
from 81 to 810 hectares depending upon the number of

27specif ically prohibited from entering the Argentine
oil industry were all foreign nations and any corporations
in which a foreign government was a financial partner.
This provision was obviously aimed at the Anglo-Persian
syndicate in which the British government was a major
stockholder.
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discoveries made and the number of investors
involved.
The remainder of the exploration lot
was to revert to the
government either to be reserved for state
exploitation or
declared open for new private activity.
Concessionaires
were to pay a royalty of from 5 to 20% upon
production

depending upon the location of the wells and the
quality
of the oil. They were also to be liable for
maintaining a
level of production dictated by the Executive Power in

accord with the conditions of the deposit.

Finally, the

bill prohibited either the transfer of petroleum rights or
the exportation of oil without permission from government

authorities.

There can be no doubt that this bill was designed with

control of private companies in mind, but in some particulars it was more liberal than existing provisions of the

Mining Code.

Most important in this respect was the ex-

tension of the exploration period from 300 days to

possibly

4

years.

3

and

Furthermore, no limits were placed upon

the number and location of exploration lots, and the maxi-

mum size of the exploitation grant was expanded from
810 hectares. 28

56 7 to

Concessionaires were also given protection

28 There was no limit on the location of exploration
lots in the original Mining Code, but a Ministerial Resolution of January 31, 1911 declared there had to be a space
equal to the size of a third lot (2000 hectares) between
It was an attempt
any two lots granted to the same party.
to protect against the danger of one company obtaining exclusive rights over any single petroleum district. The
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against any increase in taxes or royalties
for the duration
of their grant.
The bill on the processing of applications
for mineral

exploration rights was an attempt "to assure the
just
application of the Code and. . .protect the legitimate
interests of those who dedicate themselves to mining." 29
It specified the data to be supplied to government
authorities, the exact time periods for the execution of each

step of the process, the penalties for failure to comply

with the regulations, and, in cases involving privately
owned lands, the prodedures for settling disputes over the

concessionaire's right of way.

Insurance against specula-

tion in petroleum rights was sought in two forms.

First,

all applicants had to prove ownership of adequate drilling

equipment and deposit in the National Bank a sum equal to
one-third of the value of that equipment.

The money was to

be returned only if the concessionaire started working his
lot within 30 days of the issuance of his permit.

Secondly,

the rigid time limits established for the completion of

each step involved in processing a permit request would
have made it impossible for a speculator to keep his

resolution had little effect, however, since companies
simply took care never to request adjoining lots under the
name / of the same individual. Velarde, Las minas de
petroleo , 58-59.
29 Diputados, Diario ,

1923, VI, 245

(from the message

145

request pending indefinitely while he sought a
buyer.
The administration's bills stirred only limited
comment.

Expected praise appeared in the government's semi-

official press arm, La Accion , along with a warning against

Congressional failure to sanction the proposed reforms.
Such inaction, it was observed,

would amount to conspiring knowingly,
through error or incompetence, against
the country's most vital interests,
against the very future of the nation. 30
The strongest criticism came from those most likely to be

affected by the suggested reforms, the private investors.
Sir John Cadman of the Anglo-Persian syndicate took the

position that although the broad principles of the Mining
Code bill were sound, its datails were "too rigid and
inelastic" given the technical difficulties of oil

exploitation in Argentina.

El petroleo argentino , a

semimonthly oil journal, claimed the bill bore no relationship to the needs of the nation's oil industry, and that
the conditions proposed for oil concessions would

which accompanied the bill)
October 18, 1923, p. 16; see also
November 3, 1923, p. 16; November 17, 1923, p. 16.
30 La Accion

31

,

Robertson to Hughes, October 26, 1923,
835.636 3/259, enclosure.

RRIAA

,
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effectively exclude private capital from all areas except
those in which oil deposits were known to exist and where,

therefore, the investment risk was low. 32

The general re-

action of private interests was summarized well in the

comment of an official United States observer:
It is generally considered here that this
project of law, if approved, will make
petroleum matters even worse here than does
the present Argentine Mining Code, and the
project appears to have been drawn up by
someone regrettably ignorant of petroleum
mining and of the necessities of the case. 33

Time was to prove that private investors had nothing
to fear from these particular proposals since Congress

virtually ignored them.

Repeatedly the Executive Branch

requested Congressional action, but to no avail.

Le Breton

himself appeared before the Chamber on October 17, 1923 to
impress upon the Deputies the urgency of passing oil legislation. 34

His pleas went unanswered.

President Alvear

emphasized the same point in his messages opening the
Congressional sessions of 1925, 1926, and 1927. 35

He

included petroleum legislation among the topics selected
for consideration in the 1925 and 1926 Extraordinary

32

"Las reformas al Co'digo de Mineria," El petroleo
argentino , No. 11 (September 25, 1923), 1.
33 RRIAA , Robertson to Hughes, October 11, 19 23,

835.6363/255.
34 Diputados, Diario,

1923, VII, 488-493.

35 S enadores, Diario,

1925, I, 60-61; 1926, I, 37;
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Sessions of Congress ,36 and on three
occasions the President and the Minister of Agriculture
sent notes to the
Chamber specifically asking for approval
of the bills
submitted in 1923.37 Through it all
congress remained
,
unmoved, and the administration's bills
remained buried
in Committee.

Forced to act without Congress, Le Breton and
Alvear
turned to the Executive Decree, the instrument used
so

frequently in the past in relation to petroleum matters.
They signed two decrees on January 10, 1924 which, according to one Argentine scholar-statesman, "marked the opening

of a new era in the defense of Argentina's oil wealth. "38
The first decree set aside for oil exploration by the

National Bureau of Mines a massive three-part federal
reserve totaling nearly 33 million hectares. 39

i

t en-

compassed practically all known and alleged petroleum land

1927, 35.
36 Diputados, Diario,
37 Ibid .

,

1926, VI, 12; 1927, I, 23.

1925, IV, 306-307; 1926, III, 5; 1927, I, 23.

/
JOO Frondizi, Petroleo
•5

3 9 YPF,

/

y_

politica

,

160.

Recopilacio^ I, 145-146. The first segment of
the reserve embraced the National Territory of Neuqu^n along with parts of the Territories of La Pampa and Rio
Negro (27,600,000 hectares). Segments two and three were
smaller consisting of the mid-eastern sector of the Territory of Tierra del Fuego (430^,000 hectares) and a block
encompassing southeastern Chubut and northeastern Santa
Cruz Territories (4,800,000 hectares). Three more Execu,
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under the jurisdiction of the national
government. No
new requests for petroleum exploration
permits relative to
lands included in the reserve would be
accepted by the
mining authorities, and all pending requests
were to be

processed according to regulations to be established
in
the second decree.

The provisions of that decree followed closely the

pattern set in the administration's legislative proposal
of the previous September. 40

The objective again was to

prevent speculative activity by demanding proof that applicants possessed the financial capacity for exploration and

by preventing bureaucratic delays in the issuing of permits

Confirmation that this decree stemmed from Le Breton's
announced policy of "mines for the miners" came in an
interview he gave to a La Prensa correspondent:
With regard to the regulations established
for persons who have already requested
exploration rights in areas reserved by
yesterday's decree, those regulations
tended to favor the real miners and, at
the same time, to avoid the abuses that
have been committed in the past. 41

tive Decrees issued in 1927 at the request of YPF expanded
Lands were adthe reserve to almost 40 million hectares .
ded in the western part of Chubut and in the western and
The
255, 266, 270.)
southern parts of Santa Cruz. Ibid
task of exploration was originally entrusted to the Bureau
of Mines, but YPF was subsequently authorized to aid in
163-164, 246.
Ibid .
the work.
(

.

,

,

40 Ibid.

,

147-151.

41 La Prensa, January 11, 19 24, p.

12.
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As a counteroffensive against
speculation, these
decrees were a spectacular success. On
January 10, 1924

there were 7,237 applications pending
before the Bureau of
Mines for oil exploration rights involving
8,116,000

hectares.

Slightly over three years later, on March
10,
1927, there were 72 applications covering 73,500
hectares. 42

Supplementing the national government's policy of
creating official reserves was the action taken by the

authorities of several provinces.

Governors issued decrees

creating reserves that encompassed the entire provinces of

Santa Fe and Entre Rios
and Jujuy. 43

,

and substantial portions of Salta

The combined national and provincial reserves

left only some geographically uninviting areas in Mendoza

Province where private interests might still request new

*****

exploration rights.

For all of Le Breton's persistent and effective fight

D. G. de Minas, Produccion de petroleo en la
repiiiblica argentina durante el ano 1926 £ otros datos
mineros (Buenos Aires: D. G. de Minas, 1927) , 1."

43yPF, Recopilacion , I, 130 (Santa Fe, October 10,
1923), 165-166 (Jujuy, December 10, 1924), 170-171 (Salta,
December 12, 1924), 191-192 (Entre Rios, June 8, 1925).
While the Santa Fe reserve was created prior to the
national reserve, the introduction to the provincial decree
indicates that the action was taken to coordinate Santa
Fe's policy with directions already indicated by the
national government.
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against speculative waste, the commanding figure of the

Alvear years insofar as petroleum was concerned was YPF's
new Director General, 45-year-old Army Colonel Enrique
Mosconi.

The son of an Italian immigrant, Mosconi gradu-

ated from the Military Academy at the head of his class in
189 4 and held a civil engineering degree from the Univer-

sity of Buenos Aires (1903),

Assigned to the Army Engineer-

ing Corps, Mosconi traveled to Europe three times before

WW

I

as part of study and purchasing commissions, and on

Regu-

two occasions he put in stints with the German Army.

lar promotions brought Mosconi to the rank of Colonel in
1917 and to the post of Director of the Army Air Force in
In that capacity, Mosconi demonstrated the dedica-

1920.

tion, energy and extraordinary administrative talents which
44
were to be the hallmark of his career with YPF.

He

always believed that his accomplishments with the Army Air

Force were a determining factor in his choice as YPF head
in 1922. 45

The details of Mosconi' s appointment on October 19,
1922 are not entirely clear.

Though a man of ability, his

reputation did not extend beyond military circles.

In fact,

44 The biographical data on Mosconi is from Raul Larra's

Editorial
ni, general del petroleo (Buenos Aires:
Mosconi

Future

'

19371

,

r4=7T,

lyb-m.

45 Mosconi, El petroleo argentino , 18
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neither the man nor his career were
known to Alvear or
Le Breton until just before the
appointment was
made.

^

Other than the need to procure fuel for
his Army planes,
Mosconi's involvement with oil matters
prior to 1922 was
limited to participation in the Second
Engineering Congress held in Buenos Aires in 1921. He
presided over the

Committee on Aviation which discussed the
importance of
domestic oil to guarantee vital fuel supplies. 47

in

short, his chief asset in October 1922 was his proven

administrative expertise rather than knowledge of, or

experience in the petroleum industry.

In estimating the

importance of this asset, it is well to keep in mind that
the state oil enterprise was sadly disorganized in October

1922 and much in need of strong, disciplined leadership.

Alvear permitted his Ministers considerable latitude
in the choice of administrative subordinates, and, therefore, the actual choice of Mosconi was made by Le Breton.

Le Breton first offered the YPF Directorship to a friend

who in declining called the Minister's attention to
Mosconi's name.

After looking into Mosconi's background

4^Larra, Mosconi , 33-34; Frondizi, Petroleo y_ politica
Unless otherwise indicated, the details of Mosconi's
154.
appointment are taken from Frondizi.
47 Mosconi, El petroleo argentino

Mosconi's
report to the Congress contained no specific recommendations concerning petroleum, Enrique Mosconi, Dichos y_
hechos, 1904-1938 (Buenos Aires: Librer/a "El Ateneo"
,

16.

,
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and speaking with both the
candidate" and the Minister of
War, Agustr'n P. j wto ,A9 Le
Breton made his
In addition to his administrative
talents, Mosconi

brought to his new post two
convictions which would influence his actions throughout his
career with
YPF.

He

firmly believed that the State
could run an industrial
enterprise effectively, and that under
no conditions should
control of the domestic petroleum market
be abandoned to
large foreign firms. Against doubters,
Mosconi defended
the feasibility of government-run
industries given high

administrative standards and exemption from
political
interference. 50

In the final meeting of YPF's Administra-

tive Commission held during Alvear's presidency,
Mosconi

traced much of YPF's success to the fact that the President

1938)

93-95.

,

48
a

La Epoca

,

October 19, 1922,

p.

1.

a

La Prensa, October 19, 1922, p. 12. According to
Frondizi, Mosconi never knew the circumstances surrounding
his appointment. Larra contends that Alvear originally
considered appointing Mosconi as Minister of Public Works,
but changed his mind when warned by War Minister Justo
against including too many military men in the Cabinet.
(Larra, Mosconi, 33-34.)
This undocumented account may
have some substance to it, but it runs counter to Alvear's
known practice of cnoosing prestigious figures for Cabinet
posts.
50

/

Mosconi, El petroleo argentino , 13-14, 183-184.
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and his Ministers had met these requirements:
The Executive Power has been primarily
responsible for the accomplishments which
the Petroleum Administration believes it
has achieved, because the President of the
Nation,..., seconded by Ministers Dr. Le
Breton and Engineer Mihura, has set and
maintained standards necessary for effective
management, standards which excluded entirely
political influence. That is an indispensable
condition for the success of an industrial
and commercial enterprise. ... 51

With regard to the domestic petroleum market, Mosconi

consistently emphasized the need to increase YPF's production to the point where the state industry could exercise
a controlling influence in setting market prices.
19 36

In

when Mosconi looked back upon his eight years with

YPF, he placed attainment of this objective at the top of

his list of accomplishments. 52

He dated his drive to

control the foreign "trusts" from an incident which

occurred while he headed the Army Air Force.

When the

manager of a Standard Oil affiliate denied him delivery of
aviation fuel on anything but a cash-and-carry basis,
Mosconi, according to his own account, swore on the spot
"to cooperate by all legal methods in breaking the

51 Y1"F, "Acta No. 831," (October 9, 1928) (Located in
Buenos
the collection of the Centro de Estudios iMacionales,
Emilio Mihura replaced Le Breton as MinAires) , 50-51.
ister of Agriculture on September 1, 1925.
52 Mosconi, El petro'leo argentino , 16-18.
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trusts. -53

whether th±a incident alQne was responsible
fQr

kindling the fires of economic nationalism
in Mosconi is
difficult to tell, but certainly his words
and deeds as

YPF's chief would display an aggressive
nationalist, antitrust tone.
Mosconi' s appointment touched off a six-month
long house cleaning in the state oil agency.

He thoroughly

investigated the past history and the existing condition of
his new charges, calling in a state auditor to go over
YPF's books, and writing exhaustive reports to Le Breton

describing his findings and recommending changes. 54
On a list of twenty-three suggested reforms submitted
to the Minister on February 23, 1923, top priority was

assigned to the need for petroleum legislation on the one

hand and for reorganization of YPF's administrative structure on the other. 55

Congress held the key to the legisla-

tive problem, but administrative remodeling was subject to

immediate and independent Executive action.

Mosconi 's

objection to the structure of YPF lay in the lack of

53 ibid .

,

17.

54 For a summary of Mosconi 's more important criticisms
of how the agency had been run in the past, see above,
Chapter III, 102-104. One report of interest not cited in
those pages was sent to Le Breton by Mosconi after the
See Diputados, Yacimientos
latter visited Plaza Huincul.

petroliferos fiscales; Antecedentes ,
Ibid.

,

636.

I,

560-621.
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*

autonomy under which the bureau was
forced to labor. He
complained to Le Breton on November 18, 19
22 that Yrigoyen's
administration had made YPF
so dependent upon the [Agriculture] Ministry
that it was impossible for the agency to
employ the commercial procedures which are
essential to any industrial enterprise, a
category within which state oil exploitation must be placed. 55

Mosconi's request for more independence was accomodated
through an Executive Decree issued April 12, 1923. 57

No

longer would YPF operate solely as an advisory body with

decision-making power monopolized by the Minister of Agriculture.

Henceforth, the Director General and a six-man

Administrative Commission would exercise nearly autonomous
control over YPF's activities.

Ministerial approval would

be necessary only for the department's annual budgets, for

credit operations, and for major purchases as in the case
of petroleum tankers and refining equipment.

The willing-

ness of Le Breton and Alvear to oblige Mosconi on this

point was a manifestation of the Executive support YPF

would receive throughout Alvear' s administration.
Fully aware of his problems and resources and armed

with an administrative mechanism of his own design,

56 Ibid.

,

549.

57 YPF, Recopilacio'n

,

I,

115-119.
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Mosconi set about the task of producing
"the most oil
possible at the lowest cost possible. -58
He and his

dinates devoted their energies to improving
and expanding
every phase of the industry from exploration
and production
to transportation, distillation, storage,
and commercialization.
The key to progress, however, lay less in
developing the necessary auxiliary services than in
harmonizing
them to achieve the goal of the highest production
at the

lowest cost.

This is precisely where Mosconi* s adminis-

trative talents asserted themselves, guaranteeing an

efficient coordinated operation.

His success allowed

Mosconi to bequeath to the nation a vertically integrated
state oil industry when he stepped down as Director General
in September 19 30.

Statistics do not tell the entire story, but a comparison of several growth indices for 1923 and 1928 provides
a measure of YPF's expansion during the Alvear years.

The firm's capital base grew from 61,969,913 $m/n to

166,291,826 $m/n.^^

The number of drilling apparatus in-

creased from 39 to 53, total meters drilled from 28,303 to

5^Dipi:tados

,

Yacimientos petroliferos

f iscales

Antecedentes , I, 703.
59 YPF, Desarrollo de la industria, 230.

;
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108,640, new wells from 53 to 168, and producing wells

from 144 to 660. 60

Gross production of crude oil

spurted from 407,186 to 860,604 m 3 , 61 storage capacity

went from 265,959 to 504,307 m 3 62 and the capacity of
,

YPF's maritime fleet increased from 22,700 to 50,236
tons. 63

Other significant improvements were less easily
quantified. 64

In Comodoro Rivadavia, electricity was pro-

vided for the field's power needs, and docking facilities
were improved.

Steps were taken to train technical personnel

at home and abroad, while living conditions for laborers

were improved through new housing, schools, hospitals,
churches, food cooperatives and amusement facilities.
In the Federal Capital, Argentines were treated to

evidence of YPF's rising fortunes in the form of an impressive new office building on Paseo Colon.

Finally,

and most significantly for YPF's commercial expansion, a

60 Ibid

These figures do not include YPF's
213, 249.
work in Salta which only began in May 192 8.
. ,

61 BIP, December 1936, 18, 29, 34.
62 YPF, Desarrollo de la industria , 378.
63 Ibid .

,

363.

64 For a concise summary of YPF's year by year activ-

77-165 (Comodoro Rivadavia), 245-249
ities, see Ibid .
YPF, "Acta No. 831," 5-35.
(Plaza Huincul)
,

;
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major refinery was constructed in La Plata, the capital
of Buenos Aires Province. 65

Since the marketing of petroleum by-products was

potentially the most profitable phase of the oil business,
discussion about installing a state refinery was nearly as
old as the 190 7 Comodoro Rivadavia discovery itself. 66

Yet

by 1922, small distilleries in Comodoro Rivadavia and

Plaza Huincul represented the sum total of state refining
After taking over as Director General, Mosconi

activity.

became an enthusiastic advocate for the building of a major
state facility.

On May 20, 1923, he sent a memorandum to

Le Breton emphasizing the importance of the undertaking and

submitting a concrete plan for a plant.

Le Breton and

Alvear responded with a request to Congress for authorization to invest 20,000,000 pesos in the state oil industry,

part of which would be earmarked for building refineries. 67
While Congress ignored the bill, and private interests

attacked it as another step in the Le Breton-Mosconi plot

65 For a complete and convenient summary^ of the building
of the La Plata plant, see Mosconi, El petroleo argentino
Unless otherwise indicated, tne following comments
113-119.
are based upon that account plus YPF, Desarrollo de la
,

industria

,

309-331.

66

Fliess, M E1 petro'leo y Comodoro Rivadavia," 439-440,
1925
446; La Epoca, December 24, 1920, p. 2, December 23,
p.

1.

The money was
1923, III, 296-298.
to have been borrowed and repaid out of YPF's earnings.
67 Diputados, Diario,
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to suffocate private exploitation, 68 YPF
negotiated a pre,

liminary agreement with the Bethlehem Steel
Company (U.S.)
for the construction of a distillery in La Plata.

The fi-

nancial problem was solved by a Ministerial Accord
signed
on December 31, 1923 which authorized the use of credit

operations to fund the proposal. 69

with all roadblocks

removed, construction was begun in January 1925, and on

February 1, 1927 YPF personnel took charge of a fully
functioning installation equipped for "topping" or primary

distillation and for "cracking" gas oil in order to
increase the yield of gasoline. 70

Subsequently, the La

Plata facilities were expanded with the addition of a
"cracking" plant designed to increase the gasoline yield by

68 RRIAA, Robertson to Hughes, June
26,

835. 6363/232

,

1923,

enclosure.

69 YPF, Recopilacion

138-140.
The fact that the
section of the budget law which constituted the only legislative basis for state oil exploitation did not authorize
the use of credit operations by YPF placed Executive
authorization of such activity upon questionable
Recognizing this, the Ministerial Accord reasoned
grounds.
that since the budget law authorized reinvestment of YPF's
earnings to increase production, the investment in a distillery was in accord with the law. The decision as to
how the investment was actually made, it was argued, was
up to the Executive.
,

I,

Topping" is the initial refining process which
yields gasoline, kerosene, gas oil and fuel oil. The
latter two may be "cracked" to increase the yield of
by-products
70,,

»

1

3
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breaking down the fuel-oil residue of primary
distillation.

7

Construction of the refinery marked an important

plateau in the vertical integration of the state industry.

No longer limited to the production of crude oil, YPF
emerged after 1925 as an increasingly powerful force in
the
domestic petroleum market.

State sales of crude oil fell

from nearly 500,000 tons in 1925 to just over 4,000 tons in

During the same years, sales of fuel oil shot up

1928.

from 25,753 to 434,799 tons, kerosene sales from 4,578,073
to 25,578,730 liters, and gasoline sales from 5,941,538 to

100,050,105 liters. 73

Argentines, who before 1926 could

purchase YPF's products at a single distribution center in
Buenos Aires, found them available in 19 28 at over 900

locations throughout the Federal Capital and the interior
of the nation. 74

Despite YPF's dramatic advances under Mosconi,

7 ^Mosconi,

petroleo argentino 119-121; YPF
Desarrollo de la industria , 331. This plant too was constructed by Bethlehem Steel. It was handed over to YPF
in working order on February 26, 1929.
72 Ibid.
7

,

E_l

,

389.

Due to the nature of the sources, all
the figures cited in this study on the production and sale
of gasoline contain small quantities of airplane fuel as
well.
Ibid.

,

74 Ibid.

,

391.

The actual task of retailing YPF products
was subcontracted to J.F. Auger and Co. from 1926 to 1929.
399.
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Argentina remained a major fuel importer.

President Alvear

set the goal of self-sufficiency for his administration
in his address opening the 1923 Congressional sessions, 75

and on the same occasion in 19 25 he predicted rapid

fulfillment:

Petroleum production will soon be
sufficient to satisfy the national
market, and definite assurances can
be given that fuel autonomy is a
fact. 76

Yet by 1928, YPF's increased productivity combined with a

marked rise in private production still left a sizeable
"fuel gap" that had to be plugged through importation. 77
In 1928 when YPF registered fuel oil sales of 434,799 tons,

Argentina imported an additional 806,741 tons; kerosene

75 Senadores, Diario ,

1923, I, 24

While the figures which follow
Ibid. , 1925, I, 60.
make Alvear' s prediction seem ridiculous, the conditions
under which it was made must be taken into account. Not
only was the La Plata refinery under construction, but
Le Breton and Alvear had approved an expansion plan for YPF
drafted by Mosconi and the Administrative Commission that
promised state production of crude oil would reach
In fact, production in 1927 would be
1,943,000 m 3 by 1927.
only 822,875 mfi. YPF, "Acta No. 831," 8-9; Eduardo M.
Gonella, La explotacion oficial del petroleo Su evoluci6n
economica y_ financiera (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la
Universidad de Buenos Aires, 19 27) , 57-58.
7

;

77 Private production rose from 123,023 m 3 in 1923 to

In terms of total national production
581,459 m 3 in 1928.
from
of crude oil, the private sector's share increased
Nearly all (92.7%) private production came
23.2% to 40.3%.
contributed
from Comodoro Rivadavia, and while 15 companies
or it;
to the 19 28 total, 3 firms accounted for almost 87%
Compania Ferrocarrilera de Petroleo (owned by British
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sales of 25,578,730 liters were supplemented with

60,969,822 imported liters, and the figures on gasoline

were 100,050,105 liters sold by YPF and 398,789,485 liters
imported.

Coal imports likewise remained high, increasing

from 2,579,466 tons in 1923 to 3,121,969 tons in 1928. 78
The financial handicap imposed by the lack of fuel autonomy
is apparent from the fact that in 1927 outlays for foreing

coal and petroleum products amounted to over 40% of the
total value of the nation's imports. 79
YPF's emphasis upon maximum production was spurred not

only by the desire to attain fuel autonomy, but also by the

need to awaken public confidence in the state industry.

As

in the pre-1922 period, state exploitation was often greet-

ed with indifference if not hostility.

While most were

forced to admit the feasibility of state exploitation in

Comodoro Rivadavia, a considerable body of opinion advocated halting operations in Plaza Huincul where YPF by 1925

Astra (primarily German with some Swiss and
Railroads)
French capital) , Compania Industrial y Commercial de
Petroleo (Anglo-Persian affiliate). BIP, December 1936,
19-28, 30-31, 33, 35.
,

Nafta
78 Importacion de combustibles y_ lubricantes
C aminos (JIP Reprint) (Buenos Aires: Talleres Graficos
R. Canals, 1938), 12, 15, 30.

y_

79 "Expresion grafica de hechos economicos," Revista de
Economia Argentina, XXI (August 192 8) , 94.
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had still not turned a profit. 80

Mosconi, testifying be-

fore the Chamber Committee on Industries
and Commerce,

noted the debilitating effect of public opinion
which
-consistently feeds on malignant rumors."

The resulting

mental strain on the firm's employees
leads to wariness and, therefore, to a
coo frequent turn over in high level
personnel, something which is contrary
to improving administration. 81

The danger to YPF posed by public indifference became

apparent when the Administrative Commission attempted to

market the bond issue to finance construction of the La
Plata refinery.

No purchasers could be found until a

member of the Commission, Dr. Carlos Madariaga, offered his
personal fortune as a guarantee to prospective investors. 82
YPF encountered similar problems in the retail market.

The

absence of public confidence combined with a campaign by

private oil interests to discredit YPF's products forced
YPF officials to visit retail distribution centers and

80 La Accion

October 30, 1925, p. 3. Though the crude
oil from Plaza Huincul was of higher quality than that from
Comodoro Rivadavia, freight costs for transporting it to the
La Plata refinery were prohibitive, doubling production
Gonella, La explotacion of icial del petroleo 25.
costs.
,

,

Comision de Indus trias y Comercio, Anexo
a la orden del dia No . 66 ; Antecedentes de _la comision de
TncHIs/trias y_ comercio en el_ proyecto de ley org^nica del
petroleo (Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Camara de Diputados,
See also BIP, No. 4 (December 1924), 311-312.
1926), 55.
81 Diputados

82 YPF,

t/

"Acta No. 831," 50.
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attempt to convince motorists of the quality of state-

produced commodities. 83

It is not surprising, therefore,

that YPF's authorities emphasized increasing production as
a means of presenting tangible and convincing evidence that

the state industry was serving the nation.

The price of YPF's single-minded concentration on

production was insufficient exploration of Argentina's presumed oil reserves.

Denied additional funds by Congress

and, therefore, entirely dependent upon profits for expan-

sion, it would have been unreasonable to expect YPF to have

financed extended exploration either of its original reserves in Comodoro Rivadavia and Plaza Huincul or of the

massive stretches set aside by the January 10, 1924 decree.

Exploratory wells sunk by private companies outnumbered
those of YPF by almost

3

to 1 in the Alvear years. 84

No less

an authority than the Ministry of Agriculture admitted in
1932 that since the Bureau of Mines discovery at Plaza

Huincul in 1918, "serious exploration or the search for new
85
deposits by the State has been almost non-existent."

83 Frondizi, Petroleo
petroleo argentino , 128.
84 Frondizi, Petroleo
85Quoted in

As

y_

politica

,

169-170; Mosconi, El

y_

politica

,

165.

Eduardo I. Rumbo, Petrqleo v_ vasallaje
carnero contra carbon mas petroleo (liuenos

Carne de vaca y_
Aires : Hechos e Ideas, 1957)

;

,

62.
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a result, YPF's crude oil production flowed almost
exclu>

sively from the vein tapped in 1907, and plans for expansion had to be formulated without full knowledge of under-

ground reserves. 86

The petroleum potential of the areas

reserved in 1924 remained a mystery, unexplored by the

*****

State and inaccessible to private interests.

Mosconi and the Administrative Commission were pri-

marily concerned with YPF's industrial development, but

petroleum legislation was also a matter of interest to
them.

Actually it was impossible to separate the two

phases of the oil question, because any decision on the
legal framework for national oil development was bound to

have repercussions on the scope and direction of the state
industry.

Repeatedly, Mosconi pinpointed the lack of

comprehensive legislation as a critical problem and

requested that his superiors pressure Congress for passage
of a law. 87

On August 6, 1926, testifying before the

Chamber Committee on Industries and Commerce, he warned
that YPF's continued success was endangered by the absence

86 In 1928, over 94% of YPF's crude oil came from the

central field in Comodoro Rivadavia. No new vein was
tapped until the following year when production from the
central field began to decline. Ibid . , 49.
87 Diputados, Yacimientos petroliferos fiscales
Antecedentes , I, 636; Diario , 1926, III, 610-613,

624-627.

;

*

,
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of adequate legislation. 88

And less than a month later

on the occasion of his promotion to General,
Mosconi

informed a gathering of well-wishers that
although YPF had
accomplished much since 1922, more would have been
done had
Congress cooperated by providing an oil law. 89
Mosconi' s specific recommendations for a law must be

prefaced by a glance at petroleum matters as they were unfolding in the northern provinces of Salta and Jujuy.

Events in that theater helped shape Mosconi' s thinking,
thrust him onto center stage in the debate over petroleum
legislation, and stirred public concern over national

petroleum policy.
In 1923 and 1924, the mining authorities in Salta and

Jujuy faced the same situation as the National Bureau of
Mines. 90v

Nearly all the supposed oil lands within their

pO

f

°°Diputados^ Comision de Industrias y Comercio, Anexo
a la orden del dia No . 66 , 50.
89

Mosconi, Dichos

y_

hechos, 133.

90 Unless otherwise indicated, this brief account of
events in the North is based7 upon the following sources:

"El Intransigente" El petroleo del norte argentino
Comentarios del diarXo E1 Intransigente " de la cludad -de
v-xxxii (proSalta (Salta; Imprenta C. Velarde, 1928)
logue by E. Mosconi); Diputados, Pi ario 1926, III
610-613, 624-627 (two notes from Mosconi to Le Breton),
1926, VI, 757-766 (memorial to the Chamber from the ExecuProvincia de Jujuy, El petive Power of Salta Province)
troleo y_ la constitucion nacional (Jujuy: Talleres GrafTcos
del Estado, 1926) . One of the best compilations of documents
on this matter appeared in BIP, No. 28 (December 1926)
1321-1404.
:

,

*'

,

,

;
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jurisdictions were the subject of requests
for private
exploration permits. In Salta alone, 563
such applications
awaited processing by late 1924, and in
August 1923 representatives of Standard Oil of New Jersey
(SONJ) unsuccessfully approached Salta's Governor, Adolfo
Gueraes, with a
proposal which would have given SONJ development
rights
over 90,000 hectares for 20 years. 91
In December 1924 after YPF expressed interest
in

undertaking exploratory work in Salta and Jujuy, Le Breton

commissioned Mosconi to personally contact the provincial
Governors and discuss the situation created by the numerous

applications for exploration permits.

Mosconi'

s

objective

was to obtain provincial action similar to that taken by
the national government in its January 10, 1924 decrees,

action which would have compelled serious companies to

explore their grants and forced to the sidelines those

with purely speculative interests.

The lands recovered

from speculators were to be turned into a reserve where YPF
could carry out geological studies and exploratory drilling.
He returned to the Capital convinced of the success of

his mission.

In each province, two decrees were issued

Gueraes was an Yrigoyenist Radical.

SONJ's representatives included the conservative lawyer-politician
Francisco M. Uriburu. A member of the Union Provincial,
the Salta conservative party, Uriburu had served as a
National Deputy from 1914 to 1918.

s

16 8

in December 1924 which followed
the pattern established by
the national decrees of the
preceding January. Reserves

were created which the national
government was expected to
explore, and stiff regulations were
set up for processing
applications for exploration permits. 92
Over the next two years, Mosconi changed
his mind

about the fate of his trip to the North.

In a series of

communiques to Le Breton, he alleged that the
provincial
decrees had not altered conditions in the North.

Mosconi

admitted that some speculators had been eliminated, but
he
charged that improper enforcement of the regulations

governing petroleum grants had permitted SONJ in Salta and
Leach Brothers in Jujuy to retain control over the most

promising oil lands. 93

As a result, he claimed, YPF was

denied access to oil areas for exploration in the North

when it had the men, money and materials for the job.

Re-

buttals quickly issued from the governments of Benjamin

Villafane in Jujuy and Joaquin Corvalan in Salta, and a
verbal battle ensued during 1925 and 1926 which projected

92

The only substantial difference in the decrees was
that Salta* s reserve was limited to five years while Jujuy'
was created without a time limit. For copies of the
decrees, see YPF, RecopilacioVi , I, 165-175.
93 Leach Brothers was a firm with agricultural and

mercantile interests owned by wealthy Englishmen. They
sold their petroleum rights to SONJ in 19 26. RRIAA
Saddler (SONJ) to Kellogg, November 5, 1926, 835.6363/291.
,
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petroleum developments in the North into the national
limelight. 94

Technical points about how the regulations were or

were not being enforced were wrangled over by national and

provincial authorities, but the spirit with which they were

enforced was as much the crux of the matter as anything.
Mosconi, speaking for YPF and the national government, de-

manded the strictest possible enforcement of the regulations
in order to exert pressure on private companies and open up

the maximum amount of land for exploration by YPF.

Provin-

cial authorities, on the other hand, probably tended to see

increased national government interest in provincial oil as
the opening wedge for federalization, a measure they opposed.

They were, therefore, prone to a more liberal inter-

pretation of the regulations on private oil grants. 9 5
Mosconi was so obviously the spearhead of the attack
on the provincial authorities that La Prensa suggested he

Villafane was an anti-Yrigoyenist Radical. Corvalan
belonged to the conservative Union Provincial, the party of
Francisco Uriburu and Robustiano Patron Costas.
95 Sufficient work has not been done to date on petrole
urn matters in the northern provinces to clarify why provincial authorities opposed federalize tion. It should be
noted, however, that Salta and Jujuy were extremely poor
areas, and federalization of their oil could have been view
ed as another step in the long-established process of
draining off provincial wealth for the benefit of the littoral area. For evidence of this kind of thinking, see
Jujuy, El petro'leo y_ la constitucion nacional, 17.
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was overstepping the bounds of his office,
and that if he
felt obligated to act, he should refrain from
using "dogmatic language" and an "acerbic tone" in addressing
provincial

officials. 96

Mosconi and his associates on the Administra-

tive Commission were so anxious to get their case before the

public that they personally financed the publication in La

Nacion of some of the more extensive notes sent to the
provincial governments. 97

The impact of events in the

North upon Mosconi can be seen in the fact that after

19 24

he almost never spoke or wrote about oil without making

specific reference to Salta and Jujuy.
Mosconi' s writings and speeches reveal that he had no

rigidly defined criteria for legislation in 1922, and that
his position evolved in response to his growing experience
and knowledge of petroleum matters.

Running through all

his comments, however, and providing a thread of consistency was the spirit of economic nationalism.

In a 1927

radio address, Mosconi presented one of his most compre-

hensive statements on this theme.

He acknowledged the con-

tributions men and capital from abroad had made to Argentina's development and granted the continuing need for

foreign aid.

At the same time, he advocated replacing the

96 La Prensa , September 27, 1926, p. 8.
97 Mosconi, El petroleo argentino , 19 3.
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old policy of "economic internationalism" with
one he

termed "a nationalist economic framework" as the
guideline
for accepting such aid:
The time has now arrived for admitting
men and capital on a selective basis,
and also for establishing protection
for nationals and domestic capital. By
undertaking the exploitation and development of the nation's resources with the
nation's own men and money, we will
obviously improve our standard of living,.... 98
In agriculture, industry, commerce and finance, urged

Mosconi
it is now time that Argentine intelligence
and capital intervened on a wider scale
and received the collective benefits which
today slip through our fingers. 9 9

Specifically on petroleum, he continued, Argentina had
to protect its deposits "from any but eminently nationalist

influences." 100
The key to Mosconi' s nationalist policy was federalization of the nation's oil reserves.

While he supported this

measure from the beginning, his advocacy became more

insistent and vociferous with the increasing involvement of
SONJ in Salta and Jujuy.

To his superiors in the Executive

branch and to the Chamber Committee on Industries and

98 Mosconi,

E_l

"ibid.
100 Ibid., 201.

petroleo argentino, 200.
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Commerce, he defended federalization on the grounds that
the provinces lacked both the money and the technical facil-

ities necessary to control the industrial and commercial

phases of the oil industry. 101

However impolitic it may

have been, Mosconi told the Chamber Committee that national
and provincial interests were not necessarily coincident in
the northern provinces, and that federalization was essen-

tial to guarantee predominance of the former. 102

He also

argued that petroleum was an important factor in contemporary international relations and, therefore, should be under
the jurisdiction of the national government.

Finally, he

added the sugar coating usually offered by advocates of

federalization by pointing out that national control did

not mean that the provinces would be denied participation
in the financial benefits from deposits exploited within

their boundaries. 10

"*

Private exploitation enjoyed conditional support from
Mosconi prior to the Congressional debate on oil legislation
in mid-19 27.

It was a question of resources rather than

ideology, for, as Mosconi pointed out, during the Alvear

years Argentina lacked the funds and the technical and

101 D ip U tados, Comision de Indus trias y Comercio, Anexo
III, 612.
a la orden del dia No. 66, 56, 60; Diario, 1926,
102 Diputados, Comision de Industrias y Comercio, Anexo
a la orden del dia No. 6_6, 60.

103ibid.
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administrative personnel to operate without foreign
capital. 1

He, therefore, supported private exploitation

so long as it was controlled effectively and
speculation

was curbed.

As he explained to the Chamber Committee

in August 1926,

The work of private companies is not a
problem; on the contrary, it is beneficial
as long as it is always controlled by the
state.
The problem is speculation in
exploration rights .... 10 $

He v/ent on to recommend that a royalty of not less than
10% be placed on private production, the proceeds of which

would fund a mining authority capable of enforcing all
mineral laws and regulations.
By 1925 , Mosconi had added the final element in his

pre-1927 legislative formula, the combination of private
and state capital in mixed companies.

In August 1925

,

he

recommended this solution for the problems which had arisen
in the northern provinces,

10 7

and in 1926 before the

Chamber Committee, he presented mixed companies as the

Administrative Commission's considered choice for a general

^-^Mosconi,

El^

petroleo argentino

,

180.

105 Diputados, Com^sion de las Industrias y Comercio,
Anexo a la orden del dia No . 66 , 52.
106 ibid.

107 Diputados, Diario, 1926, III, 612-613.

174

answer to the question of who should
exploit the nation's
oil deposits. 108

Citing the Anglo-Persian combine as a
prototype,
Mosconi recommended organizations in which

the State would

supply 51% of the capital and hold veto
power over all
decisions affecting general petroleum policy.
All technical and administrative decisions would be
left

to represen-

tatives of the private investors.

In view of the many en-

emies of state exploitation and the lack of public
confidence under which YPF labored, Mosconi thought mixed

companies presented the best alternative:
State exploitation and private exploitation
are two divergent systems: mixed exploitation
combines all forces, conciliates all interests, and coordinates all factors, thus assuring the achievement of maximum efficiency. 109

Particularly noteworthy in Mosconi' s testimony is the
absence of any suggested limitations on the sources of

private capital to be included in mixed companies.

Appar-

ently foreign capital was as welcome as domestic.
Mosconi' s voice, for all its influence, was only one

among many in a growing national debate over petroleum
policy.

The nagging absence of oil legislation, YPF's

growth under the General's aggressive leadership, and

108 Diputados Corrosion de las Indus trias
y Comercio,
,
Anexo a la orden del dia No. 66, 54-55.
109 Ibid., 55.
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events in the northern provinces all
stimulated a widening
public discussion in which capable spokesmen
emerged on all
sides
The Buenos Aires press reflected the mounting
sense of
urgency over petroleum affairs with its unanimous
demand
for petroleum legislation. 110

More significant still was

the agreement among major dailies on the advisability
of

federalization.

By July 1927 when Congress began debating

an oil law, La Nacion stood alone in its contention that

federalization violated the Constitution. 111

La Prensa ,

though a latecomer among supporters of federalization,

accurately summarized the press's arguments in its favor:

At the present juncture, oil arouses the
greed of the imperialist countries. It
is a serious error, therefore, to withhold control over it from the national
authorities. The same concern for public
welfare which places with the National
Congress the power to regulate domestic
and foreign trade, and the same powerful
motive of general security which gives

Congress exclusive control over national
defense, dictate the necessity of reforming petroleum legislation.

La Accion , November 3, 1923, p. 16, March 14, 1925
p. 14, March 15, 1926, p. 8, February 10, 1927, p. 1; La
Epoca , May 23, 1925, p. 1, February 15, 1927, p. 1; La
Nacidn , June 5, 1923, p. 4, August .12, 1926, Sect. 1, p. 6;
La Prensa , October 21, 1923, p. 5, September 17, 1926,
p. 9, July 22, 1927, p. 9; La Vanguardia , November 10, 1925,
p.

1.
11:L

La Nacion , July 23, 1927, p. 6, July 27, 1927, p.

112 La Prensa, July 22, 1927, p. 9.

6.

See also La Epoca ,
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The language of the petroleum
nationalists had invaded the
editorial columns of one of the Capital's
leading conser-

vative spokesmen.
On the question of exploitation rights,
a note of
unanimity, albeit a negative one, again
appeared in the

Capital's press.

No major newspaper advocated turning ex-

ploitation over exclusively either to the State or
to
private investors. All favored some combination
of

the two

sectors.

La Prensa opted for the existing system of con-

current and separate state and private exploitation, but

with regulations liberal enough to attract the large-scale
investors that La Prensa considered necessary to translate
the nation's oil wealth from possibility into reality. 113

La Razon and La Ac c ion backed the creation of mixed

companies as a means for attracting the necessary capital. 11
As La Accion explained, the State was without sufficient
funds, and

May 24, 1927, p. 27, October 29, 1926, p. 1; La Vanguardia
January 6, 1925, p. 1; La Razon , December 3, 1922, printed
in RRIAA, Riddle to Hughes, December 28, 1922, 835.6363/195,
enclosure 3. Less than a year before the editorial comment
cited above appeared, La Prensa was arguing against the
constitutionality of federalization.
(September 28, 1926,
No explanation was
p. 10, September 30, 1926, p. 10.)
offered for the turnabout, but the timing suggests events
in Salta and Jujuy may have been influential.
x

La Prensa , October 21, 1923, p. 5, September 17,

1926, p. 9.
114 La Razon , December 3, 1922, printed in RRIAA ,
Riddle to Hughes, December 28, 1922, 835.6363/195,
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m

this business with its brilliant and
secure future, limited earnings are
preferable to no earnings at all. 115

La Vanguardia, the Socialist paper, continued its
support
for Nicola's Repetto's 1914 bill which called for state and

private exploitation, and speculated on the possibility of
limiting private oil investment to domestic capital. 116
La Epoca , the Yrigoyenist paper, merits special

attention on the matter of exploitation rights.

In various

editorials, it set forth what it claimed to have been the
oil policy of Yrigoyen's government and offered this as
the proper guideline for the future.

Thus La Epoca wrote:

At the heart [of President Yrigoyen's oil
policy] lay the firm intention to reserve
for the State the exploitation of a natural
wealth whose alienation would not only be
economically unwise but also dangerous to
the international tranquility of the
Republic. 117

Displaying a truly nationalist spirit,

enclosure 3; La Accion , June 7, 1924, p. 16. La Accion 's
suggestion applied specifically to petroleum deposits yet
to be discovered and not to the existing federal reserves.
La Razo'n did not specify where mixed companies would
operate.
115 La Accio'n , June 7, 1924, p. 16.
ll6
p.

La Vanguardia , May 1, 1923, p. 37; August 22, 1923,

2.

La Epoca , October 21, 1923, p.

1.
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Dr. Yrigoyen felt that the country

should carry forward [oil] exploitation by using only its own efforts and
resources, totally rejecting the participation of foreign capital which was
offered without limit for this task. 118
The nation's sources of wealth must be
developed by the nation itself, with
the resources it has available [and]
with all foreign activity excluded,.... 119

Depending upon how the words "state" "country"
,

,

and

"nation" are interpreted, La Epoca appeared to be supporting

either exclusive state exploitation, or at least the limitation of private investment to nationals.
This interpretation is contradicted, however, by

another statement which appeared in April 19 25;
the resources necessary for taking
advantage of the wealth contained in
the oil deposits must be found inside
or outside of the country , but foreign
firms cannot be allowed to intervene
in the administration of petroleum

development. 12 0

While a literal interpretation of La Epoca 's comments
produces only contradictions, it is fair to conclude that
the Yrigoyenist press favored a strongly nationalistic oil

policy, the most aggressively nationalist of all newspapers
in fact.

Still, prior to July 19 27, La Epoca

118 Ibid

. ,

December 14, 1924, p.

119 Ibid.

,

January

12 Qlbid.

,

April 5, 1925, p.

8,

'

s

comments

1.

1926, p. 1.
1.

The underlining is

179
*

fell short of a forthright demand for a full-dress
state

monopoly over petroleum development.
La Epoca

'

s

attempt to pass off its editorials as

accurate descriptions of Yrigoyen's petroleum policy repre-

sented nothing more than "court history".

As we have seen,

Yrigoyen»s policy was informed by a nationalist sentiment,
and he was concerned about trust activity.

Nonetheless, he

did not reject but welcomed private investment both foreign
and domestic.

Events in Salta and Jujuy did not escape the purview
of the Capital's press.

La Epoca devoted the most ink to

developments in the North, featuring increasingly strident
demands for corrective action against SONJ's onslaught.

Typical was the following selection from a January 1927
editorial:
The intervention of the federal authorities
is essential and urgently needed when,
through misunderstanding or ciminal activity,
oil deposits might be surrendered to the
greed and voracity of private companies
whose activities are the source of a conflict
of incalculable gravity, one destined to
compromise the very sovereignty of the
Nation. 121

Less than two weeks later, La Epoca lamented that it was

already too late for action, that the provincial govern-

mine.
121 Ibid.

,

January 27, 1927, p.

1.

,
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raents

had handed out their oil wealth to private firms, and

that "Argentina will not exploit its oil deposits except

through others and for others." 122

Conditions in the

North as they were portrayed by oil nationalists were
ideally suited for La Epoca 's drive to grab for the

Yrigoyenist Radicals the mantle of chief protector of the
nation's oil deposits.

Private oil investors and their supporters entertained
a somewhat different view of oil matters than the Buenos

Aires press.

Hopes that Alvear's administration would

provide an acceptable legal framework for private operations

were soon dissipated, and while Congress delayed legislation, advocates of the private sector were reduced to

grumbling about how private exploitation was being
stymied. 123

The government's tough line on the granting

of exploration permits prompted one source to suggest that
the national authorities were sacrificing the national

oil industry in their effort to stimulate the public

122 Ibid .

,

February 15, 1927, p.

1.

123 "E1 gobierno nacional debe fomentar, estimular y
proteger la accion particular," Petr^leos y_ Minas , No. 2 8
(August 15, 1923), 7-9; "Una orden ministerial y sus consecuencias," El Petroleo Argentine No. 11 (September 10,
1923), 4; Buenos" ~A.ires Herald , January 11, 1923, printed in
RRIAA, Riddle to Hugnes, January 16, 1923, 835.6363/198, enclosure, November 28, 1923, printed in RRIAA , Gibson to
Hughes, November 28, 1923, 835.6363/ 263, enclosure; Buenos
RRIAA
Aires Standard , September 21, 1923, printed
Robertson to Hughes, September 25, 1923, 835.6363/250,
~

m
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sector. 124

as we have seen, the bills sent
to Congress by

the President in September 1923 drew
only increased protest from private interests.
In fact, by late 1923 reports

were circulating that forcast the imminent
withdrawal of
major foreign companies. 125 They proved to
be no more
than rumors, however, as most foreign companies
adopted
a "wait and see" attitude. 126

Faced with a growing nationalist campaign for the

protection of Argentina's oil resources, private interests
and particularly foreign investors felt called upon to

I

justify the existence of the private sector of the oil
industry.

Their case in its most complete form was laid

before the Chamber of Deputies in July 1927 in a memorial
from seven firms organized as a "special section" of the

Union Industrial Argentina. 127

Making adroit use of

statistics, the memorial purported to show that despite

considerable capital outlays by both the state and private

enclosure.
124,,

La industria petrolera argentina," El Petroleo
Argentino , No. 10 (August 25, 1923), 2-6.
125n Una orden ministerial," El Petroleo Argentino 4;
,
RRIAA, Robertson to Hughes, October 11, 1923, 835.6363/256,
Riddle to Hughes, December 3, 1923, 835.6363/265.
12 Ibid
.

,

Gibson to Hughes, September 9, 1924,

835.63637276.
127 Diputados, Diario, 1927, II, 220-237.
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sectors, national production of
petroleum products was
falling increasingly behind national
consumption. 128

Despite being faced with a widening -fuel
gap", their
brief continued, Argentines were being
misled by an exceedingly optimistic picture of the nation's
oil wealth
for

which there was no basis in fact.

Comodoro Rivadavia

was the single oil field of proven commercial
capacity,

and even there YPF was not obtaining results
commensurate

with its investment.

The conclusion, asserted the memorial,

was self-evident:
for the government as well as for the
country in general, it is desirable to
increase exploration and to maintain
private industry as the indispensable
partner of the State in this phase of
the latter* s activity. 129

12 8

The memorial listed 37 companies as having been
organized to exploit Argentine oil as of January 1, 1927,
28 of them having made capital investments totalling
120,313,265 pesos. It asserted that 24 of the companies
had already folded with capital losses totalling 26,850,000
pesos.
Of the remaining 13, the five major investors were:
Standard Oil Cia., S.A. Arg.
22,729,000 pesos
(SON J)
As,tra, Cia. Arg. de Pet. S.A.
Cia. Comercial e Industrial de

15,500,000
13,500,000

"

Pet.

Ibid .

,

Diadema Argentina, S.A.
(Royal Dutch Shell)
Cia. Ferrocarrilera de Pet.
221-222.

129 Ibid., 234.

13,200,000

"

11,000,000

"
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This could be done, it was suggested, by radically
altering
the situation created by the 1924 decrees so as to permit

exploration under the kind of technical,
legal, and political conditions which
are essential for the development of
this work. 130
Such conditions along with a law allowing private firms to

compete on an equal footing with YPF were what private
investors were seeking.
The terms of exploitation grants were of particular

importance to oil investors.

They were anxious to avoid

excessive duties, taxes, and royalties which would deprive

them of profits.

The journal Petroleos

y_

Minas referred to

such burdens on private investment as "stones thrown at our
own roof.

1
'

131

The oil companies' memorial to the Chamber

warned that legislation imposing restrictive conditions on
private investors would, in practice, produce a state

monopoly

132
since private interests would withdraw.

Recognizing the need for some control over private exploitation, the memorial offered the following advice,
the restrictions or controls which the
State might impose on private industry
to protect the community's interests
can and should be established easily,
while taking into account at the same
time that protection, that guarantee

130 Ibid.

131 Petroleos y Minas , No. 19

(November 15, 1922), 18.

132 Diputados, Diario, 1927, II, 234.
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for capital investments,
and that
promotion of the industry which
we
are requesting. 133
In truth, of course, it
was no facile undertaking
to find a
compromise between the protection
for national interests

demanded by nationalists and the
liberal operating conditions requested by investors.
The pleas of private investors
ran counter to the
spreading nationalist sentiment
regarding oil, but the

private sector was not without influential
Argentine advocates.
Chief among them was Matias G. Sanchez
Sorondo,

prominent lawyer, National Deputy (B.A. Prov.

,

Conservative

Party, 1918-1926), and University Professor
of Mining Law.
Speaking with undeniable expertise, Sanchez
Sorondo

commented on oil legislation before a meeting
sponsored by
the Instituto Popular de Conferencias in November
1923. 134

133 Ibid

. ,

236.

Matias G. Sanchez Sorondo, Politica del petroleg;
La legislacion (Buenos Aires^ Agencia General de Libreria,
The discussion of Sanchez Sorondo's ideas is based
1923).
upon this pamphlet, and only direct quotes will be cited.
For those who shared his belief about the need to stimulate private exploitation, see Guillermo Hileman, Sob re
legislacion del petroleo en la republica argentina (Buenos
Aires: Imp^enta La Aurora ", 1927) ; Eduardo Bidau,
"Legislacion sobre petroleo," La Na cion , November 9, 1926,
p. 6;7 0. M. Figueroa, "La explotacion de petro'leo," La
Nacion , March 26, 1923, p. 4. Hileman was an engineer and
geologist who had worked in the oil fields in California
and Comodoro Rivadavia and served, as Director of Mines in
Mendoza Province. Bidau, like Sanchez Sorondo, was a lawyer
and University Professor who specialized in mining law.
Figueroa, when he wrote his article, was employed by the
T,

11
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He, like private investors themselves, emphasized that

prophesies about Argentina's fabulous oil wealth were not

based upon knowledge of proven reserves, and that money
rather than myths was necessary for oil exploitation.

The

extensive and expensive work inherent in the industry made
large companies as essential in the oil as in the railroad

business.

Argentines, he warned, had to abandon their

preconception of large companies as enemies:
To speak against the large companies
that explore for oil is, in my opinion,
to demonstrate ignorance of the demands of the industry, or, if you
prefer, to propose killing the
goose that lays the golden eggs;....-*- 35

Sanchez Sorondo advocated an "open doors" policy, wel-

coming all the so-called "trusts'* as long as they came openly under their own names and competed fairly under Argentine

laws.

The objective of Argentina's new oil law, he maintain

ed, should be to lure private capital by granting the

legal security and... the prospect of
capital returns insofar as they result
exclusively from the investor's own
efforts. 13S

The security of investors' rights against arbitrary alteration by new laws or executive decrees was of such overriding

Anglo-Persian syndicate.
135 Sanchez Sorondo, Politica del p_etroleo, 15.
136 Ibid., 18.
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importance to him that Sanchez Sorondo felt it should
be

protected through a contractual agreement.

The new oil

law, he suggested, might empower the national authorities

to arrange contracts with private investors and provide a

general outline for the agreements.

The specific details

would vary with the geographic and geological conditions of
each grant.

Contracts would thus provide flexibility

as well as security. 137

Sanchez Sorondo' s position was, naturally, an open

invitation to criticism from oil nationalists.

Anticipating

their attack, he lashed out at the "xenophobic" argument as

unworthy of a civilized and advanced people and vehemently

denied giving away anything.

As he succinctly put it,

What would we be giving away? A hope.
What would we be receiving? A magnificant reality. 138
Well might Sanchez Sorondo have been wary of criticism
from the nationalists, for their message to Argentines was

exactly the opposite of his own.

Where he predicted that

dire consequences would flow from the exclusion or excessive regulation of large companies, oil nationalists saw
the same course as being the only way to guarantee that

137 Sanchez Sorondo presented a bill to the Chamber
drafted along these lines, Diputados, Diario, 1925, II,

546-564.
138

Sanchez Sorondo, Politica del petroleo , 32.
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Argentina's oil would benefit Argentines.

By 1927, the

nationalists' ranks included not only Mosconi and a
large

segment of the Capital's press, but also such notables as
Ricardo Oneto, the long-time oil propagandist; Dr. Eduardo
A. Ramos, Professor of Law and Social Sciences at the

National University in La Plata; Luis Colombo, President of
the Union Industrial Argentina; and General Alonso Baldrich,

Chief of the Army Engineering Corps. 139

Baldrich 's Army

career paralleled Mosconi 's in many respects.

A graduate

of the National Military College and the holder of a degree

in Civil Engineering from the University of Buenos Aires,

Baldrich too had experience in Germany and had served as
Chief Administrator in the Comodoro Rivadavia fields of YPF
from April 1923 until January 1924. 140

He would assume an

increasingly vociferous role in petroleum matters.

In

addition, organizations like the Federacion Universitaria
de Buenos Aires 141 and the Alianza Continental enlisted

•"^Oneto, El centinela , 165-201; Eduardo A. ^ Ramos , El
petroleo en la republica argeqtina Su legislacion (Buenos
Luis
Aires: Valerio Abeledo-Libreria Juridica, 1927)
Colombo, El petroleo argentino y_ la necesidad de su legis lacion (Buenos Aires: Talleres GraTicos Caracciolo y
Plantie', 1927); Alonso Baldrich, El petr6le,o ; Su importancia
comercial , industrial y_ militar Legislacion petrolera
(Buenos Aires: Imprenta "El Misionero", M.d.).
;

;

;

140

"General Alonso Baldrich," Estrategia No. 4
(November-December, 1969), 135-136; Baldrich, El petroleo
,

,

141 La Vanguardia , February 5, 1927, pp. 1-2; La Epoca ,
June 20, 1927, p. 2; Diputados, Diario, 1927, I, 709.

5.
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their services in the nationalist cause. 142
The nationalist argument, whether it came from the

newspapers, from General Mosconi, or from one of the men
or organizations cited above, was shot through with the

rhetoric of anti-imperialism and tended to change little in
form or content from article to book to speech.

The

standard approach was to emphasize domestic oil as the key
to industrial growth and military defense and to suggest

that this invaluable resource was threatened by the greed
of the "great world oil trusts."

North American interests

represented by SONJ and British interests under the guise
of Royal Dutch Shell and Anglo-Persian, it was alleged,

were locked in a death struggle for control of the world's
oil reserves.

The financial power of these concerns, their

frequently corrupt methods, and especially the fact that
they enjoyed the support of their home governments made

them a constant threat to the domestic peace and even the

sovereignty of host nations.

To buttress claims about the

potentially disturbing effect of the trusts, nationalists

142 La Epoca , June 26, 1927, p. 4; La Vanguardia , July
The
27, 1927, p. 4; Mosconi, El petroleo argentino , 235.
Alianza Continental was founded in May 192 7 to fight foreign
imperialism in general and U.S. "Dollar Diplomacy" in parIts leaders hoped to foster a continent-wide
ticular.
sense of unity among Latin American peoples in order to protect the area from foreign powers who would attempt to
"Alianza
deprive Latin America of its natural riches.
Continental: A los pueblos de sur y centro america, mexico
Sociales
y las antillas," Revista Juridica y_ de Ciencias
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often attributed the outbreak of the Mexican
Revolution to
competition between British and North American oil
interests.
The following introduction which General Baldrich
used
for an address before the Centro Naval on February
2, 1927

outlined the essential points of the nationalists' case,
Because of its significance for the industrial
progress of the country, because of its increasing importance for national defense, because of the lessons which other nations offer
us through their improvidence or apathy, compromising their economic and financial future
and reducing or losing their sovereignty, because of all this... I will concern myself
[with petroleum] , convinced as I am of the
immense importance for us... of this magical
source of national wealth that foreign
interests seek, covet and menace. 143
Predictably, events in Salta and Jujuy served to

intensify both the anxieties and the rhetoric of the
nationalists, and to

maize

point of their attacks.

SONJ more and more the focal
This again is Baldrich from his

February 2, 1927 speech:
Through the North, gentlemen, the Spanish
invasion under Pezuela attempted to enter
in order to smother our new born political
independence! Through the North, Argentines, Standard Oil has taken the first

RJCS ) , ano XLIV (Nov. 1926-May 1927), 43-50; Arturo
Orzabal Quintana, "Nuestro nacionalismo continental," RJCS,
51-53; "La Alianza conano XLIV (Aov. 1926-May 1927)
tinental," RJCS, ano XLIV (May 1927), 84-91.
(

,

143 Baldrich, El petroleo , 8.
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step in an invasion designed to smother
our economic independence without which
political independence is a fiction. 1 * 4
The first step in preventing "trustification"
of

Argentina's oil by foreign firms, claimed the
nationalists,
was federalization of the nation's deposits.
Occasionally
proponents of federalization engaged the opposition on
con-

stitutional grounds and argued the legal nuances of the
matter. 145

More often, however, nationalists branded the

constitutional attack on federalization as sophistry and
insisted that the urgency of the situation and the magnitude
of the threat were sufficient justification for the measure.

Pleading "general interest" as the proper criteria for
deciding the issue, Baldrich stated,
The Constitution is a life giving
instrument, not a cross upon which
the Republic remains nailed while
its riches are withdrawn from it in
the name of an inapplicable Code.... 146

Agreement also existed among nationalists on the
proper role for private capital in the domestic petroleum
industry.

Not surprisingly, they followed Mosconi's lead

144 Ibid., 21.

145 Ramos, El petroleo en la r epublica argentina ,

272-275.
146

Baldrich, El petroleo , 30.
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and recommended the creation of mixed companies. 147

Among

the men cited above, only Ramos would have excluded foreign

capital from these firms. 148

The others were united in

their support for a bill placed before the Chamber in 1926
by the Committee on Industries and Commerce which would not

have excluded foreign investment from mixed companies.

It

is also worth noting that the Committee's bill called for

federalization and state control over the transportation of

domestically produced petroleum and petroleum by-products,

but it did not provide for either the expropriation of
existing private holdings or the cessation of grants to

*****

private investors. 14 ^

Care must be taken not to distort the importance of
the petroleum issue in the period prior to mid-1927,

Argentina was by no means a major world producer of oil,
and oil legislation was not an issue in the Congressional

elections of 1924 or 1926. 150

Even as late as March 1926,

147 0neto, El centinela , 201; Colombo, El petroleo
argentino, 15; Ramos, El petroleo en _Ja repi?blica
argentina" , 224-225; Baldnch, El petroleo , 22.
148 Ramos, El petroleo en la r r.publica argentina ,

218-221.
149 For a copy of the bill, see Diputados, Sesiones
ordinarias , 1926.;, Orden del dia num. 66_ (Buenos Aires:
Imprenta de la Camara de Diputados, 1926).

150 Only the Socialists and the anti-Yrigoyenist
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La Accion complained that Argentines did not attach sufficient importance to the oil problem, and noted that an

urgent need existed to arouse public opinion so pressure

might be exerted upon Congress for study of the matter. 151
Nevertheless, the preceding survey indicates that

pressure for the passage of petroleum legislation was
building, and that by mid- 1927 it was more intense than
it had ever been.

Equally important was the explosive

potential of this issue as the anti-imperialist rhetoric
of the nationalists promised to push the debate into the

realm of ideology.

Congress, in whose hands lay the

crucial legislative decision, was facing a problem that
daily was growing more complex and volatile.

Radicals published programs for the 1926 Congressional
elections, and both documents were silent on the question
La Vanguardia , January 31, 1926,
of petroleum legislation.
p. 1; La Accion , February 2, 1926, p. 5.
151 La Accion, March 22, 19 26, p. 6.

CHAPTER
ALVEAR II:

V

THE GREAT PETROLEUM DEBATE

Prior to mid-1927, as we have seen, Alvear's administration witnessed vigorous action on several fronts of the

domestic petroleum scene, including the attack on permit

speculation directed by Le Breton, the brilliant accomplishments of YPF under Mosconi, the increased crude oil production of private companies, and the steadily developing

nationalist campaign demanding strict government supervision
of the nation's oil wealth.

Yet these activities unfolded

under legal conditions so ill-defined as to deny all
parties, public and private alike, any security for their

interests and investments.

Few denied the need to reform

or supersede the 1886 Mining Code insofar as petroleum was

concerned, but year after year the opportunities passed

without definitive Congressional action.

Not until

September 1927, almost twenty years after the Comodoro
Rivadavia discovery, was an oil bill approved by even one
chamber rf the national legislature.

Congress's apparent unwillingness to satisfy the consensus demand for petroleum legislation should not be

attributed to ignorance of, or apathy toward, this problem
193
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in particular.

During the Alvear years, Argentina's

national legislators ignored virtually all their law-making
duties whilt turning Congress into a forum for the political

battles which followed the Radical Party's schism.

Within

less than two years of Alvear' s inauguration in October
1922, the split which had threatened to disrupt Radical

ranks during Yrigoyen's term was formalized.
side were the "personalistas"

,

On the one

named for their continued

devotion to Yrigoyen's leadership, and on the other side

were the

"

antipersonalistas" whose name manifested their

opposition to the alleged personal domination of the UCR by
the aging caudillo.

The antipersonalistas adopted President

Alvear as their titular head, but the thrust of their move-

ment was clearly more anti-Yrigoyen than pro-Alvear.
Throughout Alvear 's administration, both groups
trained their political sights on the 1928 presidential
election.

The antipersonalistas, led by Vicente Gallo

(Interior)

and Tomas Le Breton (Agriculture)

from their

Cabinet posts and Leopoldo Melo (Entre Rios) from his
Senate seat, were committed above all else to preventing

Yrigoyen's return to the Casa Rosada.

Meanwhile, at his

modest lodgings in Calle Brasil, Yrigoyen resurrected his
incomparable talents for political organization and began
piecing together the coalition he hoped would return himself
and the "cause" to the pinnacle of Argentine political
power.
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In Congress, the UCR split
all but paralyzed the

nation's legislative machinery
because no one party or
coalition was able to establish a
consistent majority. 1

a

right-of-center coalition of Conservatives
and antipersonalistas dominated the Senate, unthreatened
from any quarter
during the Alvear years. In the Chamber,
the personalistas
were the most numerous group, but in a
partisan
fight they

could not muster a winning majority.

And while the anti-

personalistas, the Conservatives, and the
Socialists shared
an anti-Yrigoyen bias, this common bent
was not sufficient
adhesive for errecting an alliance capable of
consistently

dominating Chamber activities.

Effectively stymied as a legislating body, the Chamber
spent hours, days, and even months wrangling over
essentially

political questions such as the intervention of provincial

governments and the admissibility of the credentials of

newly elected Deputies.

The number of laws passed during

the Alvear years indicates the extent to which political

conditions undercut the Lower House's ability to fulfill its

law-making function.

In 1924, nine laws were passed.

2

In

1925, ten measures received Congressional approval, including

1A

valuable portrayal of politicking in Congress is
provided by the Socialist Deputy (1924-1928) Joaquin Coca
in his E_l contubernio
Memorias de un diputado obrero
(Buenos Aires:
Claridad, 1930).
:

Senadores, Diario, 1924, I, xlv.

;
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two for constructing monuments, one closing
business enter-

prises at 8:00 P.M.

,

one declaring a holiday, and one

appropriating funds for the Executive Committee of the Third

National Congress of Medicine. 3

The passage of sixty laws

in 1926 indicated that matters were improving, but in 1927

Congress reverted to form and produced merely seventeen new
laws. 4

While Congress delayed its decision on petroleum legislation, a sense of forward movement was maintained through
a series of Chamber requests to the Executive branch for

information on petroleum-related matters, through petroleum
bills presented by various Deputies, and through the
studies, hearings, and trips undertaken by the Chamber Com-

mittee on Industries and Commerce prior to its drafting of
an oil bill.

Between January 1923 and September 1926, the

Chamber requested from President Alvear and his subordinates
data on the state petroleum agency prior to October 1922 and
on the results of Mosconi's investigations subsequent to his
takeover of YPF,^ on the financing of the La Plata

3 Ibid.

,

1925, II, xliii.

4

By comparison,
Ibid. , 1926, II, liii-liv; 1927, lvii.
the 1920 legislative period yielded 115 laws, and that of
Ibid . , 1920, II, xxxvi-xxxvii
1928 produced 136 laws.
1928, liii.

Diputados, Diario 1922, V, 596-599, 612; VI, 128129; VII, 175-176, 441, 598? 1923, VI, 187-189, 322-323,
472; VII, 393.
5

,
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refinery, 6 on the activities of foreign-owned oil

companies operating in Argentina, 7 and on the
correspondence

which passea between Mosconi and the Governors of Salta
and
Jujuy concerning oil matters in those Provinces. 8
This

process of accumulating information was a poor substitute
for the passage of necessary legislation, but it did serve
to remind the legislators periodically of the petroleum

problem and to keep them abreast of the most recent developments in oil circles.
As for new oil bills, the administration's 1923 measures

were joined by major proposals from two Conservative Party
Deputies representing Buenos Aires Province, Rodolfo Moreno
Jr. and Matias G. Sanchez Sorondo.

Moreno, a 44-year-old

lawyer-University Professor, submitted a bill to the Chamber
on June 1, 1923 which dealt exclusively with state exploitation. ^

in defense of the limited scope of his proposal,

Moreno suggested that while a comprehensive oil statute

would require extensive study and debate, the question of
state exploitation could be settled quickly because there

6 Ibid.

,

1925, IV, 320; V, 862-865.

7 Ibid

. ,

1926, II, 753-756; III

S lbid

. ,

1926, V, 298-300; VI, 199, 213-236, 654,

575-579.

704-739.

These pages include a long
1923, II, 232-281.
introductory statement from Moreno which is valuable for the
summary it provides of state exploitation prior to 1923.
9 Ibid.

,
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existed general agreement in all quarters on
what should be
done. Emphasizing the need to learn from
past failures
in

the state industry, Moreno urged passage of
a law which

would lead to "an orderly administration, free from
political interference, and endowed with ample powers, full

responsibility and effective controls." 10

Such a law, he

contended, would lend a permanence and stability to state

exploitation which could not be obtained while YPF's legal
footing consisted of Executive Decrees and articles in the
annual budget law.

There was nothing innovative about the bill itself.
Its passage simply would have provided a statutory basis

for what already existed in fact - YPF and state petroleum

exploitation.

The provisions of the bill would have

produced no major changes in the structure or operations of
YPF as it was then functioning.

Nonetheless, only after

four years and considerable Committee alteration would

Moreno's bill come before the Chamber for discussion. 1
Sanchez Sorondo's bill, introduced on September

^"

6,

1923, represented an attempt to gain Congressional approval

for his well-known "open doors" policy toward private

10 Ibid.

^In

,

234.

1925 when the time limit on Moreno's bill expired
and Congress had not discussed it, Moreno reintroduced it.
Ibid. , 1925, I, 83.
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investment in Argentina's oil industry. 12
,

,

The salient

part of the bill proposed the addition of a section
to the
Mining Code specifically designed to govern oil exploration
and exploitation.

The new section featured, among other

things, extremely liberal oil grants in terms of size and

duration, and contractual arrangements to protect the
rights of concessionaires.

The inclusion of stiff penalties

for the failure to work exploration lots, requirements for

royalty payments on crude oil production, and the assertion
of government control over both the transfer of oil rights
and the exportation of oil provided evidence that Sanchez

Sorondo was not ignoring the nation's stake in its oil
reserves.

Still, the bill bore the unmistakable impress of

his conviction that substantial private investment was man-

datory if Argentina's oil industry was to fulfill its
alleged potential.

From 1923 to 1927, the Chamber's most active group in
oil matters was the Committee on Industries and Commerce

whose members labored diligently to draft a bill for consideration on the floor.

12 Ib:d .

During the 1923 sessions, the

Sanchez Sorondo, like
1923, V, 492-495.
Moreno, found it necessary to reintroduce his bill in
Ibid . , 1925, II, 546-549.
1925.
,

13 For a summary of the Committee's work during
these years, see Ibid . , 1926, IV, 736-737.

.
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Committee studied Moreno's proposal and despatched it to
14
Deputies.
the
by
ignored
it
have
to
only
floor
the

The

following year in July, the Committee renewed its deliberations, hearing testimony from the Ministers of Agriculture,

Public Works, and Navy, and journeying to Comodoro Rivadavia
and Plaza Huincul on fact-finding missions.
9,

On September

task by
1925, the Committee members completed their

on the
forwarding a bill to the Chamber which was placed

agenda as Order of the Day 95, 1925 (OD 95, 1925)

15

in the
Moreno's 1923 proposal scarcely was discernible
16
report.
majority
Committee's
the
bill which constituted
exploitation with a
The attempt to provide YPF and state

sole objective now
legislative basis which had been Moreno's

14 Ibid .,

1923, V, 680.

For a copy of the bill, see
Anexo a la
Diputado^7~Comisi6n de Industrias y Comercio,
orden del dxa No . 66 13-22.
15 Ibid., 1925, IV,

188.

,

16 The majority report was signed by the Committee's

cited
Federal, Partido Socialists) is

K

Radical)

« ££

submitted a minority report.

l

9
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became the starting point for a more extensive
measure.
Among the appended sections were a set of regulations

to

govern oil concessions, and articles calling for both
the
federalization of all deposits of oil and gaseous hydrocarbons and a government monopoly over the transportation
of oil and oil by-products.

The proposed regulations for

private oil concessions were particularly restrictive, even

more so than those in Alvear's 1923 bill which had drawn
such strong criticism from private oil investors. 18

Also

sure to draw fire from private interests was Article 31 of
the Committee's bill which empowered YPF to oversee private

exploration.

Had the Committee conceived of YPF as a govern

ment agency created solely to supply the government's oil
needs, this provision might have been acceptable, but it

was not justifiable when YPF was projected as a publiclyfinanced competitor of private oil firms.
The Committee's two Yrigoyenist Deputies, Bias Goni and

Jose Luis Alvarez, submitted a minority report to the

''The transportation monopoly was to be exercised
directly by the government in the Comodoro Rivadavia region
In other oil districts, it was to be exercised directly by
the government or through contracts with private firms.
Ibid. , 20.
18 Under the proposed regulations, exploration concessions were to be made through public auction. All bidding
companies had to be domiciled in the Federal Capital, prove
their capacity to undertake petroleum exploration, and
deposit 5,000 pesos in the National Bank as a quarantee

that they would carry out their obligations. Grants were
to consist of 500 hectares for three years providing work
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Chamber, offering a series of substitute articles for
the

sections of the majority's bill which dealt with federalization, the regulation of private concessions, and the

transportation monopoly. 19

If the designated provisions of

the majority's bill had been eliminated and the substitute

articles adopted, the result would have been essentially

Moreno's 1923 bill, a proposal to legalize state exploitation under YPF and empower national and provincial authorities to create oil reserves.

The dissent of Goni and Alvarez

,

particularly from the

provision on federalization, is somewhat surprising in
light of their party's strong support for federalization at

was begun within the first year. In the event oil was discovered, the concessionaire was entitled to exploitation
rights over 250 hectares for a non-renewable term of 50
years.
The remaining 250 hectares were to become part of
the government s oil reserves .
Exploitation concessionaires
were obliged to pay taxes of 20 pesos per hectare
annually, 10% of all crude oil production, and 50% of all
profits in excess of 20% of their invested capital • The
provinces were to share in these revenues if the oil
deposits were located in their territorial jurisdictions.
Exploitation activity could not be interrupted for more
than six months at any one time, and no one person or
company would hold more than five exploration and/or
exploitation grants at one time. Finally, companies were
prohibited from associating for commercial purposes, and
the transfer of private oil rights was prohibited without
Ibid , 17-20.)
the approval of the Executive Power.
1

(

Ibid.

,

21-22.

.
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the time and its increasingly strident,
nationalistic oil
policy. While their action suggests
a lack of party discipline on the oil issue in 1925, they later
justified their
dissent on the grounds that changes in the
Mining Code were
the province of the Committee on General
Legislation rather
than the Committee on Industries and Commerce. 20

Again the Chamber ignored the Committee's work,
partly
because it was ignoring most of its legislative duties,
and

partly because the bill was submitted late during the 1925
sessions.

When Congress also proved unresponsive to the

President's request that petroleum legislation be considered
during the 1925-1926 Extraordinary Sessions, 21 OD 95 (1925)

appeared slated for the legislative oblivion shared by all
previous oil bills.

That it would not become Argentina's

long anticipated oil law, however, was decided by petroleum

developments in the Northern Provinces rather than by

Congressional apathy.

When the Committee met in 1926, the members decided
that events in the North warranted their study before they

185

20 Diputados, Diario
,
(Goni)

21 Ibid

. ,

1927, II, 525

1925, IV, 12,

(Alvarez), III,
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sent another oil bill to the floor. 22

Lat e in July, they

began collecting statistical data, hearing expert
testimony, and eliciting written reports from government

agencies and private oil firms, and in mid-September, some
of the members traveled to Salta and Jujuy to observe con-

ditions firsthand and interview provincial authorities and

representatives of Standard Oil. 23
Chief among the experts heard by the Committee was

General Mosconi.

On August 6, he offered his analysis of

the nation's oil situation as well as his recommendations
for oil legislation. 24

Emphasizing the necessity for an

oil law to facilitate YPF's work in particular and to

provide guidelines for the oil industry in general, Mosconi

pointed to Salta and Jujuy as the primary trouble spots.
He presented his version of developments in those provinces

since 1924 and warned the Committee that SONJ was fashioning a monopoly there which threatened to remove the North's

"^ Ibid .

The Committee's membership
1926, IV, 736.
had changed somewhat. Romero Day, Lloveras and Alvarez
were replaced by Julio C. Raffo de la Reta (Mendoza,
Partido Liberal) , a conservative, Jorge Calle (Menodza,
UCR Lencinista) and Clorindo Mendieta (Santa Fe, UCR
Unificada) , both antipersonalistas , and Juan Garralda
As a result, the Com(B.A. Prov. , UCR) , a personalista.
mittee's political balance stood at two Conservatives, two
antipersonalistas, two personalistas , and one Socialist.
,

23For reports on the journey to Salta and^ Jujuy, see
La Prensa, September 15, 1926, p. 18; La Nacion, September
T5, 1926, p. 7.
24 Diputados, Comision de Industrias y Comercio, Anexo
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oil deposits from Argentine control.

His specific recom-

mendations included federalization of all oil
deposits,
exploitation through mixed companies based on the
AngloPersian model, continued private exploitation under

strict

government control, and assessment of a royalty on private
oil production as a means of financing a national agency

responsible for enforcing mineral laws.
Four privately owned oil firms responded to the Com-

mittee^ invitation
(1925). 25

to submit written critiques of OD 95

All four advised against including the struc-

turing of YPF and the regulation of private exploitation
in the same bill, and all criticized specific articles of

the bill such as that which empowered YPF to control

private exploration.

However, the oil companies' primary

concern was the set of regulations proposed for governing
private operations.

Unanimously, they predicted that the

bill's provisions were so restrictive that passage would
chase all private investors from the oil industry, effective
ly creating a state oil monopoly.

a la orden del dia no .

66

,

Standard Oil's brief

49-60.

The four responding companies were
SONJ (29-34) , Astira (34-42)
the Compania Industrial y
and the Compania Diadema
Comercial de Petroleo (42-45)
Argentina (45-46) . Astra and the Compania Industrial y
Comercial de Petroleo were among the nation's leading
private producers in 1926, while Diadema was a Royal Dutch
affiliate with interests in the Comodoro Rivadavia region
which had just begun yielding crude oil in 1925.
IbjL— •

'

29-46.

,

,

.

,
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summarized their preferences in this matter:
It is necessary to protect the explorer
to give him time so he may study the
geography and geology of th3 lands he
intends to explore, so he may transport
his equipment and construct extremely
expensive roads through completely unexplored forest and mountain regions, so
he may position exploratory wells with
some probability of success, and, finally,
once petroleum is discovered, it is absolutely essential to grant the explorer
irrevocable rights over an area sufficient
to provide a return on the capital invested, 26

Only on the question of federalization did any significant

difference emerge in the four statements, with SONJ alone

objecting to it as unconstitutional.

While on the surface

it might seem surprising that the other three failed even
to mention federalization, it should be pointed out that

Standard alone held provincial interests (Salta and Jujuy)

which would have been affected by federalization.

The other

three were operating in regions already within the juris-

diction of the national government.
On September 21, 1926, the Committee forwarded the

results of its studies to the Chamber, its despatch becoming
27
Order of the Day 66, 1926 (OD 66, 1926)

26 Ibid .

,

The bill which

33.

For a copy of the
The
1927, III, 211-217.
Committee's despatch, see Ibid
bill which represented the Committee's majority report
carried the signatures of the two antipersonalista and the
two Conservative members of the group. Castellanos, the
Socialist member, registered his dissent from the provisio
27 Diputados, Diario , 1926, VI, 9.
.

,

207

constituted the Committee's majority report varied significantly from OD 95 (1925), clearly displaying the impress of

recommendations and information gathered by the Committee.

Apparently accepting the advice of the private firms to
make state and private oil exploitation the subjects of
separate bills, the Committee excluded from OD 66 (1926)

any regulations for private concessions.

Instead, it

proposed in its bill a series of temporary taxes on private
concessions which were to continue in force until passage
of a law regulating private activity. 28

The protestations

of the private concerns were accomodated also on the ques-

tion of YPF's control over private exploration.

This latter

duty was not among YPF's obligations according to OD 66,
(1926)

.

The other major alteration of the Committee's 1925

position was embodied in Art. 30 of OD 66 (1926) which em-

powered the national Executive to create mixed petroleum
companies.

Undoubtedly influenced by Mosconi's testimony,

the Committee recommended firms in which the government

would hold 51% of the stock, and appoint the President and
one-third of the Board of Directors.

The remainder of the

stock and the Board positions were to be left to private

of the bill which would have empowered YPF to make use of
credit operations. The two personalista members submitted
a minority report which will be discussed below.
28 While staying in Cordoba on his return from a trip
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investors, but the government representatives
were to hold
veto power over decisions involving changes in
the company's
statutes, the sale or leasing of oil deposits, the
exporting
of the firm's products, and the "paramount interests
of

the State."
In all other matters, OD 66 (1926) was nearly a copy
of OD 95 (1925)

.

Small changes in wording and detail left

essentially unaltered the sections on YPF's structure and
functions, federalization, the creation of federal oil
reserves, and the state monopoly over the land transport of

oil and oil by-products.

Similarly unchanged in 192 6 was the dissenting opinion
of the Committee's two Yrigoyenist Deputies, now Bias Goni
and Juan Garralda. 29

As in 1925, their proposed revisions

would have stripped the majority report of all but those
matters covered in Moreno's 1923 bill.

Goni would later

explain, as he did in connection with OD 95 (1925)

,

that

matters like federalization which involved changes in the
Mining Code were beyond the jurisdiction of the Committee

to the Northern oil districts, the Chairman of the Committee,
Julio C. Raffo de la Reta, made it plain in newspaper interviews that the ^Committee favored continued private exploitation.
La Nacion, September 15, 1926, p. 7; La Prensa,
September 15, 1926, p. 18.

29Diputados, Diario, 1927, III, 216-217.
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on Industries and Commerce. 30

Still, it is difficult to

understand why a personalista Deputy would have
cited a
procedural technicality to justify dissent from federalization when it was receiving strong support from his
party
in 1926, and when it would become nothing less than
the

touchstone of party loyalty in less than a year.
Two other explanations are v/orth considering.

On the

one hand, as suggested before, it may have resulted from
a lack of party discipline on this issue.

With no petroleum

debate apparently in the offing, personalista ranks may not
have been sufficiently closed on the question of federalization to prevent the seeming inconsistency in Goni's and

Garralda's dissent.

On the other hand, the personalistas

may have decided by mid-19 26 to make a major political
issue of federalization.

In that case, they may have been

seeking a separate bill covering only federalization since
that would have afforded them the maximum opportunity to

showcase the issue and their policy.

30 Ibid .

Technically, Goni appears to
1927, III, 326.
have been correct. Petroleum bills which proposed specific
changes in the Mining Code, such as those of President
Alvear and Sanchez Sorondo, were sent to the Committee on
General Legislation. Those like Moreno's which were
essentially administrative measures were directed to the
Committee on Industries and Commerce, At best, though, the
distinction was hazy and unsatisfactory, for Moreno's bill
on YPF and state exploitation involved a basic alteration in
the 1886 Mining Code since that code prohibited state
,

mineral exploitation.
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s ome

indication that the latter strategy may have

prevailed in personalista councils came on September

1,

1926 when personalista Deputy Diego Luis Molinari, a member

of Yrigoyen's inner circle of party leaders, reproduced a

bill originally submitted to the Chamber in 1918 by the
V

Committee on Legislation. 31

As presented, the bill would

have authorized state mineral exploitation, federalized all

deposits of oil, iron ore and coal, and prevented retroactive application of the law to concessions of the three

minerals made prior to September

1,

1926.

In short, all

details were avoided in a bill which emphasized the two

principles basic to the oil nationalists' case, federalization and state exploitation.

Two weeks later, the brilliant young Socialist Deputy,

Antonio de Tomaso, followed Molinari* s lead by reproducing
the same bill with one important change.

He omitted the

article which would have blocked retroactive enforcement of
De Tomaso, who was a member of the Committee

the measure.

of Legislation in 1918 and who had acted as the Committee's

spokesman for the bill on the Chamber floor, did not

31 Ibid .

,

32lbid.

,

1926, IV, 805-806. Molinari changed one date
in the 1913 bill to make it current in 1926. Otherwise,
See Chapter II, 65-70, for the
he left it unaltered.
Chamber's discussion of the bill in 1918.
1926, V, 616.
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specify why he now wanted to change the
proposal.

Both bills went to the Committee on General
Legislation

which wasted no time in its deliberations.

On September

28 , it despatched its report to the floor where it
became

Order of the Day 77, 1926 (OD 77, 1926). 33

The bill which

was signed by the Committee's majority contained but a
single article.

It called for the federalization of oil,

iron ore and coal deposits and authorized their exploitation through state agencies.

Since both these principles

were included in the Committee on Industries and Commerce's
bill, OD 77 presented an alternative to OD 66 only insofar
as its approach to oil legislation was concerned.

Congress ended its regular sessions on September 30

without discussing an oil law, and the legislators again
ignored a presidential request to consider one in the

Extraordinary Sessions which opened on December

3 3 Ibid.

2.

34

For a copy of the Committee's
1926, VI, 326.
report, see Ibid . , 1927, II, 489-501. The bill which constituted the Committee's majority report carried the signatures of the Socialist Enrique Dickmann (Capital Federal)
and two personalistas , Eduardo F. Giuffa and Guillermo R.
Fonrouge who were both members of the UCR representing the
Federal Capital. Conservative Deputy Jose Heriberto
Martinez (Cordoba, Partido Demo'crata) submitted a minority
report which differed from the majority's in that his bill
included an extensive set of regulations for governing
private oil concessions.
,

34 Alvear did not include oil legislation among the

tasks originally selected for treatment during the Extraordinary Sessions, but he later added it in a note sent to
Congress on January 25, 1927. Ibid . 1927, I, 23.
,

2

Nonetheless, during the months prior to the
opening of
Congress's 1927 meetings, there were more
positive indications that ever that an oil debate was imminent.
First,

the Chamber's committees had completed their
labors and

presented their definitive proposals.

Second, in October

1926, a group of Deputies and Senators who anticipated a

major petroleum discussion in the Chamber undertook

a

fact-finding trip to Comodoro Rivadavia where they were

shepherded about the state and private installations by
General Mosconi himself. 35

The following February, Presi-

dent Alvear made a similar journey accompanied by Mosconi
and a retinue of high administration officials. 36

Few

would contend such jaunts could have yielded anything beyond superficial impressions of conditions in Comodoro
Rivadavia, particularly when the President spent about six

hours ashore and most of those socializing.

Yet they were

evidence of the quickening concern about petroleum matters
Third, neither the events in Salta and Jujuy nor the

mounting public pressure for passage of oil legislation

35 La Nacion , October 8, 1926,
p. 7, October 16, 1926,
p. l f October 17, 1926, p. 7; La Prensa , October 12, 1926,
p, 9, October 17, 1926, p. 7,
36 La Nacion
February 8, 1927, p. 7, February 11, 1927
,
p. 7, February 12, 1927, p. 7, February 13, 1927, p. 7,
February 15, 1927, p. 7; La Prensa , February 10, 1927, p. 2
February 14, 1927, p. 17, February 15, 1927, p. 14,
February 16, 1927, p. 13, February 17, 1927, p. 13.
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could have been ignored much longer.

Unless the Congress

contemplated an open declaration of its bankruptcy
as a
representative institution responsive to the needs and

wishes of its constituents, an oil debate was almost
a
necessity.

And finally, the weight of public demands for

Congressional action was magnified by the rapidly approach
ing national elections scheduled for April 1928.

As the Chamber organized for its 1927 sessions, it

was still without a majority party.

Yrigoyen's faithful

filled 59 of the Lower House's 158 seats, with 29 in the

hands of antipersonalistas
tives.

,

and

44

occupied by Conserva-

The Socialist deputation fell victim to a party

schism in 1927.

Early in July, eleven Independent Social-

ists, the splinter group led by de Tomaso, requested and

received recognition in the Chamber as a separate party.
The parent organization led by Repetto and now referred to
as the Orthodox Socialist Party was left with just eight

seats.

7

3 ^The

Thus, in a strictly partisan struggle, no party

figures presented here total 151 rather than
158 because the 1927 Chamber rejected the credentials of
four men elected in the 1926 Congressional contests, and
three other seats were vacant.
The following scheme of abbreviations will be used in
the text to identify the party affiliation of the Deputies.
The party names listed are those v/hich appeared on the
election ballots. To distinguish between personalistas and
antipersonalistas in the several Radical Party factions, a
w
w
for personalista or "a" for antipersonalista will
p
follow the abbreviation cited below. Thus UCRp would indicate a personalista member of the Union Civica Radical,
while UCRBa would indicate an antipersonalista member of
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could bend the will of the Chamber to its own.
On June 24, 1927, Deputy Juan F. Fiorillo
(UCRUa, S.
Fe)

moved that discussion on a petroleum law begin during

the Chamber's next meeting and continue until a bill was

passed.

A brief discussion led instead to the choice of

July 15 as the starting date. 3 8

At this time some incon-

clusive debate arose over whether OD 77 (1926) from the

Committee on General Legislation or OD 66 (1926) from the
Committee on Industries and Commerce would be the basis for
the Chamber's deliberations.

When it was argued that OD 66

could not be debated because it had not been despatched

during the 19 27 sessions, Enrique Dickmann (PS, Capt. Fed.)

the Unio'n Civica Radical Bloquista.
Radicals,

Union Civica Radical
Partido Radical
Unificada
UCR Bloquista
UCR Unificada
UCR Lencinista
UCR Antipersonalista

Conservatives
Partido Con^ervador
Partido Democrata
Partido Democrata
Progresista
Union Provincial
Concentracio'n Civica
38

UCR

Socialists
Partido Socialista
PS Independiente

PS
PSI

PRU
UCRB
UCRU
UCRL
UCRA
PC
PD

PDP
UP

ConC

Concentracion Popular
Partidos Liberal y
Autonomista
Partido Liberal,
Tucuman
Partido Liberal,
Mendoza

Diputados, Diario, 1927, II, 68-70.

ConP

PLA
PLTuc

PLMen
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reintroduced Moreno's 1923 bill, 39 and the Committee
reacted swiftly, sending OD 66 back to the floor.

Now it

became Order of the Day 95, 1927 (OD 95, 1927) 40
When the Chamber failed to meet on July 15, debate on

petroleum legislation was delayed until July 20.

On that

day discussion about which Committee bill would be debated

began in earnest.

Led by Diego Luis Molinari and Eduardo

Giuffra (UCRp, Capt. Fed.), the personalistas pressed for
prior consideration of OD 77 (1926) on the grounds that
the paramount question of federalization would be settled

With this done, the Chamber could proceed

immediately.

logically to the technical aspects of organizing the
nation's oil industry. 4 ^
The antipersonalistas and Orthodox Socialists argued
the case for OD 95 (1927).

Jorge Calle (UCRa, Mend.) and

Jose Luis Pena (PS, Capt. Fed.) contended that it too

posed the theoretical question of federalization while also
raising important practical problems such as the legal

framework for exploitation.

Pena further argued that

1927, II, 69. No indication was given during
the debate as to why the same objection did not apply to
39 Ibid .

,

OD 77 (1926)
40 Ibid., 1927, II, 183.
For a copy of the Committee's
despatch7~see Ibid . , 1927, III, 211-216. OD 95 (1927) differed from OD 66 (1926) in that the order of its articles
was revised slightly, but there were no substantive changes.
41 Ibid., 1927, II,

515-517, 522-523.

216

OD 95 (1927) involved only petroleum
while OD 77 (1926)
included iron and coal resources as
well. 42
No decision on which bill would be
debated was
reached on July 20, and the matter was
reopened on July 28.
Suddenly, an unexpected element was added.
Taking the
floor shortly after the debate began,
Molinari defiantly
announced that the personalista Deputies would
abide by
two principles on the question of petroleum:

The first is that petroleum deposits
are the property of the Nation; the
second is that the national government will directly exploit its oil
deposits to the exclusion of all other
parties. 43
So closely interrelated were these principles, asserted

the personalista leader, that his party would not vote for
any bill which did not contain both.

Should the Chamber

reject either proposition, he promised that the personalistas would absent themselves from the Chamber. 44

Given Molinari* s uncompromising and impassioned

statement of party policy, it is easy to understand why the

personalistas favored OD 77 over OD 95.

Discussion of the

shorter bill would have brought the two principles acclaimed

by Molinari immediately to the fore, while federalization

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid

,

. ,

44 Ibid.,

1927, II, 521.
1927, III, 184.
1927, III, 184-185.
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did not appear in OD 95 until Article 27.

Jorge R.

Rodriguez (PRUp, S, Fe) spoke shortly after Molinari
and

summarized the personalistas

'

position by stating,

From the outset, we want each party to
accept the responsibility of facing
squarely the central issue - the federalization of oil and its exclusive exploitation by the State. 45

Many supporters of OD

95

were more offended than

daunted by Molinari' s battle cry.

Antipersonalista Deputy

Agustin Araya (UCRUa, S. Fe) criticized the dogmatic tone
of Molinari'

s

remarks and demanded for his party "our

right to be independent and formulate our own opinions, our
right to express ourselves and act with complete freedom,..
..

m46

Nicolas Repetto (PS, Capt. Fed.) likewise counselled

against doctrinaire proclamations while discussing a

question as complicated as petroleum. 47
Persisting in their support of OD 95, the antipersonalistas, Conservatives, and Orthodox Socialists were joined

on July 28 by the Independent Socialists.

When the vote

was registered on Enrique Dickraann's motion to accord
OD 95 preference, personalista opposition was overcome by a
count of

66

45 Ibid .

to 50.

48

The vote indicated the degree to

,

1927, III, 205-206.

Ibid .

,

1927, Ill, 193-195.

47 Ibid.

,

1927, Ill, 196-198.

4

48 Ibid., 1927, Ill, 207-208.
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which, even at this early juncture, the
debate had become

"politicized", i.e., the degree to which it had
become one
in which party affiliation was the dominant
consideration
in vote casting.

With one exception in each case, every

personalista Deputy voted negatively, and every antipersonalista, Conservative and Socialist voted affirmatively.

Upset by their defeat, the personalistas immediately

retired from the Chamber, leaving it without a quorum.
Their absence was shortlived, however, and by August

4

the Yrigoyenists were back in their seats in the center of

the Chamber waging the battle for federalization and a

state oil monopoly.

Throughout August, Chamber business

was dominated by the general debate on OD 95. 49

Though the

bill encompassed nearly all aspects of the petroleum question, discussion centered almost exclusively on federaliza-

tion and monopolization.

These two principles were the

crux of the problem, because any action on specifics such
as transportation and royalty payments depended upon who

owned Argentina's oil and who would be permitted to exploit
it.

Federalization proved to be the less controversial of

49 The term "general debate" is used to denote the
discussion of a bill which preceded its acceptance or

rejection in principle.
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the two issues.

Deputies of every political stripe

favored handing over all petroleum deposits to the federal
government, while opposition was limited to a few Conser-

vatives and antipersonalistas.

Constitutional arguments

dominated the floor exchanges over federalization.

Advo-

cates sought to prove the federal government's sovereign

right to assume control over petroleum deposits, while
opponents upheld provincial autonomy.

Participants on

both sides delved into colonial and early nineteenth-century

Argentine history, resurrecting appropriate witnesses and
legal codes and offering interpretations which buttressed

their cases.

Because the speeches were often more con-

spicuous for their length than for their lucidity, Nicolas

Repetto suggested that the Chamber, at times, resembled
"a veritable museum of legal or constitutional paleontol-

ogy."h50

Though the details of this Constitutional squabble

need not detain us, the positions of both sides can be
stated quickly.

Those favoring federalization argued that

the national government replaced Spain as the sovereign

entity in Argentina after independence and inherited from
the Spanish crown property rights over all mineral re-

sources.

More formidable, however, was their contention

50 Diputados, Diario ,

1927, III, 621.
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that Congress could do as it pleased with Argentina's

mines because the Constitution of 1853 granted to the
federal government the right to draft a mining code. 51

Opponents countered with the assertion that the Provinces

existed before the Argentine nation and, therefore, had
prior claim to sovereignty over mineral resources within
their boundaries.

Since the federal pact of 1853 did not

specifically grant the national government the power to
federalize petroleum deposits, it would be unconstitutional
for Congress to do so. 52

Thus, the case for provincial

autonomy rested on an extremely narrow interpretation of
the Argentine Constitution.

Interspersed among the constitutional briefs were

supplementary arguments mustered by both sides.

Protection

of the nation's oil from the ravages of foreign imperialists was the leitmotif of the advocates of federalization.

Socialists, Conservatives, personalistas and antipersonalistas alike condemned the activities of the foreign oil
"trusts", particularly those of SONJ,

Their case rested on

the two premises already popularized by the oil nationalists
one, that Argentina's oil was essential to the nation's

51 Ibid .

1927, III, 283, 313-315, 321, 396-397, 419,
439-455; IV, 321.
52 Ibid

,

1927, III, 378-390, 407-409, 594-610, 800,
832-833; IV, 77-79, 323-325.
.,
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economic development and military defense, and
two, that
British and North American oil interests were engaged

in a

death struggle for control over the world's oil resources,
and small oil possessing nations often became incidental

victims in that commercial war. 53

There was actually a

third premise to the anti-imperialist argument to the

effect that the provinces either could not or would not
resist the machinations of the "trusts".
unstated.

This premise went

A few Deputies emphasized the anti-imperialist

argument to the exclusion of constitutional considerations.
Enrique I. Caceres (UCRp, S. del Estero) contended that
since national welfare dictated the need for federalization,
the constitutionality of the measure was immaterial. 54

Assuming that their opponents were motivated, at least
in part, by financial considerations, advocates of federal

ownership also stressed that OD 95 (1927) guaranteed a
share of the profits from petroleum exploitation to the

province within which the oil was located.

5^

There is

little evidence, however, to indicate that opposition was

dictated by the location of oil deposits.

Representatives

from Salta and Jujuy, provinces with known petroleum

5

Ibid. , 1927, III, 378-390, 407-409, 594-610, 800,
832-833; IV, 77-79, 323-325.
54 Ibid

.

,

55 Ibid.,

1927, III, 494-497.
1927, III, 250-252, 340-341; IV, 321-322.

.
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resources, did oppose the federal takeover, but so
did

Deputies from Buenos Aires, Entre Rios, Santa Fe, and

Corrientes where no oil exploitation was in progress. 56
More crucial for the anti-f ederalization faction was a
sincere concern for maintaining provincial autonomy and a

deeply rooted anxiety over the concentration of national
control and wealth in the federal government and in the

Federal Capital.

Francisco V. Martinez (ConP, E. Rios)

summed up this feeling when he implored,

We must not persist in the differential
policy followed to date with regard to
ports, river dredgings, railroads,
tariffs, and even with respect to the immigration that comes to us from abroad,
and we must try to defend ourselves and
stop expanding, until it smothers us,
this enormous Argentine capital. 5 ?

While the issue of federalization cut across party
lines, discussion on a state monopoly brought a rapid

closing of ranks.

Without exception, the personalistas and

Independent Socialists stood for monopolization, while the

antipersonalistas , Conservatives, and Orthodox Socialists

presented a solid front for mixed companies along with
continued private exploitation.

56 Ibid .

,

57ibid.

,

1927, III, 421-424 (A. Usandivaras, UP,
Salta) ; IV," 77-79 (M. Ramon Alvarado, UP, Salta) , 41 (F.
Calvetti, UCRp, Jujuy) ; III, 342 (M. Juarez Celmai^, PC,
B.A. Prov.); IV, 203-209 (F. Martinez, ConP, E. Rios); III,
594-610 (A. Araya, UCRUa, S. Fe) , 407-414 (R. Meabe, PLA,
Corr.)

1927, IV, 209.
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Independent Socialist support for a state monopoly
took the Chamber by surprise.

As late as July 28, 1927,

Antonio de Tomaso proclaimed his group's backing for public
and private exploitation and mixed companies. 58

August 11, Jorge R. Rodriguez (PRUp,

S.

Fe)

Then on

notified the

Chamber that he had information indicating the Independent
Socialists would support all points of the personalista

program except the expropriation of private concessions. 59
One week later, on August 18, de Tomaso confirmed
Rodriguez's statement.

He explained that the Independent

Socialists hesitated at first to back a state monopoly, but

after discussing the matter in two long party meetings,
they had decided it was best.

Their objective, however,

was not the state monopoly itself, but "socialization" of
the petroleum industry.

As defined by de Tomaso, "sociali-

zation" involved removing the monopoly from political en-

tanglements by placing it under the control of a board

composed of representatives from all social segments
interested in oil:

workers, employers, consumers, etc.

such means the Independent Socialists hoped to guarantee

f

1927, III, 206.

59 Ibid.,

1927, III, 667,

58ibid.

By

2

.

,
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that the result of a state monopoly would
be social improvement rather than monetary profit and pure
"statism" 60

Expropriation of private concessions was rejected
by
the Independent Socialists as expensive and
impractical.
De Tomaso insisted that a state monopoly over
exploitation,

land transportation and oil pipelines, along with
tight

export controls were sufficient insurance against malpractice by private concerns. 61

Buttressed by Independent Socialist support, the personalistas fought for monopolization with all the uncom-

promising zeal which had marked the UCR's early years.

On

August 3, shortly after the general debate on OD 95 opened,
Eduardo Giuffra introduced a substitute article for Article
1

of the Committee's bill.

It was signed by ten personalis-

tas and contained the basic proposals of their party;

federalization, a state monopoly over both the exploitation
and transportation of oil, expropriation of private

holdings, and a prohibition against the exportation of crude
oil or its derivatives."

The anti-monopoly coalition

agreed on the need for a transportation monopoly and tight

ow

6l
6

Ibid„, 1927, III, 850-856.

Ibid .

,

1927, III, 863.

1927, III, 406. After mid-August when the In
dependent Socialists came to the aid of the personalistas
expropriation of private holdings was dropped from the
personalista program because the Independent Socialists
Ibid.

,

export controls. 63

However, they considered these measures

combined with mixed corporations as adequate
to protect
national interests in petroleum development.
For the
personalistas, transportation and export controls were

subsidiary to the prime safeguard

-

exclusive state exploi-

tation.

Personalista speeches favoring monopolization were
laden with anti-imperialist rhetoric.

Personalista

Deputies had no monopoly on decrying foreign capital, but
no other group matched their virulence.

Jorge B. Rodriguez

set the tone with an address on August 11.

After citing

Royal Dutch Shell, Anglo-Persian, and SON J as particularly

undesirable interests, he severely criticized the latter
and its founder, J.D. Rockefeller.

SONJ was especially

dangerous, alleged Rodriguez, because its own immense

power was augmented by that of the United States government
To substantiate his remarks and dramatize Argentina's

impending fate, he cited Mexico's unfortunate experience

with the "trusts".

64

The personalistas and Independent Socialists refused

refused to vote for it,
63 ibid .

,

1927, III, 237, 290-294, 629; IV, 203

64 Ibid.

,

1927, III, 670-682.

,

226

to see any efficacy in mixed companies for warding off the

foreign menace.

Once private capital was allowed to par-

ticipate in petroleum exploitation, warned A, Gonzalez

Zimmermann (UCRp, S. Fe)

,

it would demonstrate a "subtle

capacity" for weaking the nation's defenses. 65

He failed

to elaborate on exactly what this process entailed.

Allegations that the state was incapable of administering an oil monopoly drew strong rebuttals from the pro-

monopolists. 66

The state railways, the post office, and

the Banco Hipotecario were cited as proof of the state's

administrative ability.

7

J.R. Rodriguez and De Tomaso

pointed to YPF as a model of administrative efficiency, but
strangely enough, they were to only ones to do so.

68

It is

odd that the personalistas did not take advantage of

perhaps the government's best run agency.

Maybe they did

not wish to call attention to one of the outstanding

accomplishments of Alvear's antipersonalista administration.

Another criticism raised against a state monopoly

65 Ibid.

,

1927, IV, 185.

66 Skepticism about the state's capacity to administer

It was founded
an industrial enterprise was long standing.
principally on the notion that petty political considerations would interfere with industrial efficiency. Ibid .
1927, IV, 25-26, 42.
67 lbid ., 1927,
68 Ibid.,

III, 689; IV, 184.

1927, III, 685, 856-857.
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involved its financing.

Where, asked anti-monopoly

Deputies, was the national government to get the funds for

such an operation?

Working in Comodoro Rivadavia where

easy transportation was readily available was one thing.

Exploring and exploiting all the oilfields of the Republic
was quite another. 69

The probable expense of a monopoly

prompted Repetto to remark acidly,
It is ridiculous for someone to
come here and speak of a state
oil monopoly in a country that
has to borrow money to errect
public monuments in the plazas
of the large cities. 70

Seemingly unconcerned about such practical questions, the
personalistas completely avoided the issue of financing
their proposal.

Monetary .objections to a state monopoly were related
to the general anti-monopolists' contention that the whole

idea was impractical.

Deputy Pascual Herraiz (PLMen. Mend.)

pointed out that no government in the world exercised a

monopoly over oil production, and that the only nation to
attempt it, Russia, had failed.

69

A

Enrique Dickmann

Ibid.

,

1927, IV, 71-72, 81, 199-200.

70 lbid .

,

1927, III, 627-628.

71 Ibid.

,

1927, IV, 200.
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suggested that the proposal for a monopoly
was not only
impractical but improvised. He emphasized
the personalistas' failure to support federalization
during Yrigoyen's
presidency and claimed that they had displayed
no strong
attachment to federalization or a state monopoly
72
since.

Deputies Araya and Repetto carried Dickmann's
allegations
one step further and strongly intimated that
the personalistas' policy was politically motivated.

Repetto character-

ized their position as "an opportunistic attitude that
tends to conciliate or serve a passing interest rather
than
to defend an important public aim." 73

While attacking the principle of monopolization, the
anti-monopoly coalition also stressed the benefits of mixed
companies.

Given federalization plus a transportation

monopoly and export controls to protect national interests,
they contended that private capital could make valuable

contributions toward increasing Argentina's petroleum
production.

T

A

Mixed corporations, in their estimation,

would have permitted the state to benefit from the capital
and technical resources of private oil firms while

72 Ibid.
7

Ibid.

,

,

1927, IV, 15-20.

Ibid. , 1927, III, 632.
1927, III, 600.

74 Ibid.

,

For Araya's comments, see

1927, II, 244-245.
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maintaining control over exploitation. 75

Early in the

general debate, the anti-monopolists' cause was boosted
when, on July 29, Minister of Agriculture Emilio Mihura

spoke in the Chamber in favor of OD 95 (1927) and mixed

companies.

Although the administration considered the

government capable of operating a monopoly, declared
Mihura, mixed exploitation was preferrable because it would

accomodate both public and private interests. 76

It was

also well known that Mosconi and YPF's Directors favored

mixed companies, and that Mosconi had recommended the
creation of such enterprises to the Committee on Industries
and Commerce.

The General's expertise, however, carried no

weight in personalista circles.
As August passed into September, it was evident that

extending the debate would facilitate repetition rather
than enlightenment.

On September

1,

OD

9 5

(19 27)

was

approved in principle, and the Chamber turned to voting on
its specific articles.

Parliamentary manipulation now

assumed an important role in deciding the final form of the
oil bill.

Jorge Calle, a member of the Committee on

Industries and Commerce, introduced, and the Chamber
approved, a motion to split OD 95 into three separate bills.

75 ibid .

,

1927, IV,

76 Ibid.

,

1927, III, 326-333.

34,

85,

96,

322.
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Bill number one consisted only of Article 27 on federalization; bill number two included Articles 1-22 on the

structuring of YPF; and bill number three contained the
remainder of the original bill including the provisions on

mixed companies. 77

The motion was supported by all

parties but for differing reasons.

From the beginning of

the debate, the personalis tas had urged treating the

questions of federalization and monopolization before
all else.

Half this objective was attained when the

first bill dealt solely with federalization.

On the

other hand, the antipersonalistas , Conservatives, and

Orthodox Socialists hoped that splitting the original

bill would isolate federalization and monopolization in
separate bills.

They reasoned that federalization alone

might pass the Senate, but to couple it with a state oil
-

monopoly was to ensure its rejection.
After OD 95 (1927) was broken down, the singlearticle measure on federalization was immediately approved
in principle and became the center of debate.

Quickly,

the personalistas gave notice that they had not abandoned

their plan to sanction federalization and monopolization in
a sigle bill.

Ibid.

,

Deputies Guillermo Fonrouge (UCRp, Capt.

1927, IV, 334-336.
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Fed.)

and Eduardo Giuffra requested that Giuffra's
substi-

tute motion of August 3, calling for a state monopoly
over

exploitation and transportation and a prohibition against
exportation, be added to the bill. 78

When anti-monopoly

Deputies protested that the Senate would reject federalization if it were combined with a state monopoly, 79 Molinari

issued his party's stock reply,
We must repeat now as yesterday, and as
we will repeat tomorrow, that for us
national ownership of the deposits is
indissolubly linked to their direct exploitation by the national government.
The sacrifice of the one will mean the
sacrifice of the other. 80

When the Committee on Industries and Commerce refused to
accept any addition to the federalization bill, the personalistas simply maintained their proposal as an amendment
to be considered after the bill itself was voted upon.

There was never any doubt about the outcome of the

balloting on federalization, and it passed by an overwhelming
majority, 88 to 17.

Deputies from every political sector

voted for the bill, while a combination of Conservatives
and antipersonalistas opposed it. 81

78 Ibid.

,

1927, IV, 340.

79 Ibid .

,

1927, IV, 341, 343-349.

80 Ibid.,

1927, IV, 351.

81 Ibid.,

1927, IV, 362-363.

.
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Debate then turned to the
personalista amendment.
After listening to Jose7 Luis Pena
reiterate the antimonopolists' objections, the personalistas
pressed for a
quick vote. 82 To their dismay
^
opposition forceg
countered by leaving the Chamber and
breaking the quorum.

^

On September

2

and September 7, the antipersonalistas
and

Conservatives again prevented a quorum by
refusing to
participate. 83

Obstructionist tactics were a last futile effort
at
resistance. When the absent members returned to
the Chamber
on September 8, the Independent Socialist-personalista
coalition pushed through their amendment to the
federalization bill. 84

The balloting on a state monopoly followed

party lines almost exclusively.

With one exception, all

65 affirmative votes were cast by personalistas or

Independent Socialists, and all 55 negative ballots came

82 Ibid.

,

1927, IV, 63-67.

83 The

Orthodox Socialists remained outside the Chamber
on September 2, but they retook their seats on September 1.
04
°*
Ibid

1927, IV, 478-503.
The additional provisions
were tacked onto Article 1 of the bill, rather than being
made new articles. One new ingredient appeared in these
additions at the behest of de Tomaso. Since private concessions were not to be expropriated, he recommended a
state monopoly over all petroleum pipelines in the Republic
which lay outside the limits of private concessions. De
Tomaso' s proposal was almost an exact reproduction of
Articles 25 and 26 of OD 95 (1927)
. ,
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from the Conservative-antipersonalista-Orthodox Socialist
coalition. 85

The hours and days of debate paled to insigni-

ficance as the partisan vote reflected the seat count of
the contending coalitions rather than the merits of the
issue.

With their basic demands ratified, the final stage of
the personalista-Independent Socialist strategy emerged

with Antonio de Tomaso's motion to drop the three-bill
approach and add any other provision desired by the Chamber
to the bill already approved.

The anti-monopolists again

warned against inviting Senate rejection of an omnibus
bill, but they lacked the voting strength to make their

opposition effective.

breaking the quorum.

p "7

Once more they vacated their seats,

They repeated this action on

September 12, -but it served only to highlight their own
impotence in the face of the votes the personalistas and

Each paragraph of the amendment was voted upon
separately, and only on the question of monopolization does
The 6 5
the Diario record the vote by number and name.
affirmative votes came from 53 personalistas, 11 Independent
Socialists, and 1 Conservative. Of the 55 negative votes,
28 from Conservatives, and
19 were from antipersonalistas
Ibid . , 1927, IV, 478.
8 from Orthodox Socialists.
,

86 Ibid

. ,

87 Ibid.

,

1927, IV, 506-507.
1927, IV, 509.
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Independent Socialists commanded.
On September 22 and 28, the personalistas
directed by
,
Guillermo Fonrouge, and the Independent
Socialists, led by
de Tomaso, fashioned a bill of some
twenty-seven articles.

Generally, the procedure was simply to adopt
the provisions
of OD 95 (1927) with the alterations made
necessary by the

inclusion of a state monopoly in Article

l. 88

The single substantial change in OD 95 involved
Article
13 which prescribed the destination of profits realized

from state oil exploitation.

According to the Committee's

bill, 65% would have gone for expanding the state industry,

and the remainder would have been split up among workers'

benefits, geological exploration, a reserve fund, and the

national treasury.

The version approved by the Chamber on

September 28 allocated 60% of the profits for intensifying
state exploitation, and

4

0% for the national treasury.

Both the Orthodox and the Independent Socialists supported
the original article which included workers' profit sharing,

but the personalistas were able to defeat it by the slim

margin of 52 to 50,

Deputy Molinari explained that his

party did not feel it was proper for state oil workers to

88 For a complete copy of the bill as it was passed by

the Chamber, see Roberto Etchepareborda and Tito Leoni,
eds., Politica emancipadora ref orma partimonial Vol. II,
Petroleo, Vol. XII of Pueblo y_ gobierno 215-221.
,

;

,
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enjoy benefits not shared by all government employees.
Completion of the oil bill on September

28

89

was

followed immediately by the passage of a separate bill on

royalty payments.

The personalistas and Independent

Socialists found Article 30 of OD

95

(1927)

too complicated

and replaced it with a flat levy of 10% on the gross produc-

*****

tion of private concessionaires

9^

Not since the UCR halted its electoral boycott in 1912
had the party so clearly manifested that intransigence which
was the essence of the Radical spirit.

If anyone doubted

that the personalista oil policy was fashioned by Yrigoyen
himself, the uncompromising tenor of personalista conduct

during the debate was unmistakable evidence of the hand of
the aging master. 9

89 Diputados,

90 Ibid

Demonstrating none of the capacity for

Diario , 1927, V, 625-630.

1927, V, 641-646. Article 30 of OD 95 (1927)
outlined a scheme wherein the royalty payments were to vary
with the quality of the petroleum involved and its geographic location.
. ,

9 ^Both

Frondizi and del Mazo maintain that Yrigoyen
was directly responsible for setting personalista oil
policy in the 19 27 debate. Frondizi notes that divergent
opinions existed within the personalista bloc prior to the
debate, and that Yrigoyen induced uniformity through direct
Frondizi,
and precise instructions to his legislators.
76.
Petro'leo y_ politica 195; Del Mazo, E_l radicalismo
,

,

,

'
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compromise which is often necessary to produce effective
legislation, the Yrigoyenist Deputies stood inflexibly

behind their twin principles of federalization and monopoli
zation.

As a result, the Chamber sent on to the Senate a

petroleum bill which stood little of no chance of surviving
a guaranteed conservative onslaught.

A search for the why behind the personalistas
position in the petroleum debate yields at least three
possible explanations.

The first stems from the Radical

Party schism which followed Yrigoyen's presidency.

Histori

ans of the Radical movement contend that the party split

liberated the Yrigoyenists from the conservative influence
of the Alvear wing and allowed the development of what

Forndizi has termed "more forthright doctrinal positions...
and more distinctly popular Radicals."

92

Gabriel del Mazo

credits the break up with permitting Radicalism to regroup

around Yrigoyen and return to its old banners of "Social

Justice and National Autonomy.

As a result of this

reawakening, he argues,

Petroleum became... the chief political
banner of Radicalism. With its oil
policy in the forefront, the Radical
Party moved toward progressively better
92

/

/

Frondizi, Petroleo

y_

politica , 194-195.

93oel Mazo, El radicalismo

63,

77.

defined national and social policies. 94
There is undeniable merit in this interpretation,
and
it helps explain the increasingly nationalistic oil
policy

of the Yrigoyenist Radicals during Alvear's presidency.
Yet, it falls short as an explanation for personalis ta

conduct in the oil debate, because it fails to account for
the timing of personalis ta support for monopolization.

The

party schism was formalized in 1924 and latent a number of
years before that.

Why, then, did the Yrigoyen wing wait

until July 1927 to declare its unswerving support for

a

state petroleum monopoly?

A second possible explanation for the conduct of the
personalista bloc during the oil debates involves the
conservative complexion of the Senate, and the consequent
likelihood that it would reject a state oil monopoly.
These were hard political facts in 1927, but the personalistas may have been contemplating a change in the Senate's

political balance if they could return Yrigoyen to the
Casa Rosada the following year.

As President, he would

have been in a position to intervene provincial governments
and thereby break the political stranglehold held over many

94

ibid,

,

64.

95 In the 1927 Senate, the personalistas held only 4
The Orthodox Socialists held 2 seats, the
of the 30 seats.
Conservatives 9, and the antipersonalistas 12. Etchepareborda, "Yrigoyen y el Congreso," 64.

.
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of them by local conservative machines,

if enough of the

intervened provinces returned personalista
Senators after
being "reorganized", a personalista majority in
the Upper
Chamber was not inconceivable.
There is no evidence that Yrigoyen had mapped such a
strategy, but he had a known tendency to view as extra-

legal provincial governments controlled by conservative

groups that had their roots in the pre-1916 era, and he had

not been reticent about intervening such governments during
his first administration. 96

He v/ould intervene only two

provincial administrations after 192 8, but the chaotic
conditions during his second term and its premature demise

nullify it as a test of the hypothesis posed here.
The third and most viable explanation of the personalistas

oil policy rests on the assumption that they

1

were looking straight at the 1928 election rather than
beyond it, and that they were using the Chamber as an

^During Yrigoyen's first presidency,

20 provincial

interventions were carried out. Fifteen were the product
of Executive Decrees while only five resulted from acts of
Hector Rodolfo Orlandi and Jorae Rodolfo, La
Congress*
reparacion institucional Vol. II, La republica federal
(II) , Vol. VI of Pueblo £ gobierno , 519.
The list of inter
ventions printed in this source actually cites only 19, but
it fails to include the intervention of San Luis Province
,

t

,

(Law 11,172)
97 Ibid .

Both interventions during Yrigoyen's
second term were the result of Executive Decrees.
,

520.
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electoral podium during the 1927 oil debate. 98

Nineteen

twenty-seven was an "ano politico" with politicians readying their forces for the 1928 presidential and congression-

al contests.

The presidential election would answer the

question which had given meaning to nearly all political

maneuvering at the national level during Alvear's term.
Would Yrigoyen be returned to the Casa Rosada?

Even before

the Chamber petroleum debate opened, the antipersonalistas

had nominated a ticket of Leopoldo Melo and Vicente Gallo
and

approved a platform for the election, 99

an(j the

Executive Committee of the Socialist Party had drafted an

election program for submission to their Party Congress. 100

9^The charges of " electioneering" hurled against the
personalis tas during the debate itself have already been
They were repeated by the opposition press, La
noted.
Nacion, September 5, 1927, p. 4; La Vanguardia August 11/
12, 1927, p. 1, September 10, 1927, p. 1, September 13,
1927, p. 1, September 30, 1927, p. 1.), by foreign observers,
RRIAA , Bliss to Kellogg, September 19, 1927, 835.6363/302.),
and by literature wh,ich touched on the debate. Alejandro /
Cia.
E. Bunge, La economia argentina , 4 Vols. (Buenos Aires:
Impresora Argentina, 1928-1930), II, 181; Repetto, Mi p_aso
por la politica , de Roc a Yrigoyen 271-273; Rumbo,
PetrBTeo y_ vasalla je , 56-57.
(

,

(

,

The party platform
legisincluded~a vague reference to the need for petroleum
It stated simply in its last article, "Definitive
lation.
undoubtedpetroleum legislation." A more precise statement
party over
ly was prevented by disagreement within the
such points as federalization.
99 La Accio'n , April 29

,

19 27, p.

2.

draft
La Vang uardia , May 31, 1927, p. 2. In this
federalizaprogranfof 24 points, number 15 called for the
tion of oil, coal and iron ore resources.
100

.
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The political stakes in 1928 were sufficiently high to

guarantee that any issue raised in the 1927 Congress would
be bent tc the demands of the electoral process.

Petroleum

was no exception

When the discussion of oil legislation began in the
Lower House, and the personalis tas were forced to move from
an oil policy which featured federalization and nationalist

rhetoric to something more specific, they chose the path

which promised the maximum political advantage.

Little

political capital could have been made out of federalization because it enjoyed multi-partisan support.

By

coupling federalization with a state oil monopoly, however,
the personalistas created a unique and distinguishing

policy which thrust them into the vanguard of the

nationalist movement to protect the nation's oil resources.
Furthermore, by posing as the national oil sentinels, the

personalistas, through implication if not accusation,
could portray their opponents as men willing and eager to

hand over the national patrimony to foreign concerns.

And,

finally, a strident nationalist, anti-imperalist stand on

petroleum was the ideal complement for the traditional
Yrigoyenist foreign policy which stressed Argentine
independence and individuality in the world community.

According to Frondizi,
Yrigoyen, displaying good political
sense, understood that a nationalist
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and popular position on petroleum
would complement his international
policy plank.... 10 !
It was time for producing votes, not oil,
and Yrigoyen's
forces were not about to waste an opportunity.

The abrupt fashion in which the personalista faction

shifted to supporting a state oil monopoly was enough
to
arouse the suspicion that political opportunism was the

motivating force, and the manner in which the Yrigoyenists
conducted their side of the Chamber debate did nothing to

dispell that impression.

They consistently avoided

practical and technical questions while concentrating on
the theoretical and the ideological.

strategy was simple and direct.

The logic of this

In order to make oil an

effective election issue, the debate had to be staged in a

manner which would expand it beyond the halls of Congress
and involve the electorate.

Few voters were likely to

become enthused about a discussion of dry, technical
matters, but they could be reached by nationalist rhetoric
and the specter of foreign imperialist exploitation.

Pricking nationalist sentiments was a powerful instrument
for mobilizing political support.

10 Frondizi, Petr^leo

politica , 19 5. Frondizi does
not deny that political opportunism was involved in the
formulation of the personalista oil policy, but he maintains that after the election, federalization and
monopolization of Argentina's oil remained central to
Radical doctrine.
y_

s

s
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The personalistas did not wait for the election

campaign to publicize the oil issue.

Even as the Yrigoyen-

ist Deputies harangued the Chamber in mid-1927, their

cohorts pressed the matter outside Congress.

La Epoca

fulfilled its role as the press wing of the movement,
arguing the case for federalization and monopolization as

vehemently as the party's Congressional spokesmen. 102
aspect of La Epoca'

One

campaign surpassed the argument pre-

sented by the personalis ta legislators.

Not obliged to

observe the decorum appropriate in Congress, La Epoca

openly impugned the motives of the anti-monopoly coalition.

A July 31 editorial denied that mixed companies would
provide protection against the invasion of foreign
capital, characterized that policy as "an enormity", and

suggested
It would be ingenuous to believe that
such an enormity is the result of
sincere convictions. One has a right
to suspect the existence of factors
which are influencing the drafting of
a law openly opposed to the supreme
interests of the Nation,

offerings,
102For representative examples of La Epoca
see July 23, 1927, p. 1, July 25, 1927, p. 1, July 31, 1927,
p, l f August 1, 1927, p. 1, August 11, 1927, p. 1, August 20,
1927, p. 1, September 2, 1927, p. 1, September 17, 1927, p. 1.
'

103 Ibid.

July 31, 1927, p. 1. See also August 11, 1927,
p, 1, September 5, 1926, p. 1, September 17, 1927, p. 1.
,

The lack of specifics in this type of innuendo
did not

mask the effort to identify the personalista oil
policy
with patriotism.
An energetic speech-making campaign supplemented La
E P° ca s journalistic efforts.
'

The Alianza Continental

shifted its position to accomodate a state oil monopoly
and organized public assemblies to encourage support for
the Yrigoyenist policy. 104

Local precinct committees

sponsored street corner meetings, 105 as did organizations
like the Asociacio'n Nacional de Empleados del Comercio
y
de la Industria. 106

The bulk of this type of activity,

however, was conducted under the auspices of the Junta

Nacional Pro Defensa del Petroleo.

The Junta was founded

early in August 1927 specifically to propagandize for feder
alization and monopolization, and throughout August its
leaders held outdoor rallies to that end. 107

Leading the

104 La Vanguardia , July 27, 1927, p. 4.
General Baldrich
addressed~~the meeting cited here, but in September the
Minister of War prevented him from addressing an Alianza
gathering on the grounds that the organization was supported
by Russian money. RRIAA , Office of the Naval Attach^ to
Kellog, September 19, 1927, 835.00B/7.

105 La Epoca August 12, 1927, p. 3, August 17, 1927,
,
p.

1.

106 Ibid

. ,

August 12, 1927, p.

1.

107 Ibid., August 5, 1927, p. 1, August 8, 1927, p. 1.
August 10, 1927, p. 1, August 14, 1927, p. 1, August 16,
1927, p. 1, August 19, 1927, p. 1.
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stumping brigade at all these gatherings were the same

personalista Deputies who were directing the Chamber
fight, particularly Leopoldo Bard (UCRp, Capt. Fed.),

Guillermo Fonrouge, Eduardo Giuffra and Diego Luis Molinari.
During the campaign prior to the April

1,

19 28

elections, the personalistas provided more evidence of their

determination to capitalize on their petroleum policy.

The

refusal of the personalistas to draft a party platform, the

vague and uninformative manner in which political rallies

were covered in the press, and the paucity of other materials
on the campaign reduce to guesswork the job of estimating

how heavily Yrigoyen's supporters stressed the oil issue..108
Still, it is clear that personalista manifestos and orators

frequently discussed petroleum policy, often framing it in
the anti-imperialist context which had become the hallmark
l_.
ofc the party's position.
.

,

109

Post-election comments also indicate that the personalistas emphasized the oil issue.

La Vanguardia referred

lO^Not only did the personalistas not publish a party
platform, but their convention which formally nominated
Yrigoyen did not meet until one week before the election
itself. By that time, Yrigoyen had halted all personalista
campaigning in the Buenos Aires area because of an outbreak
March 18, 1928,
Ibid
of violence at a personalista rally.
p. 1, March 19, 1928, p, 1.
.

109 Ibid .

,

January 15, 1928, p. 1, January 24, 1928, p.
3, February 2, 1928, p. 4, February 23, 1923, p. 12, March
13, 1928, p. 2, March 14, 1928, p. 1, March 19, 1928, p. 8,
March 20, 1929, p. 1, March 25, 1928, p. 12.
,
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to it as the "battle horse" of the Yrigoyen campaign, U0

while Carlos G. Menica, President of the Junta
Central of
the Comite Universitario Radical, interpreted Yrigoyen'

victory as
a popular declaration which ratified the
Radical petroleum law, because at every

opportunity party representatives spoke
to the people of the need for a law that
safeguards equally the integrity of the
nation's economy and its sovereignty,.... 111

Personalista use of the petroleum issue to garner
votes in 19 28 is not proof in itself that their policy was

formulated expressly for that purpose.

Yet, that con-

clusion is unavoidable when the election campaign is seen
as the culmination of a well planned piece of political

opportunism which had its origins in the 1927 Chamber
debate.

For all their energy and dedication, the personalistas

owed much of their success in the Chamber to the Independent
Socialists.

Personalista speeches and writings consistent-

ly ignored the fact, but the eleven Independent Socialist

votes provided the margin of victory for a state petroleum

110 La Vanguardia , September 1, 1928, p. 1; see also
January 23, 1930, p. 1.

^^Comite Universitario Radical, Junta Central, El
petroleo argentino (Buenos Aires: Talleres "Capano"
7-8.
Frondizi also cites the petroleum issue as
1930)
one o£ the pillars of the personalista campaign. Petroleo
polrtica , 195, 225.
y_
,

.
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monopoly. 112

As we have seen, the policy shift which landed

the Independent Socialists in the pro-monopoly camp
was

every bit as abrupt and surprising as that of the personalis tas.

De Tomaso, in announcing the shift to the Chamber,

did not reveal the nature of the discussions at those two

party meetings where the crucial decision was made, but it

would appear that his group also responded to political
considerations 113
The Independent Socialists were a party in need of an
issue.

Their separation from the parent organization had

been formalized on the eve of the petroleum debate, and

because the schism resulted from personal rather than

policy differences, the Independent Socialists needed a
policy which would distinguish them from the Orthodox
Socialists.

For this purpose, support of a state petroleum

monopoly was ideally suited.

An editorial which appeared

in the Independent Socialist publication Critica

y_

Accion

shortly after the oil debate closed demonstrated the

direction Independent Socialist propaganda would take.

112gy their own admission, the Independent Socialists
knew that, given personalista solidarity, their votes would
ensure passage of the state oil monopoly provision in the
Chamber. Diputados, Diario, 1927, III, 856; IV, 4 56.
113 Several commentaries on the 1927 oil debate have
leveled charges of "electioneering" at the Independent
Socialists. Coca, El contubernio , 92-93; Repetto, Mi paso
por la politica , de Roca a Yrigoyen , 274 ; Rumbo, Petroleo y_
vasalla je , 57; La Vanguardia , September 20, 1928, p. 1,
July 10, 1928, p. 1.
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Citing "socialization" as the only true socialist position
on the oil question, the editorial labeled Orthodox Social-

ist opposition to it as a violation of Socialist doctrine
and the principles of the Socialist labor movement and

attributed that opposition to nothing more than a personal

hatred for the Independent Socialists. 114

The claim that

they had "outsocialized" the old faction on the petroleum

question would remain a consistent theme of Independent

Socialist political propaganda.
In February 1928, the party's First Annual Congress

drafted a fifteen point electoral platform, and federalization of oil deposits and a state monopoly over exploitation

headed the list. 115

When the question of federalization

was being discussed, one delegate suggested that the party

advocate federalizing all mineral deposits.

De Tomaso,

while not disagreeing with the principle, questioned the
tactical wisdom of the proposal.

As he explained,

The law passed with our support last
September referred only to oil, so if
we were to include federalization of
all mineral resources, we would give
the point an extremely broad and general
scope, and it would not have the immediate

114 Critica

Accion October 1, 1927, p.
editorial was reprinted from La Libertad
,

y_

1.

This

.

115 La Libertad February 9, 1928, p. 2. The Independent
Socialist party was not a national one. Its electoral
efforts were limited to the Deputies contest in the Federal
Capital.
,

s
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value we have sought by reducing
it to petroleum deposits alone. 116
In short, why shift the focus away from a politically

marketable policy?
During the campaign, the Independent Socialists con-

centrated on portraying themselves as the legitimate heirs
to the Argentine Socialist tradition, and they frequently

cited their petroleum policy in support of that contention.

Typical of their efforts was an extensive analysis of the
oil issue and of de Tomaso's Chamber discussion of

"socialization" by Roberto J. Noble who concluded,
[de Tomaso properly]

interprets not
only the economic doctrine of socialism
in its purest sense, but also the most
vital interests of the nation in which
he labors and whose confidence he has
now won. 11^

La Libertad also ran major articles which emphasized the

threat to Argentina posed by the oil "trusts", the support
for monopolization and "socialization" rendered by the

Independent Socialists, and the ill-advised actions of

H6ibid.

,

January 30, 1928, p.

5.

March 19, 19 28, p. 6. The problem already
noted of vague newspaper coverage of the campaign also
accounts of the
emerges in the case of La Libertad
Independent Socialist campaign. Nonetheless, there are
frequent references to party orators discussing the oil
See March 11, 1928, pp. 1, 3, March 14, 1928,
issue.
pp. 2, 4, March 16, 1928, p. 2, March 19, 1928, p. 6,
March 20, 1928, p. 6, March 21, 1928, p. 6, March 22, 1928,
p. 2, March 23, 1928, p. 2, March 26, 1928, pp. 1, 2,
March 27, 1928, p. 2.

H7ibid.

,

'
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the "dependent socialists (on senor Nicolas
Repetto)
the Chamber debate. 118

in

Election day brought an upset victory for the Independent Socialists.

Outpolling the Orthodox Socialists and

the antipersonalista-Conservative coalition, they
finished

second to the personalistas and thereby snared the six

minority-party Deputy seats for the Federal Capital.

How

much of their surprising success the Independent Socialists
owed to their petroleum policy is difficult, if not impossible to determine.

The same is true of trying to

determine whether identifying their petroleum policy with
that of the personalistas produced a significant "coattail"

effect in the wake of the resounding personalista triumph..

But these problems should not conceal the fact that the
Independent Socialist policy was designed with electoral
ends in mind.

Nearly twenty years had elapsed since the Comodoro
Rivadavia discovery before the Chamber Deputies approved
proposal for a national oil law.

However, because the

debate occurred at a time when the clouds of the 1928

political storm were gathering, the debate's results were
not commensurate with the toll exacted on the national

118 Ibid .
p.

3,

,

February 10, 1928,

March 20, 1928, p.

3.

p.

3,

March

8,

1928,

a
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petroleum industry by the two decades of
delay.
The
decision of the personalista Radicals and
the Independent
Socialists to turn the petroleum issue into
a political
football left Argentina in April 1928 as far
from having

viable petroleum legislation as it ever had
been.

CHAPTER
YRIGOYEN III:

VI

AFTERMATH

The euphoria induced in Yrigoyenist circles in April
1928 by the greatest outpouring of popular sentiment in
the nation's political history to that time was soon dis-

sipated.

Argentina's voters had elected the dynamic and

tireless founder of the Radical Party, but the man who

entered the Casa Rosada in October 192 8 was an aging and
tired figure.
tion of the

w

His second term would bring not the culmina-

reparacion w but twenty-nine months of im-

passioned and frequently violent political confrontations
followed by crushing defeat on September 6, 1930.
The continuing debate over petroleum legislation which

took place in this political atmosphere was essentially a

heated and noisy anticlimax to the Great Chamber Debate of
1927.

Personalista Radicals pressured and propagandized for

a full state oil monopoly, while anti-monopoly forces

attempted to clog the legislative mechanism in the Senate.
Meanwhile, the petroleum nationalists, frustrated by what
they viewed as criminal sabotage in the Upper Chamber, un-

leashed a campaign favoring a state oil monopoly which at
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times exhibited hysterical and even
scurrilous overtones.

The first act of the 1928-1930 scenario
stemmed from
the magnitude of the personalis ta victory
at the polls.

Along with the presidency, Yrigoyen's forces had
secured a
controlling majority in the Chamber of Deputies. When
the Lower House convened for its 1928 sessions,
personalista

Deputies occupied 87 seats, nearly 20 more than all the

opposition groups combined. 1

Under these circumstances, it

was not surprising that the personalistas resurrected their

proposal to expropriate all privately held petroleum concessions.

This measure was part of the original legislative

parcel that the personalistas had tried to push through the

Chamber in 1927, but were forced to discard because the In-

dependent Socialists refused to vote for it.

Equipped now

with their own majority, the personalistas could complete
their initial design for a national petroleum law.

As

Yrigoyenist Deputy Eduardo Giuffra (Capt. Fed.) commented in
describing expropriation to the Chamber, "it is nothing but
the logical conclusion of the question posed last year...."^

The bill which was intended to eliminate the private

sector of the oil industry was introduced on July 26, 1928

^here were

24 antipersonalistas , 35 Conservatives,

Independent Socialists, and
seats were vacant.
8

2

2

Orthodox Socialists.

Diputados, Diario, 1928, IV, 357.

Two
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over the signatures of ten personalis ta Deputies. 3

its

text did not call for the immediate cessation of private
activity.

Rather it declared privately-held sources of

petroleum and gaseous hydrocarbons liable to expropriation
and empowered the Executive Branch to procede with the actual

process of taking over according to the relevant laws.

Thus,

the bill's phraseology left considerable latitude to the

Executive insofar as the timing of the actions that would
force the various private firms to cease their operations.

Since four of the seven members of the Committee on

General Legislation were personalistas, the Committee's

report to the floor on September

5

recommended passage of

the expropriation bill exactly as it had been submitted.

4

With the bill on the Chamber's agenda, the only obstacle to
passage was a procedural one.

Congress's regular sessions

closed at the end of September, and unless preferential
treatment were accorded the expropriation bill, time would
expire before the Chamber could get to it.

Bearing this in

mind, opposition Deputies for nearly two weeks after

September

5

broke quorums and employed the tactics of

parliamentary delay to defeat repeated personalista

J

Ibid ., 1928, II, 575-576.

Ibid., 1928, III, 694. The three non-personalista
members"oT the Committee did not sign the report, but
neither did they submit a minority report.
4

5
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initiatives to gain preferential treatment for the bill.
La Epoca's editorial columns blistered the opposition, al-

leging collusion with Standard Oil to defraud Argentina of

her oil and referring to obstructionist maneuvers as crimes

against national interests, 6

Yet the simplest arithmetic

made it obvious that the problem and the solution lay

with the personalistas themselves, for their numbers were
sufficient to ensure a quorum and pass nearly any motion
placed before the Chamber.

La Epoca finally acknowledged

this fact, and, in frustration, demanded that the

personalistas assert their numerical superiority:
By themselves they can determine the actions
of the Chamber; by themselves, then, they
should outline their plans and execute
them without hesitation or delay. 7
On September 17, the battle ended when the Yrigoyenist

sector managed to bring the expropriation bill to a debate.

5 Ibid.

,

1928, III, 802-805; 1928, IV, 30-38, 152-160,

250-256.
6

La Epoca , September 11, 1928, p. 1, September 15,

1928, p. 1.

September 15, 1928, p. 1. This outburst from
on the
La EpocT~suggests that the delay was not intentional
Rather it appears that sickness
p~art of the personalistas.
prevented
travel, overconf idence or other reasons simply
representathem from getting a sufficient number of their
tives into the Chamber on the same day.
7

8

Ibid.

,

Diputados, Diario, 1928, IV, 351, 356-398.
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Approval was now only a formality, but the anti-monopoly
coalition of Socialists, Conservatives and antipersonalistas
used the five-hour discussion to place their objections on
record.

Expropriation, they argued, was less than an

urgent matter since the Senate had yet to discuss the pe-

troleum bills sanctioned by the Chamber in 1927.

And if

those bills became law, they continued, there would be no

need to incur the expense of expropriation, because the
private oil firms would be condemned to a slow death anyway.

Deputies Mariano G. Calvento (UCRA, E.R.) and

Nicola's Repetto even suggested that expropriation would

increase the value of private holdings by guaranteeing

purchase of properties which otherwise were bound to decrease in value in the foreseeable future given the legis-

lation already passed by the Chamber.

q

Anti-expropriation Deputies also protested the apparent
willingness of the personalistas to deal with an important
and complicated matter in a hurried and casual fashion.

Where was the data necessary to make an intelligent decision
they demanded?

propriated?

How many private concessions would be ex-

What was the exact procedure to be followed?

How much would it cost, and where would the funds come
from?

The absence of such vital information, the opposition

claimed, attested to the simple-minded manner in which the

9 Ibid.,

1928, IV, 364, 378.
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question was being approached.

Antonio de Tomaso calcula-

ted that expropriation would cost in excess
of 500,000,000
pesos and, therefore, would place a crippling
financial

burden on the nation.

Why not invest those funds in the

existing state oil enterprise and expand production he
suggested? 10

Repetto, in his characteristically sarcastic

way, suggested that the money might be borrowed from

Standard Oil! 11
Personalista arguments favoring expropriation held
nothing new for those familiar with the 1927 petroleum
debates.

Argentina's natural resources, its internal peace

and security, and even its political and economic indepen-

dence were seriously menaced by the world's oil trusts,

especially by the machinations of Standard Oil in the
northern provinces.

The nation's sole defense lay in an

integrated state oil monopoly.

Thus, the legislation

passed by the Chamber in 1927 had to be complemented by the

expropriation of private oil holdings.

According to the

personalista Deputies, it was a question of principle, not
of particulars.

As for the detailed information demanded

by the opposition, Deputy Giuffra commented that facts and

10 Ibid.

,

1928, IV, 371-376.

1]-Ibid.

,

1928, IV, 370.
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figures had not posed "a basic question" for his party. 12
On financing expropriation, Gilberto Zavala (UCRp, S.L.)

informed the Chamber that the personalistas did not
consider expropriation to be a business matter:
•

It is another concept, another principle,
another objective that is being pursued
with this law, and that objective has never
been subject to delay, even by the fear
that we might not have sufficient funds
to restore to state ownership all the
concessions and oil works under the
control of private interests....
[Money]
would be a matter for the judges and for
court decisions. ... 13

The voting was a prefunctory exercise with 79 person-

alistas holding sway against 17 non-personalistas •

With the return of the personalistas to Government
House on October 12, 1928, the expropriation measure took on

added significance.

Coupled with the oil bills approved by

the 1927 Chamber, it provided a clear indication of the

general economic policy the personalistas intended to pursue

12 Ibid.

,

1928, IV, 358.

l3 Ibid.

,

1928, IV, 389.

14

The figures recorded here
1928, IV, 390.
representTthe results of the "general" or preliminary vote
was
on the bill. The vote count on the specific articles
from,
not recorded. The bill approved by the Chamber varied
that which originally had been introduced and subsequently
reported out of Committee in that additions were made to
exploration
clarify the fact that expropriation referred to
physical
as well as exploitation concessions, and to the
plant of private concessionaires as well as to the oil
Ibid ., 1928, IV, 394-396.
deposits themselves.
Ibid.

,

.
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during Yrigoyen's second administration.

The tendency was

to reject the 19th century liberal
economic notion of the

"referee state" in favor of increased
government intervention in national economic development.
Diego Luis
Molinari, speaking before an Alianza Continental
rally on
July 30, 1928, highlighted this tendency when
he discussed
the ideological significance of his party's
petroleum
policy:

At the bottom of this question lies the
mundane debate over whether it is the
interests of the State or the individual
that must dominate in the economic regulation of the properties which constitute
the collective patrimony. We are inclined
toward the State, and we believe that the
State must control these important
resources. . . 15
La Epoca indicated the same philosophical bent in an

editorial on August 23, 1928:
Obviously, if the government intends to
govern with intelligence and firmness,
it should first direct its thoughts
toward consolidating the country's economic organization. ^
It was now time, contended La Epoca , to abandon the

haphazard pattern of past economic growth and institute

government planning and controls.

In the case of petroleum,

15 La Epoca , July 30, 1928, p. 2.

16 Ibid.

,

August 23, 1928, p.

1.
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a precise policy for implementing the personalis ta economic

philosophy already had been outlined
With respect to the industrial phase of the petroleum

question during Yrigoyen's second term, the President's
first and perhaps most important decision was to retain

Mosconi as YPF's Director General.

Although the "petroleum

General's" accomplishments since 1922 seemed to obviate any

doubts about his retention, his refusal to embrace the

personalista version of a state oil minopoly must have
aroused some second thoughts.

His reappointment, there-

fore, stands as testimony to his achievements and to his

prestigious position as the undisputed leader of Argentina's
oil nationalists.

Measured statistically, YPF's 1929-1930 performance
fell far short of the spectacular advances recorded between
1923 and 1928.

Crude oil production, for instance, only

3
3
rose slightly from 860,604 m in 1928 to 872,171 m in 1929,

3
and then declined to 828,013 m in 1930.

Other quantifi-

able facets of the state enterprise displayed a similar
and
penchant for expanding slowly or stabalizing during 1929
19 30.

The outstanding exception involved YPF's sales of

Though the bulk of
from Comodoro
state cFude oil production continued to come
f lelds
Rivadavia, declining productivity in the central first
for the
there sent the percentage below 90 (87.1)
time in 19 30.
17 BIP, December 1936,

18,

29,

34.
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gasoline which shot up from 100,050,105 liters in 1928 to
189,916,327 liters in 1930. 18

In spite of the slower

growth rate, however, YPF continued to be a profitable
undertaking, as can be seen from the expansion of its
*

capital base from 166,291,826 pesos m/n in 1928 to
228,403,788 pesos m/n in 1930. 19
Internal factors such as the limited capacity of state

refining facilities, the neglect of exploratory activity,
and the declining productivity of the central field in

Comodoro Rivadavia must have had a negative effect on YPF's

growth rate, but the fact that the production curve for the
private sector of the industry mirrored that of YPF suggests
that the generally unstable conditions during Yrigoyen's

second administration, combined with the developing world

economic crisis were at least partially responsible for
YPF's 1929-1930 record* 20

xl5

YPF, Desarrollo de la industria , 391.
for this expansion are discussed below.
19 Ibid

, f

The reasons

230.

20 Private crude oil production rose from 581,459 m
in
1928 to 620,895 m3 in 1929, and then fell off to 603,094 m3

in 1930. While their production curve resembled that of YPF
the private companies were slowly rncreasing their share of
total national crude oil production. Their percentage,
which stood at 40.3 in 1928, inched up to 41.6 in 1929 and
42.1 in 19 30. As with YPF, private production continued to
be concentrated in the Comodoro Rivadavia region (79.0% in
1929, 74.3% in 1930), and as in the past, it was primarily
the work of only a few of the active private companies;
Astra, Cia. Ferrocarrilera de Petroleo, Cia. Industrial y
Comercial de Petro'leo, and Standard Oil of New Jersey.
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While the nation remained dependent upon foreign
fuel
sources, 21 YPF provided tangible benefits for Argentina's

consumers by first forcing a reduction in the retail price
for gasoline and other petroleum products, and then estab-

lishing prices which were uniform throughout the country.

Prior to 1929, Argentina's liquid fuels market was controlled
by the nation's largest importer, the West India Oil Company,
a Standard Oil affiliate. 2 2

Prices for petroleum derivatives

tended to fluctuate rapidly in any given area, and to increase in direct proportion to the linear distance from

centers of production and distribution. 23

As long as YPF

BIP , December 1936, 19-28, 30-33, 35.
2 ^-The

continued reliance on foreign fuel suppliers can
be gauged from the following statistics; for every ton of
fuel oil sold by YPF during 1929-19 30, nearly 2 were imported, for each liter of gasoline sold, 2.5 were imported, and
for each liter of YPF kerosene consumed, about 3.75 were
In addition coal imports remained in excess of
imported.
Importacion de combustibles ^
3 million tons a year.
BIP Reprint), 12, 15, 30; YPF, Desarrollo de
lubricantes
la industria 391
,

.

(

,

22 Mosconi, El petro'leo argentino , 171.
23 Between January 1923 and December 1926,

the price of
gasoline in the Federal Capital oscillated between 24 and 29
centavos per liter , never stabilizing at any level for more
(YPF, YPF, 1907 - 1937 (Buenos
than five months at a time.
And in July 1929, YPF gasoline wau
Aires: YPF, 1937), 54.)
selling at eleven different prices ranging from 20 to 34
centavos per. liter in various areas of the nation., YPF,
Desarrollo de la industria , 395; Mosconi, El petrolco
argentino , 2Tl.
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supplied only a small segment of the internal market,
its
prices conformed to those set by the private distributors
and retailers.

The foundation of YPF's 1929 move to take control of
the domestic market was laid four years before with the

construction of the large refining complex in La Plata.
State production and sale of petroleum products virtually

mushroomed after 1925.

In the case of gasoline, YPF sales

between 1924 and 1929 expanded from 3,690,050 to 126,660,134
liters, with the latter figure amounting to slightly over
15% of all domestic gasoline sales in 1929. 24

It was at

this point that YPF's directors began to consider marketing

their own products and lowering retail prices. 2 ^

With the intent of avoiding a price war, government
representatives contacted private importers and producers
of gasoline with a plan to gradually lower prices and re-

place imported with domestically-produced gasoline.

private firms were offered a

3

The

centavos per liter price

reduction along with an arrangement whereby the importation
of gasoline was to be scaled down in accordance with in-

creasing national production.

Given agreement on these

conditions, the government spokesmen were prepared to

24ypF / Desarrollo de la industria

,

391.

25 Mosconi, FA petroleo argentino , 153.

263

promise that the process of import substitution would be a
gradual one.

If the private companies hesitated, it was

suggested to them that YPF would rush the construction of
another refinery and process crude oil supplied by sources

independent of the international trusts until such time as

domestic production reached the necessary level.

In this

case, it was pointed out, the private interests would lose

control of the Argentine market more rapidly.

When the attempt to reach an accord with the private
companies failed, YPF took the dramatic step.

On May 1,

1929, the state firm took charge of its own sales activity,

and three months later, YPF announced a

2

centavos per liter

price cut for gasoline, effective nationwide.

On November

11, a similar reduction was declared, and during January

1930 regional price lowerings were implemented in the

Province of Salta and in the area around Mar del Plata.
Finally, on February 17, 1930, YPF standardized the price of

state-produced gasoline at 20 centavos per liter everywhere
in the country.

At each step along the way, private re-

tailers reluctantly lowered their prices to the levels

established by YPF.

Official sources estimated that the

combined state and private reductions in the price of

gasoline saved the nation's consumers 52,000,000 pesos m/n

26lbid., 153-154. Mosconi's account is the only one
have seen of these negotiations.

I
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during the first year, 27
YPF's assertion of control over the domestic market

was hailed widely, especially by the oil nationalists.

La

Epoca echoed the common sentiment when it praised the
price reductions for liberating Argentina from "foreign

economic tutelage" in an area vital to national develop-

ment.^°

The only sour note was sounded by La Prensa which

labeled the price reductions a propaganda trick employed by
those who had damaged the national oil industry by dis-

couraging privately-financed exploitation. 2 ^

Mosconi viewed

YPF's success in setting market prices as the capstone of
his career with the state oil agency.

Referring to the

August 1, 1929 price reduction, he wrote in 1936,
This constitutes the termination of an
intense eight-year campaign which has
produced substantial moral and material
benefits for the country. . . 30
.

27 Ibid .

154-155; YPF, Desarrollo de la industria
393-395.
The above account has concentrated upon gasoline
because, in terms of YPF's competition with private importers and producers, gasoline was the most significant single
However, gasoline price reductions on other byitem.
products were also forced by YPF, and on February 17, 1930,
uniform prices were established for kerosene (19 centavos
and
airplane fuel (26 centavos per liter)
per liter)
agricol, a tractor fuel (16 centavos per liter).
,

,

,

,

28 La Epoca , November 13, 1929, p. 1.
See also La
Epoca , December 6, 1929, p. 1, March 2, 1930, p. 4; La
Argentina , February 18, 1930, p. 1, April 25, 1930, p. 1.
29 La Prensa

,

December 7, 1929, p. 16.

30 Mosconi, El petroleo argentino ,

161.
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One of the most interesting questions raised by YPF's

drive to control the internal market involves why the

private interests allowed it to happen.

In 1929, YPF was

selling only slightly over 15 out of every 100 liters of
gasoline consumed by Argentines.

Just 18 months before

the August 1, 1929 price reduction, the chief administrator

at the La Plata distillery, Enrique Canepa, had stated that

while YPF's production costs would have permitted a reduction in the price of gasoline, "our limited production

capacity in relation to market demand would obviously make
the attempt to reduce it ineffective." 33

-

These conditions

evidently convinced the private sector that YPF could not
lower prices, and led the private producers and importers
to frustrate the negotiations on marketing gasoline sought

by the government.

When YPF did take the initiative and cut prices, the
private firms were in a sense trapped with at least three
factors militating against their starting a price war.
First, the oil nationalists' campaign had the private

companies on the defensive, and any action on their part

which could have been construed as exploitation of Argentine
consumers would have been impolitic.

Secondly, and more

share of
tangibly, YPF was supplying a relatively small

31 La Epoca , February 13,

1928, p. 4.
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the market, but its stockpiles were sufficient to expand

that share if private prices remained up. 3 2

Lastly, YPF

appeared ready to make good on its threat to tap an inde-

pendent fuel source capable of supplying the state firm

with gasoline in sufficient quantities to maintain the new
low prices and eventually to supply the entire domestic

market if necessary.

That source was a Russia anxious to

expand its international trading contacts.

During 1929-19 30,

negotiations were under way on a government-to-government
trade arrangement with the Russian state monopoly company
for international trade, Iuyamtorg.

ment had been reached on

By August 1930, agree-

three-year pact according to

a

which Argentina would have purchased annually 250,000 tons
of gasoline under advantageous conditions, and Russia would

have used the proceeds from its sales to acquire Argentine

products. 33

The agreement fell victim to the September

6,

1930 overthrow of Yrigoyen, but its near reality undoubtedly

Argentina suggested Yrigoyen purposefully waited
for stockpiles to accumulate before lowering prices (February 18, 1930, p. 1.)/ and the American Ambassador in
Buenos Aires cited YPF's inability to get rid of its mounting
inventory as the sole reason for the price reductions.
(RRIAA, Bliss to Stimson, December 12, 1929, 835.6363/336.)
No exact figures on the extent of YPF's stockpiles are available, but some indication may be taken from the fact that in
more
1929 and 1930, the state enterprise sold over 37,000,000
liters of gasoline than its refineries turned out. YPF,
Desarrollo de la industria 339, 343-345, 391.
32 La

,

see Frondizi,
radicalismo,
Petroleo y p olitica , 249-252; Del Mazo, El
terms of the
138-140; Larra, Mosconi , 124-14 7. Under the
33 For discussions of this agreement,
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helped discourage any ideas the private firms had about
fighting YPF's price reductions.
In Salta, YPF's problems with private petroleum

interests, specifically with Standard Oil of New Jersey,

were not so easily resolved.

As has been indicated,

Standard's activities in Salta coupled with the manner
in which Joaquin Corvalan's government (1926-1928) was en-

forcing the mineral laws had been a source of constant concern to Mosconi and YPF since 1924.

By 19 27, the state

agency was convinced that conditions had deteriorated to
the point where YPF's physical presence was necessary in

Salta to exercise, in Mosconi' s words, "a moderating influence on the company and on the provincial authorities,
.

..." 34

When Corvalan's administration rebuffed YPF's

efforts to obtain exploration and exploitation rights in
the province, the state company found an alternate

course of entry.

On November 3, 1927, YPF concluded an

agreement with Francisco Tobar which ceded to YPF

proposed pact, Argentina had the right to increase or
year by
decrease the amount of gasoline purchased in any one
have been beup to 100,000 tons. The price per liter would
tween 9 and 11 centavos, while the gasoline Argentina
centavos
actually imported in 1929 and 19 30 cost almost 22
per liter.
argentine-,,
34-Ei mtransigente" , El petroleo del norte
See also, YPF, "Acta No.
(prologue by E. Mosconi), xx.
831," 24.
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the petroleum rights held by Tobar in Salta. 3

5

During the

early months of 1928, state workmen installed equipment at
the "Republica Argentina" wells.

Drilling began in April,

and by September crude oil was being extracted. 36
In the meantime, almost as if it had been planned, a

direct confrontation developed between YPF and Standard Oil
over oil rights in the territory immediately adjacent to the
"Republica Argentina" site. 37

YPF claimed that the rights

it had obtained from Tobar extended to the area surrounding
the wells, and that Corvalan's government had fraudulently

lapsed those rights and made new concessions placing the
area under Standard's control.

From all appearances, YPF faced another frustrating
round in its long battle with Standard Oil.
however, YPF had a new and powerful ally.

This time,

The personalis ta

sweep in the 1928 elections had extended to the gubernatorial race in Salta and returned Julio Cornejo, an Yrigoyenista,
to office.

Assuming power on May

1,

1928, Cornejo immedi-

ately turned to the YPF-Standard conflict.

After being

approached by Mosconi with YPF's side of the affair on May

35 For a copy of the contract, see YPF, Recopilacion

,

I, 262-265.
36 YPF, Desarrollo de la industria , 257; Mosconi, El

petr^leo argentino

,

politica , 236-237; "El
(prologue
Intransigente", El petrdleo del norte argentino, present a
sources
by E. Mosconi) , xl^i-xxvi. botn of these
37 Frondizi, Petr^leo

y_

2

and soliciting a reply from Standard Oil, 38 he concluded

that Standard's concessions had been granted illegally by
the Corvalan government. 39

Come jo,

therefore, issued a

decree on May 31 which ordered a halt after 90 days to all

operations of both parties in the disputed area until their
permits were legally submitted, processed and granted.
further provided that within the

9

It

0-day period the conces-

sionaires could apply to the Salta government for the signing
of an agreement which would be necessary before any grants

would be made relevant to the area around the "Republica
Argentina" wells. ^0

Cornejo, in a letter to Yrigoyen, ex-

plained that the agreement mentioned in the decree would
establish the conditions for exploitation necessary to
safeguard the nation's and Salta'

s

oil interests.

While Cornejo 's actions were in accord with Yrigoyen'

personalista interpretation of the Salta conflict, but they
do recount the sequence of events accurately.
38 RRIAA , Bliss to Kellogg, May 24, 1928, 835.6363/314,
Bliss to Kellogg, June 13, 1928, 835.6363/315.
39 Cornejo to Yrigoyen, June 19,
La Epoca , June 26, 1928, p, 1,

1928, letter printed in

40 For a copy of the decree, see La Epoca , June 5, 1928,
pp. 1-2.

41 Cornejo to Yrigoyen, June 19, 1928, letter printed
in La Epoca , June 26, 1928, p. 1.

4

270

oil policy and won raves from the personalista
press, 42

their legality was questioned by other sources.

United

States Ambassador Robert W. Bliss described Mosconi's re-

quest to Cornejo that Standard's concessions be annuled as
a demand that the new Government

[Cornejo'

s]

undo acts conferring property rights performed
by two previous constitutionally constituted
Provincial Governments acting within their
vested authority, to the exclusion of the
Courts of Justice. 4 3

Standard Oil's directors, sharing Bliss's views and knowing
they would receive no redress from Cornejo 's administration,

went before the Supreme Court of the nation to request that
the Salta decree of May 31, 1928 be declared unconstitutional and that Standard's concessions be restored.

Standard's

case was prepared by the offices of Romulo S. Nao'n, with
the consultation of two eminent conservative experts,
«

Matias G. Sanchez Sorondo and Manuel Agusto Montes de Oca. 44
Salta*

s

defense was prepared by the legal studios of

Silvio Bonardi, a lawyer specifically recommended to

42 Ibid. , June 3,
July 1, 192 8, p. 1,

1928, p. 1, June 29, 1928, p. 1,

43 RRIAA, Bliss to Kellogg, May 24, 1928, 835.6363/314.
Bliss interpreted events in Salta as simply an extension of
the personalista campaign to federalize Argentine oil.

Romulo S. Naon, Inviolabilidad de l£ propiedad
The Chief
minera (Buenos Aires: Editorial Muro, 1928)
Justice of the Court was Jose Figueroa Alcorta, the man who
was President in 19 07 when the Comodoro Rivadavia discovery
was made.
4

.
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Governor

Come jo by

Yrigoyen. 45

The legal technicalities of this case, which was not

decided until March 19 32, 46 need not detain us, but the
briefs presented by the contestants are instructive because
they reflected the differing approaches of the two sides in
the debate over petroleum development.

Naon's presentation

was rigidly legal in scope, cataloguing laws and shorn of
ideological overtones.

In this respect, it mirrored the

tendency of private oil interests and political conservatives to discuss petroleum in legal and economic terms and

discourage the intrusion of ideological concerns. 47
Bonardi's brief, on the other hand, provided the

requisite legal arguments, but it also bristled with the
an ti- imperialist rhetoric which characterized the campaign
of the oil nationalists.

Bonardi, himself, highlighted the

differences in approach when he accused Standard's lawyers
of attempting to present as

M

a civil dispute" what was

45 Silvio E. Bonardi, En defensa de la rigueza nacional
del petroleo , ante la suprema corte de la nacion (Buenos
Aires : Rmaldi Hnos., 1928) .
46

For a copy of the Court's decision, see BIP, No. 91
Standard received substantially
(March 1932) , 165-20 8.
what it requested from the Court.
47

For examples of this tendency, see Alejandro Bunge,
"El problema economico del petroleo," Re vista de Economic
Argentina , No. 144 (June 1930), 401-436; "Astra", Compania
Argentina de Petroleo, et. al. , Las companias inaustriales
(Buenos
de petroleo ante el honorable senado de la nacion
1928).
Aires: Casa Editora "Coni"
,
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actually a much more fundamental issue. 48

in his opinion,

the Court was faced with deciding

whether Argentina's subsoil riches belong
to Argentines, or whether, on the contrary,
this incalculable wealth must be surrendered
to monopolization and the foreign "trusts"
so they can drain every deposit and then
return the sterile land after their dividends
will have extracted from us the entire
Argentine patrimony. 49
In short, while representing the Province of Salta, Bonardi

carried the banner of oil nationalism to the nation's

highest court.
An informative sidelight to the Salta dispute emerged

when opponents of petroleum federalization accused the personal is tas of failing to defend provincial autonomy.

Epoca

1

s

La

response came remarkably close to a rejection of the

traditional Argentine concept of federalism.

In a July 1,

1928 editorial, the personalista paper declared that pro-

vincial autonomy had been used during the "regimen" era as
a shield for dishonest provincial governments that sought

For the

to fleece Argentines of their rights and riches.

UCR, claimed La Epoca

,

autonomies are for the people and not
for governments that seek to wrap themselves in the banner of autonomy in
order to legitimize the impunity of

4

8Bonardi, En def ensa de la rigueza nacional

49 ibid.,

142.

,

8-9.
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their excesses and extralegal actions.

0

The following day, La Epoca returned to the same theme:

Provincial autonomies. . .are wheels in a
single mechanism which is dedicated to
the fulfillment of the supreme and
organic objective of the Argentine
people - the creation of a great homeland, ... [and] nowhere is it stated nor
can one logically imagine that the
national interest must be subordinated
51
to regional interests
In their support for petroleum federalization, La Epoca

and the personalistas were indulging in an interpretation
of federalism which threatened to destroy what limited sub-

stance the system had had in the past. 52

Yet their inter-

pretation was a logical corollary to the personalista drive
to expand the national government's role in economic

development.

At the national level during Yrigoyen's second term,
the scene of battle shifted from the Chamber of Deputies to

The petroleum bills fashioned by the person-

the Senate.

alistas in the Chamber faced an imposing obstacle in the

more conservative Senate, particularly given the personalistas'

50La Epoca
51 Ibid.

,

,

July 1, 1928, p.

1.

July 2, 1928, p. 1.

52 So harshly did the personalistas treat provincial

autonomy, that the most eminent of Radical historians,
Gabriel del Mazo, would later assert that their attempt
of
federalize oil was based on a mistaken understanding
72-78.
Argentine federalism. Del Mazo, El radicalismo,
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lack of voting power in the Upper Chamber.
,

From 1928 to

1930, seven personalis ta Senators faced one Socialist
(Orthodox)

and eighteen Conservatives and antiperson-

alistas. 53

Senators Delfor del Valle (B.A. Prov.) and Diego Luis

Molinari (Capt. Fed.) led the personalista struggle to

hasten Senate consideration of the proposals on petroleum
federalization, monopolization and expropriation, but it

was a futile exercise as the bills remained mired in
Committee. 54

Each time the two Yrigoyenist stalwarts

raised the question, the scene was the same.

Personalista

Senators emphasized the urgency of passing oil legislation
and sketched the devastating consequences of failing to

do so.

Opposition spokesmen blamed the personalistas for

complicated
the delay, warned against discussing such
that the
matters without painstaking study, and maintained
the
Executive decrees creating oil reserves and halting

checks on
issuance of new oil concessions were sufficient
55
private interests until a law was completed.

53 E tchepareborda,

"Yrigoyen y el Congreso," 64.

54 The bills were being considered jointly by the
Committee on Legislation and the c
tive .
Conservative

°"^^;

°^"f«
with
Understandably, both committees worked
antipersonalista majorities.
535-537,
55 S enadores , Diario , 1928, 279-280, 282-289,
637-649.
687-695; 1929, II, 448-453,
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Only on September 27, 19 29, three days before the
close of Congress's annual sessions, was an apparent step

forward taken when the Senate created a special five-man

Committee to draft a bill.

The Committee was to meet during

Congress's recess (September-May) with the understanding
that if the President called for Extraordinary Sessions,
the Committee's report might be submitted during those

meetings
The obvious intent of the anti-government majority to

bottle up petroleum legislation in Committee was facilitated
by the irregular pattern of Senate activity during these
years.

Never was that body prepared to function on the

constitutionally designated opening date of May

1.

And

when the Senate was ready for work, sessions frequently
were wasted either for the lack of a quorum or through

prolonged and sterile political discussions.

5

The motion to create a
Ibid. , 1929, II, 637-649.
Special Oil Committee was made by Conservative Senator
Juan Vidal (Corr.). On the grounds that five Senate
Committees had an interest in the framing of an oil law,
he proposed that the Special Committee be composed of the
Chairmen of the Committees of Legislation, Codes, Constitutional Matters, Treasury, and Agriculture. As a result, the
membership included four Conservatives and one Orthodox
Socialist; Alejandro Ruzo (Catam.), Luis Etchevehere (E.R.),
Carlos Serray (Salta) , Mario Bravo (PS, Capt. Fed.),
Hector de la Fuente (L.R.). Serrey chaired no Committee,
but Bravo chaired two and Serrey was a member of both.
Thus, Serrey apparently was selected to represent one of
those committees on the Special Oil Committee.
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Yrigoyen, in October 1929, decreed the anticipated

extra sessions for the legislators, and, at the same time,
he designated petroleum legislation as one of the matters
to be considered. 57

On four subsequent occasions during

the Extraordinary Sessions, Yrigoyen and his Minister of

Agriculture, Juan B. Fleitas, sent the Upper Chamber re-

minders of the pressing nature of the petroleum question
and of the need to sanction the bills forwarded from the

Chamber. 58

The President's note of December

7,

1929

predicted that conversion of those measures into law
will preserve the country from the
disruptions experienced by all
peoples, while, at the same time,
reserving for the inhabitants of
the Republic the incalculable
wealth deposited in its soil....

Unconvinced by such assurances, the Senate continued to
delay.

The Special Oil Committee proved as ineffective as
the President's pleas at expediting Senate action.

57ibid.
58 Ibid

f

Rather

1929, II, 733,

1929, II, 733-735 (October 22, 1929), 735
(November 19, 1929); 1929, III, 131 (December 7, 1929),
The dates given here are those
202-204 (January 17, 1930).
which appeared on the Executive's notes. Fleitas was a
Corrientes lawyer who had been President of the Radical
Party in his native province before joining Yrigoyen 's
. ,

second administration.
59 Ibid.

,

1929, III, 131.
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its work became the center of new controversy.

During

seventeen meetings in October and November, the Committee
heard testimony from Minister Fleitas and General Mosconi,
from ex-employees of YPF, and from representatives of

private oil investors and consumers.

Written reports from

oil experts were also collected, along with data on YPF's
operations.

As of the end of November, however, the

committeemen had received no reply from government officials
to some pointed questions concerning the cost of expropria-

tion, the relationship between national production and

consumption of petroleum products, and the expense of

operating a state monopoly over the exploration, exploitation, transport, and sale of petroleum. ^°

These were the

kinds of questions that personalista Deputies had con-

sistently tried to avoid during the Chamber debates.
After two months of intense work, the Committee

interrupted the main business of drafting a petroleum bill
to request investigatory powers from the Senate.

In

defending the Committee's petition, Senator Ruzo explained
that the group's labors had revealed two points which

needed clarification.

First was the matter of allegations

that certain unspecified Senators were working for Standard

60 For an outline report of the Special Oil Committee's
work during October and November 1929, see Ibid., 1929, III,
of
70-71.
In addition to the points noted above, the list

matters on which the Committee had requested information
YPF s
from the Minister of Agriculture and YPF included

s
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Oil.

Citing evidence of such charges from La Epoca'

pages and from propaganda posters and speeches, Ruzo

expressed the Committee's desire to determine which, if
any, Senators were involved and to what extent.

The second

subject needing investigation, according to the Committee,

was YPF.

Ruzo reported that information presented by

sources he described as "world renowned technicians" made
it advisable "to dig a little" into the financial and

technical phases of the state enterprise.

Over the unanimous

opposition of the personalista Senators, the Committee's
request for expanded powers was granted.

6 ^"

The nationalist press scoffed at the Special Oil

Committee's proposed investigations and presented them as
simply another trick to delay passage of an oil law.

In

the words of La Accion , they were

gold dust thrown in the eyes of the
gullible, ... [and] , in reality, they
are pretexts for dragging the matter
out and keeping it in committee....

of
advertising and price-setting policies, the extent
of
private exploration and exploitation, and the activity
privately owned refineries.

Ruzo specifically referred
61 ibid ,, 1929, III, 23-29.
and 25, 1929.
to La Epoca 's issues of November 11, 20,
62 La Accion, December 20, 1929, p.

1.

La Accion, the

administration,
semi-official press arm of the Alvear
unable to
changed hands in August 1928. I have been
the paper
identify the new directors, but they threw policy.
weight solidly behind Yrigoyen's petroleum

s
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The La Epoca articles cited by Ruzo on the Senate

floor consisted of two reports on Alianza Continental

rallies held to build support for the personalista oil
policy, and the transcript of a radio address delivered to
the same end by an engineer, Eduardo Eiriz Maglione, under
the auspices of the Comite Universitario Radical. 63

Among

the passages which probably aroused the concern of the

Senate Committee was Maglione' s contention that

several national Senators are intimately
tied to oil firms. The Senate of the
Nation, therefore, constitutes no
guar an tee. 6 4

Similar statements were reported to have been made at the

Alianza Continental gatherings by General Alonso Baldrich
and by Alianza President Arturo Orzabal Quintana.
In an effort to justify the mass character assassina-

tion in which some of its speakers had indulged, the Alianza

published a three-part proclamation in successive issues of
65
La Argentina .

Since no further evidence was published,

the first of the three installments contained what must be

63 La Epoca , November 11, 1929, p. 3, November 20, 1929,
p. 5, November 25, 1929, p. 1.
64 Ibid.

,

November 20, 1929, p.

5.

65 La Arg entina , December 22, 1929, p. 3, December 23,
Three days prior to
1929, P 7"3, December 24, 1929, p. 3.
over the

the first installment, General Baldrich took
is
editorship of La Argentina . His newspaper career
discussed below.
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assumed to have been all the specific information that

organization had at its disposal concerning "Standard Oil's
Senators".
of Jujuy.

Attention was focused on Rudecindo

S.

Campos

The material presented indicated that before

Campos entered the Senate in 1927, he had acted as a legal

representative for Standard Oil, and that he had helped
Standard to acquire oil concessions in Jujuy,
from the 1927 Senate debate on Campos

1

s

Selections

credentials also

were printed to suggest that his election could be traced
to the financial influence of Standard Oil and the sugar

interests in Jujuy

1

s

legislature.

Saltenos Luis Linares and Carlos Serrey were the only
other Senators named in the proclamation.

In their cases,

a brief and tenuous attempt was made to link their political

party, the Union Provincial, with Standard Oil money.

In

none of the three cases did the Alianza Continental document

present any evidence that, while the three men named were
serving as Senators, they had entered into collusion to

advance the interests of Standard Oil in the halls of
Congress.

This does not prove that collusion did not exist,

but the point remains that on the basis of the evidence
presented, the accusations made wera little short of
libelous.

Without attempting to defend the making of irresponsible
charges against public figures, it should be noted that the
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Senate doubly exacerbated the circumstances
which produced
those charges.
In the first place, by November
1929, it

had postponed discussion of the Chamber's oil
bills for

over

tv;o

years.

Parliamentary delay was a legitimate

tactic for opposing unwanted legislation, but with a contoversial issue like petroleum, the Senate might better
have drafted and defended a petroleum bill to its own
liking.

Such forthright action would have left the motives

of the Senators who opposed the government's policy less

open to suspicion.

Secondly, when the rectitude of some

Senate members was publicly questioned, and the Special
Oil Committee empowered to investigate, the Committee should

have acted swiftly and published its findings.

The failure

to do so opened the door to more reckless speculation and

unfounded accusations.
As for the Committee's investigation of YPF, that too

was greeted by oil nationalists as a ruse, and as evidence
of the Committee's predisposition in favor of private pe-

troleum interests.

La Epoca charged that the Committee was

intent upon discrediting state oil development, and that
the information which prompted the investigation was

supplied by spokesmen for private oil interests and by
former employees of YPF who had been discharged for

s
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incompetence and undesirable qualities. 66

The records of

the Committee's hearings are not available to test La
Epoca*

allegations, but one Standard Oil official reported

to the United States Ambassador that representatives of his

firm who went before the Special Oil Committee found the

atmosphere "distinctly friendly", and that generally private
oil men were questioned in a manner which tended to reveal
67
irregularities or incompetence on the part of YPF.

The Committee pursued its investigations and studies

through the early months of 1930, with its members making
the by now ritualistic junkets to the Salta oil fields and
68
to YPF's refinery in La Plata.

Nonetheless, reports in

April that the group was finally going to issue its report
6
proved mistaken.

^

As the prospects for Senate action waned, the
attacks
stridency and irresponsibility of the nationalists'

Special Oil
on the Upper Chamber, and especially on the

835.6363/335.
68 La Vanguardia, April 18, 1930, p. 2, April 30, 1930,
1930, p. 1; La Argentina,
pp. 1-27-Lr A^clQn TApril 22,
1.
April 10,T930, p." lr April 23, 1930, p.
69 La vanguardia , April 18, 1930, p.
April 23, 1930, p.
April 47-1 930, P.
March 28, 1930, p. 1.

H

2;

U

La Ac^n,
La Argentina,
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Committee, mounted.

The impatience and frustration of the

nationalist press was apparent in outbursts like the
following from La Argentina

;

The continuance of things as they have
developed until now would justify whatever popular pressure that might be
applied, because the community does not
have to tolerate the Argentine Parliament acting like a dependency of Standard
Oil, serving its purposes and seconding
its commitment to enslave; our sovereignty.
Rash, unfounded accusations against Senators and other

public figures who in some way could be connected with
Standard Oil became the common coin of the pro-personalista
press.

La Epoca stuck to general denunciations, probably

because its director, Delfor del Valle, was himself a
Senator, but La Argentina and La Accion exercised no such
restraint.

Senators Serrey and Campos were the chief

71 but also included on
targets for this type of invective,

the list of alleged "friends, partners, partisans,

servants, straw men or employees" of Standard were

(Tuc),
Senators Mario Bravo (Capt. Fed.), Alfredo Guzman
Luis Etchevehere (E.R.), Leopoldo Melo (E.R.),

70

La Argentina , March 26, 1930, p.

1.

71 La Accion, January 7, 1930, p. 1, January 8, 1930,
"1930 , p. 1; La Argentina, December 21,
p. 1, April 22,
3. January 15, 1930 ,
1929
p. 1, January 5, 1930, pp. 1,
2, January 24, 1930, p. 1,
p.
1930,
20,
January
1,
p.
February 18, 1930, p. 1.
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Teofilo Sanchez de Bustamente (Jujuy)
and Luis Linares (Salta)

,

,

Juan Vidal (Corr.),

along with several former provin-

cial officials from Salta and Jujuy. 72

When it appeared that nothing would shake the Upper

Chamber's lethargy with respect to petroleum legislation,

nationalist newspapers intimated that the answer lay in
abolishing the Senate.

La Accion warned the Senators of

a public weariness that now awaits the
slightest cause to manifest itself in
an intense and demanding fashion. 73

Three weeks later, La Epoca

'

message was more direct:

Located. .. like a stumbling block in the
path of the [national] regeneration and
of the country, the Senate's lot ought
to be that which fatally and necessarily
falls to everything that is dead weight
and retrogressive.... The Senate must
disappear so the country can proceed. 74

This suggestion may have been divorced from reality, but
in February 1930, it did appear to be the only way that the

Chamber-approved oil bills would become laws.
While the nationalist press alternately ridiculed and

threatened the Senate, sympathizers carried the campaign
to the nation's street corners, plazas, theaters, lecture

halls and air waves.

Mosconi maintained his stance in

72 La Argentina
February 18, 1930, p. 1, February 20,
1930, p. 1, February 23, 1930, p. 1.
,

73 La Accion January 18,
,
74 La Epoca

,

1930, p. 1.

February 10, 1930, p.

1.
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the forefront of the movement, despite his known reserva-

tions about the personalis ta Radical's concept of a state

oil monopoly.

Speaking at the University of Mexico in

February 1928, he suggested that the 1927 monopoly bill

had been passed by an "excessively cautious" Chamber, and
criticized its basic idea as a
formula which must fail because it not
only establishes a monopoly in the
least profitable facets of the entire
industry [exploration and production]
but it also creates a system which
does not enjoy public acceptance. 7 ^
He then ticked off the standard list of complaints against

state industrial monopolies; the lack of initiative, un-

necessary administrative employees, bureaucratic slowness,
and inflated production costs.

If to all this, concluded

Mosconi, one added the possibility of political interference
in the industry's development, the results could be

calamitous. 76
On the questions of federalization and expropriation,

Mosconi also found himself at odds with the government's
policy.

In the case of federalization, he disagreed with

the method of implementation, not the principle.

Given the

felt that the
assertion of national jurisdiction, Mosconi

resulting
provinces were entitled to share the profits

75 Mosconi, Dichos

76 Ibid.

y_

hechos , 165.
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from oil exploited within their borders.

The failure of

the Chamber of Deputies to recognize that right, he con-

tended, stirred legitimate opposition to federalization in

provinces with proven or suspected oil reserves. 77
As for expropriation, YPF's Director was in complete

disagreement with the personalista policy.

Mosconi

believed that the purchase of private oil concessions would
have placed a heavy financial drain on the national treasury in some cases, and, in other, it would have required
funds "which would be beyond the present financial capacity
of the nation."

Furthermore, he warned that expropriation

might occasion foreign reprisals in the form of tariff
barriers against Argentine products.

If the goal of ex-

propriation was a state oil monopoly, Mosconi maintained
that three measures would produce the same results
gradually:
holdings,

1)
2)

of crude oil,

prohibit any expansion of present private

place reasonable levies on private production
3)

expand the state industry so it could

establish market prices, thus limiting the profits of

private investors.

When denied the profits they always

77 Ricardo Oneto, El petro'leo argentino
y_ la soberania
nacional (prologue by E. Mosconi) (Buenos Aires: Ferrari
Hnos., 1929) , vi. Mosconi may have been right on provincial concern over profit sharing, but the point was not a
major one in the 1927 Chamber debates, nor was it in the
brief Senate exchanges on oil legislation between 1928 and
1930.
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pursued, predicted Mosconi, private companies would

diminish and probably abandon their activities. 78
If federalization were executed along the lines he

recommended, Mosconi believed that the answer to the ex-

ploitation problem lay in a monopoly mixed company in which
private investment would be limited exclusively to
Argentines.

By his own account, it was during a 1928

journey through other oil-producing nations in Latin

America that he rejected his former preference for combining
continued private exploitation with

a

series of mixed

companies involving limited amounts of foreign private
capital. 79

He had become convinced, he wrote in July 1928,

that while private companies existed in Argentina, they

would be involved in

a

commercial battle with state-

financed exploitation, and that
in oil matters, [the battle] can produce
a serious threat to the economic development and political peace of the country. 80

For Mosconi' s analysis of the technical
problems involved in setting equitable prices for private
holdings if they were to be expropriated, see Ibid
xii-xv.
78 Ibid., xv.

.

E1 Intransigente", El petroleo del norte
argentino, (prologue by E. Mosconi), xxx; Mosconi, El
petroleo a rgentine? 182. For an account of Mosconi s trip,
see Ibid 7 213-230.
79,,

,

.

E1 Intransigente", El petroleo del notre
xxxi.
argentino, (prologue by E. Mosconi)
80,,

,
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Mosconi was so adament about exluding foreign capital
from the oil industry that while sufficient domestic

capital could not be found to finance his preferred system,
he favored a total state monopoly to leaving the industry

open to foreign investment. 81

Specifically, Mosconi envisioned his mixed company as
an integrated monopoly covering all phases of the oil

industry with the capital divided 51-4 9% between government
and private investors respectively.

He wanted an autonomous

organization in which the private investors would elect a

majority of the directors and control the firm's administrative and technical development, while the government repre-

sentatives in the directorate would exercise a veto power

over major policy decisions.

It was Mosconi'

s

contention

that such a mixed monopoly would have constituted
an organization of limitless advantages
for the country, one whose management
would be perfectly systematized and
controlled through the reciprocal actions
of the two participating forces; political
interference stemming from state involvement would be resisted by the majority of

Whenever Mosconi criticized foreign
investors, it was usually Standard Oil which received
specific mention, but his antipathv extended equally to the
British trusts. Once when he was asked whether he preferred Standard Oil or Royal Dutch Shell, Mosconi described
of
the former as a cord of hemp and the latter as a cord
silk and commented,
if the two cords, one rough and the
other smooth, must be used to hang us,
it would appear to me the most
81 Ibid., xxx.
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the directorate which would represent
private capital, and the tendencies of
the latter toward excessive profits
would be resisted through the veto
power of the government representatives

Fundamentally, both Mosconi' s position and the govern-

ment's oil policy were nationalist and anti-imperialist in
character.

The differences in detail reflected the fact

that the personalista politicians gave priority to establishing a sharply defined ideological position, while Mosconi,
an experienced oil man, sought a solution which would

accomodate his nationalist sentiments and still provide

domestic consumers with a cheap and dependable supply of

petroleum products,
Mosconi was accompanied in his search for a nationalist
solution to the country's oil problem by such familiar and

prestigious figures as Ricardo Oneto

83

and General Alonso

intelligent course would be to
reject both,
Mosconi, Dichos £ hechos, 171.
(prologue by E. Mosconi),
See also, Mosconi, Dichos y hechos 166-168; Mosconi,
xvi.
El petroleo argentine 181-182; ^El Intransigente " El
(prologue by E. MosconU,
petroleo del norte argentino
xxx-xxxii.
82 0neto, El petro'leo argentino ,

,

,

,

,

83 0neto supported federalization and a state oil

monopoly but not expropriation. Oneto, El centinela
(prologue by E.
210-213; Oneto, El petroleo argentino
,

,

Mosconi)

,

188.
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Baldrich, Mosconi's military companion.

Mosconi's

biographer, Raul Larra, asserts that Mosconi and Baldrich

operated as a team with the former planning and organizing
the nationalist campaign while Baldrich, unencumbered by a

government post, acted as "the street agitator, the
theater and radio speaker, [and] the public critic of

Standard Oil." 84

Larra was correct about the close rela-

tionship between the two men and about Baldrich' s relative
lack of restraint in his public comments.

However,

Baldrich was not simply Mosconi's mouthpiece, as evidenced
by the fact that he supported the personalista petroleum

policy rather than Mosconi's mixed company monopoly.
Much of Baldrich *s propagandizing was conducted under
the auspices of the Alianza Continental which accorded him

the title of "honorary councilor".

Delivering radio

address, and speaking frequently at Alianza meetings in

and about Buenos Aires and in interior cities like Rosario
imperialist
and Cordoba, Baldrich warned unceasingly of the
the alleged
threat to Argentina's oil, attacked mercilessly
demanded passage
crimes of Standard Oil and its allies, and
OC

attention."
of the petroleum bills awaiting Senate

84 Larra, Mosconi, 108-109.

85 La Epoca reported regularly on Alianza activities.
on meetings where
The folISwlSTHitations include reports n
Baldrich spoke and announcements of me
October
Oc^er
1
was scheduled to speak; September 24, 1928, p. 1,

^ ^V
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On December 19

1929

,

r

Baldrich began disseminating his

views through the pages of La Argentina

,

a newspaper over

which he exercised editorial control until May
Prior to Baldrich

1

s

4,

19 30

86

takeover , La Argentina had supported

Yrigoyen's petroleum policies , echoing the nationalist
line, 8 ^ but under the General, petroleum was elevated to

the priority news item, and the paper's nationalism in

oil matters assumed a rabid intensity.
>

The unsupported attacks on Senators which have been
noted, constituted one of the two central themes of

Baldrich

1

s

editorship.

The other was a vicious campaign

against Standard Oil for its alleged corrupt and criminal
practices in Argentina and other nations.

One series of

articles began on December 30, 1929 and lasted through a

dozen installments under the headline "STANDARD OIL EX88
COUNTRY."
THE
IN
CONDUCTING
IS
IT
INTRIGUES
THE
POSED FOR

1928
1928. P. If November 19, 1928, p. 4, December 1,
August 8, 1929, p. 2, October
p 2, January 7, 1929, p. 1,
November 25, 1929,
19, 1929, p. lr November 11, 1929, p. 3,
July 31, 1930, p. 3.
p. 1, July 3, 1930, p. 1,
4.

of La
The circumstances which placed control
as are the
Araentina in Baldrich' s hands are unclear,
It may be
reasons t or his leaving the paper in May 1930.encompassed tne
significant, however, that Baldrich «s tenure
elections.
monSs surrounding the March 19 30 Congressional
86

November 29, 1929, p. 1, December 1,
December 12, 1929, p.
1929, p7~l, December 8, 1929, p. 1,
87 La Arq entina ,

88 Ibid., December 30,

1929, p.

1,

December 31, 1929,

1,
l-27"Ta"nuary 2, 1930, p. 3, January 3, 1930 , p.
January 6,
January 4, 1930, p. 3, January 5, 1930, p. 3,

pp.

1.
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With Baldrich's departure from the editor's
chair,

La Argentina's character again changed abruptly.
news was accorded low key coverage.
on Senators ceased.

Petroleum

The personal attacks

Standard Oil received only occasional

notices, and by July 19 3o, soccer was front page news in
La Argentina .

At the level of organized propaganda activity, no
group did more to cultivate popular support for Yrigoyen's
oil policy than the Alianza Continental.

Devoting its

talents, energies, and funds exclusively to this cause, the

Alianza supplied batteries of speakers for rallies in the
Federal Capital and in the major provincial urban centers.
On several occasions in Buenos Aires, demonstrations were

organized at four or five of the main plazas simultaneously

with each gathering hearing a half dozen Alianza orators.
Two series of radio addresses sponsored by the Alianza
carried the organization's message to late evening audiences
in Buenos Aires.

Besides President Orzabal Quintana and

other members of the group, the speakers at Alianza meetings

included Baldrich, Senator Diego

Bui's

Molinari, National

Deputy Victor Guillot (UCRp, Capt. Fed.), YPF counsel

Julio Aguirre Celiz, and the former YPF administrator in

1930, p. 1, January 9, 1930, p. 3, January 10, 1930, p. 3,
January 11, 1930, p. 3, January 12, 1930, p. 3, January 13,
1930, p. 3.
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Comodoro Rivadavia, Naval Captain Felipe Fliess. 89
Mosconi's relations with the Alianza Continental

present something of an anomaly.

Despite the disparity

between his solution on oil legislation and the Alianza'
support for the personalista-style state monopoly,

Orzabal Quintana has been quoted to the effect that the

Alianza
was, in reality, the instrument which we
most willingly placed at Mosconi's disposal in order to propagandize for his
patriotic purposes. 90

Furthermore, it is known that Mosconi helped Orzabal

Quintana organize part of the Alianza' s activities in
mid-1929, and that Mosconi and the members of YPF's

Directorate financed out of their own pockets the program

which was mapped out. 91

Finally, in Mosconi's 1936 book,

he listed himself among those who spoke at Alianza

various activities of the Alianza Continental
during Yrigoyen's second term may be followed in the pages
of La Epoca , and, to a lesser extent, in La Vanguardia and
La Prensa. However, since many of the newspaper reports
on Alianza meetings are quite brief, a convenient summary
of the organization's position on petroleum legislation
may be found in memorials it sent to the Senate in
September 1928 and September 1929. Senadores, Diario,
1928, 539-541; 1929, II, 706-707.
89 The

Larra attributed this
90 Quoted in Larra, Mosconi , 109.
Quintana.
quote to a letter he had received from Orzabal
91 Mosconi, El petroleo argentino, 235-236. Larra
the
claims Mosconi contributed 200 pesos a month to
Alianza' s treasury. Larra, Mosconi , 110-111.

'
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Continental rallies.

92

Any attempt to explain the contradiction between

Mosconi's stated views and his support of the Alianza

Continental must be conjectural, but it probably can be
accounted for by the nationalist orientation which Mosconi
and the Alianza shared.

It would appear that Mosconi valued

the dissemination of the Alianza'

s

ideological viewpoint

highly enough to overlook disagreements on the details of

petroleum legislation.
University students under the banner of the Comite

Universitario Radical provided a second major source of

organized publicity in favor of the government's oil
policy.

93

While the University group sponsored a limited

number of public assemblies in support of the personalistas
94 its main contribution consisted of a
petroleum proposals,

Though there
92 Mosconi, El petroleo ar gentino , 235.
deliberately misstated the
is no reason to suspect Mosconi
statement. On
facts here, I have been unable to verify his
and La
separate occasions La Spoca (July 19, 1928, p. 1)

Mosconi was
Prensa (September 107 T92S7 p. 8) noted that but I have
schedu led to participate in Alianza programs,
actually did take
seen no reports on meetings at which he
part.

activity
^Organizations which sponsored less extensive
Universi-

Liga Nacional
along the same lines included the
p.
far
H~ ia n C R. (La Epoca, September 16,
Mariano
Ar-and the Ateneo Popular October
1929, p. 1,
Moreno de la U.C.R. Ibid ., October 2,
18, 1929, p. 2.
94 La Epoca , June 11, 1929, p. 2, June 19, 1929,

^
S^tLbL^S^^^/pT

p.

2.
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series of speeches broadcast over LR 7, Radio Buenos Aires,
the radio station of La Epoca .

The addresses were

delivered between September and November 1929, and, with
the exception of three presented by personalista Deputies,

they were made by student representatives from the various

University faculties.

Their topics ran the gamut of the

nationalist spectrum, from world oil imperialism, to
Standard Oil's crimes in Salta, to the urgency for Senate
95
action on oil legislation.

The intense propaganda campaign undertaken by the

personalista Radicals and their supporters did not provoke
a commensurate response from the opponents of oil federaliza-

tion and monopolization, or from the private oil investors.

The private companies were probably secure in the belief

that the Chamber bills could not escape either sweeping

revision or slow death in the Senate.

They, therefore,

limited their public activity to the presentation of a

memorial to the Senate in September 19 28.

Submitted by

rehash of the
eleven oil firms, it was nothing more than a
companies
anti-monopoly petition which many of the same

year before.
had sent to the Chamber of Deputies the

96

The

in La Epoca, but
Most of the speeches were reprinted compilation pubin a
thev are available more conveniently
El petroleo
Ushed in 1930, Comite Universitario Radical,
95

argentine
96

"Astra M

,

al.
Compania Argentina de Petro'leo, et.

,
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literature of the period provides only the infrequent

coherent defense of foreign private oil investment,

and

while the anti-government press displayed no fondness for
the personalis ta monopoly concept, it did not focus on the
98
oil issue as much as the pro-Yrigoyenist papers did.

The absence of a strong counterof fensive to the

nationalists' thrust can be traced in part to the fact that
the anti-government forces were more interested in removing

Yrigoyen from office than they were in combatting his

petroleum policy.

The 1930 Congressional elections in the

Federal Capital demonstrated that oil policy was neither
a matter of immediate concern to Yrigoyen 's opponents,

nor the vote-swaying issue it had been in 1928.

While

personalista campaigners referred to the government's oil
policy again and again in an effort to garner support,"

honorable
Las compan'ias industriales de petroleo ante el
iinado . For a~discussion of the 19 27 memorial, see
Chapt. IV, 181-184.

problema
For an excellent example, see Bunge, "El
economico del petroleo."
97

p.
p.

98 La Nacio'n , September 27, 1928, p. 6, October 6 , 1928,
La Prensa, June 27, 1929,
8, October 24, 1929, p. 10;
15.

reports on the election campaign
La Epoca's
" daily
19 30 show that
from the~e nd of J anuary to March 1,petroleum
policy more
olrsonalilta speakers referred to
For examples,
frequently thafduring the 1928 election
27
1930, p. 3,
see January 25, 1930, p. 3, January
1930, p. 4,
February 2, 1930, p. 3, February 3,
99
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the Independent Socialists won the contest convincingly

with a

"

throw-the-rascals-out" approach that even promised

impeachment proceedings against Yrigoyen.
Some observers, mostly personalista sympathizers and

partisans, have maintained that the oil companies were the
source of more substantial opposition to the government's

policy than the above discussion indicates.

They allege,

in fact, that those companies actively conspired in

support of the coup which ended Yrigoyen'

September

6,

1930.

s

second term on

100

While this thesis has long been an article of faith
among Radicals and nationalists, any attempt to evaluate
it reveals that no evidence has been produced to support it

It rests entirely upon the assumption that the private

oil interests' felt so threatened by the prospect of a
state oil monopoly that they were willing to help overthrow

1930, p. 3, February 8, 1930, p. 4, February 12,
February 16, 1930, p. 4, February 19, 1930,
1930, p.
February 25, 1930, p. 4.
p. 5, Februarv 22, 1930, pp. 4, 5,
oil
Personalista propaganda also featured a film strip on
(La Epoca, January 30,
exploitation in Comodoro Rivadavia.
1930, p. 4,
1930, p. 5, February 2, 1930, p. 3, February 4,
La Argentina displaying typical
February 13, 1930, p. 3.)
anti-government
restraint, accused Standard Oil of financing
(personcandidates, and suggested that a vote for Yrigoyen a vote
while
alista candidates) was a vote for Argentina
Argentina,
against him was a vote for Standard. La
1.
February 21, 1930, p. 1, February 25, 1930, p.

February

7,
4,

,

100 Frondizi

El radicalismo
LlTr ra, Mosconi

,
,

Mazo
Petrileo y_ pol/tica, 268-277; Del
357,
140-144; Luna, Yrigoyen, 348-351, 356
aspecto
127; Ricardo M. Ortiz, "El
,
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the government to prevent it.

While this might follow as

a logical conclusion to the version of contemporary events

that emerges from the nationalist rhetoric, it does not

make sense when one considers that any adequately informed
observer

knev;

there was almost no chance the Senate would

approve a state oil monopoly.

In apparent recognition of

this fact, some proponents of the conspiracy thesis have

maintained that the threat of Senate passage was real because provincial elections scheduled for early September
19 30 in San Juan and Mendoza promised to return four

personalista Senators and therewith a personalista majority
in the Senate.

101

This, however, was not the case.

Four

additional personalista Senators would have given that

party eleven seats in the Upper Chamber, still five short
of a majority.

Undoubtedly, the private oil interests did

not mourn Yrigoyen's fall, but there is yet no evidence

*****

that they were responsible in a direct way for its occurrence

The events of Yrigoyen's second term demonstrated that
electoral
the promise which emerged from the great 19 28

triumph was illusory.

Certainly this was true insofar as

Revista de
econo'mico-social de la crisis de 1930,"
historia, No. 3 (1958), 60, 70-72.
141; Luna, Yrigoyen,
de la crisi
350-351 ; Ortiz, "El aspecto economico-social
de 1930," 60.
10 l D el Mazo, El radicalismo
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the prospects for the passage of oil legislation was

concerned.

Personalista hopes were elevated by their

19 27

Chamber victories and by their tendency to view the 1928
election as a referendum on the petroleum issue.

The

problem was, of course, that in spite of that election,
conservative forces continued to dominate the Senate, the
one remaining hurdle to a personalista-dictated oil law.
In large part, the doom of the 1927 Chamber bills had

been sealed by the personalista decision to settle for
nothing less than a full measure of their own policy.

With the road to compromise blocked, the opposition was
faced with either being bullied into accepting a state oil

monopoly or delaying petroleum legislation by all means
possible.

No one could have doubted which alternative the

Senate would choose.
Thus, with the petroleum issue, as with so much
else, Yrigoyen's second term brought not the ultimate

"reparacion" but burning frustration.

An ironic footnote

to the energetic personalista drive for oil legislation

was added in 19 32 and 19 35 when Argentina's long-awaited
laws were sanctioned by a Congress which contained no
102
personalista Radicals.
,

provided a statutory basis for
YPF, while Law 12,161 prescribed the general conditions
The 1932 measure left
for Argentine oil exploitation.
YPF's existing structure almost unchanged. Minor altera102 Law 11,668

(1932)
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tions specifically empowered YPF to use credit operations
and provided that 10% of the firm's profits would go to
the national treasury and 5% would be distributed among
YPF's employees.
In passing the general oil law", Congress rejected
both federalization and monopolization in favor of separate
and concurrent state and private oil development along with
mixed companies. The conditions for private exploration
and exploitation were more liberal than those demanded by
nationalists in the early 1920' s, but more restrictive
than those demanded by conservatives like Matias G. Sanchez
So^rondo.
Frondi,zi, Petroleo y_ politica
333-342; Pigretti,
Codigo de mineria 372-386 (Law 12,161); YPF, Recopilacion
I, 585-588 (Law 11,668).
,

,

,

CHAPTER VII
THE POLITICS OF PETROLEUM IN PERSPECTIVE

When viewed in the context of Argentine development
since 1916, the forgoing analysis of the petroleum issue

justifies some general observations on the nature of the

Radical Period and its political participants, and on the

significance of that period for Argentina's subsequent
development.

Because our knowledge of the 1916-19 30 era

remains incomplete, the intent here is not to offer a

definitive synthesis of the Radical Period, but to suggest
some of the guidelines within which that synthesis must

be constructed.
The consistent efforts of the Yrigoyenist Radicals to

develop a popular rather than a practical petroleum policy
constituted a clear case of political opportunism.

In the

haste to accuse the Radicals of electioneering though, it
is easy to forget that the need for courting public ap-

proval for governmental policies was something new in

Argentine politics.

Governments during the "Regimen" era

had displayed at best a patronizing disregard for public

301

302

opinion while relying on the politics of "acuerdos" (agreements) and electoral fraud to maintain their monopoly

over national and provincial political power.

The 1912

electoral reform law, however, determined that the legitimacy of future national administrations would stem more
from decisions rendered at the polls and less from their
ability to protect the interests of the estanciero class.

When the Radicals assumed power in 1916, they were obliged

not only to govern effectively, but also to maintain widespread popular support for their policies.

While they faced this novel task, the Radicals'
ability to govern was impaired by the continued strength
of the traditional Conservative forces and by internal

deficiencies in the Radical Party itself.

The economic

power of the estanciero class remained undiminished after
Yrigoyen's 1916 victory, and politically, the Conservatives continued to dominate the National Senate and most
of the provinces.

Even the excessive number of provincial

interventions initiated by Yrigoyen failed to liquidate
the Conservative majority in the Senate by 1930.

Internal factors which weakened the Radical Party as
a governing agent included:

inexperience in the practical

Yrigoyen's
business of running a national administration;
refusal to
oppressive domination of the Party and his
the heterogeneous
delegate power to capable subordinates;
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and potentially contradictory character of the groups

gathered beneath the Radical banner; and the lack of precise programs for social and economic reform.

In fact,

the Radical Party was not really a political party at all.

It was a movement dominated by a single personality and

supported by a variety of interests whose only common aim
was to break the oligarchy's monopoly on political power.
The characteristics cited above may have contributed to
the Party's growth and appeal during its conspiratorial

days, but after 1916, as we have seen in the case of pe-

troleum, they seriously inhibited effective government
action.

When viewed against this political backdrop, the decision to seek mass electoral support through a national-

istic oil policy emerges as a logical outgrowth of the
Radicals' task of reconciling the need to maintain popular

support with conditions which all but prohibited doing so
through positive action and accomplishment.
The advantages of adopting a nationalistic oil policy

were considerable.

The rhetoric of the nationalists re-

fined and simplified the complex petroleum question until
it became

a

choice between "patrio'.s" and "traitors" and,

therefore, admirably suited for mass consumption.

Further-

nationalist
more, the logical corollary of the Radicals'
ignorance or destance was that the opposition, through

X
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sign

,

policy.

was advocating an anti-national or anti-Argentine
If the Radicals could convey this impression,

they could claim a monopoly on Argentine nationalism, identify the Radical Party with the Argentine State, and, thereby, create the strongest possible source of legitimacy for

their exercise of national power.
The effectiveness with which the Yrigoyenists manipu-

lated the petroleum issue in particular and the concept of

economic nationalism in general served as an object lesson
in how to mobilize mass support which was not lost on future Argentine politicians.

Both Peron and Frondizi ben-

efited from the same kind of appeal.

Perb'n, in particular,

improved on the Radical model by developing techniques
and instruments for institutionalizing the support that

could be evoked through a nationalist program.

The con-

trolled labor unions, the government subsidized charities
run by Eva Peron, the Peronist education system, and the

Justicialist Party all provided avenues for solidifying
the identification between Peronismo and Argentine nation-

alism.

It was a more sophisticated apparatus than that at

Yrigoyen's disposal, but Peron operated with fewer restrictions on his power and with a model from which to
work.
a
In terms of state-directed economic development,

in Argencorollary of 20th century economic nationalism
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tina, the governments of Yrigoyen and Alvear set the prec-

_

edent with YPF.

The state oil industry along with the

abortive 19 29 government-to-government oil deal with Rus-

sia were not parts of a coherent industrialization program,

but they involved a novel degree of government interference
in the economic sphere which would be accentuated in the

post-1930 period.

The link, for instance, between

Yrigoyen' s oil policy and Peron's IAPI (Argentine Institute
for the Promotion of Trade)

and his five-year plans is un-

mistakable.
If the Radicals exposed the political potential of a

nationalist oil policy, Yrigoyen' s second term demonstrated
that such a policy had its limitations as a prop for an

ineffective and/or unpopular government.

In the March

1930 Congressional elections, the personalistas lost in

the Federal Capital despite a campaign which emphasized

their oil policy.

In addition, Yrigoyen 's premature de-

parture from office may have saved him from suffering the
effects of a politically even more serious limitation of
a nationalist, anti-imperialist oil policy - its inability

to ensure a sufficient oil supply in the marketplace.

Pe-

troleum is a high risk, capital intensive industry which
demands sophisticated technical skills, and Argentina
resources
simply lacked the capital and the technological
investment.
to attain fuel autonomy without foreign
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Yrigoyen was not forced to acknowledge these facts,
but
both Peron and Frondizi found themselves compelled to re-

treat from their nationalist positions and seek the aid
of foreign oil capital.

Because the image of internation-

al oil firms as incorrigible imperialistic criminals

proved easier to create than to destroy, their policy reversals cost both men heavily in terms of popular support.
One final observation concerning the Yrigoyenist

Radicals is justified by their record on the petroleum
issue.

Yrigoyen' s lack of a concrete policy in 1916, the

inept manner in which his first administration handled the
state oil industry, and the attempts to win votes through an

exaggerated nationalist policy all suggest that petroleum

development and industrialization were not as critical to
the Radicals as their propaganda indicated.

Instead, the

record confirms the picture of Radicalism as a movement

more interested in political reform than in promoting fundamental social and economic changes.

As a political

force, in short, Radicalism proved much more effective at

mobilizing the disaffected elements in Argentine society
than at drafting social and economic programs that might

have satisfied the aspirations of tiose groups.
The absence of a strong commitment to basic change

continued to characterize the Radical Party after 1930 and
conducted
was evident during the 19 46 presidential campaign

*
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by Jose Tamborini, the UCR (and Union Democratica) can-

didate who ran against Peron.

With the latter promising

sweeping social and economic reforms, Tamborini could offer
only the traditional, and by then suspect, shibboleths about

democracy and civil liberties.

Tamborini' s efforts were

futile, but they were well grounded in the Radical Party

tradition.

Insofar as the Socialists were concerned, the consistency with which the small Buenos Aires based party sup-

ported a moderately nationalist oil policy buttressed its
claim to being Argentina's only "non-criollo" party.

Its

members prided themselves on their rejection of personality
cults and political opportunism, and emphasized the party's

attachment to principles and explicit party platforms, its
democratic and disciplined internal organization, and its
scientific approach to lawmaking.

The Socialists apparent-

ly failed to realize, however, that these traits were not

assets in a political system where personalities were more

important than issues.

It would take more than ideological

consistency and well drafted legislative proposals to close
who ran the
the gap between the middle class professionals

claimed to
Socialist Party and the laborers whom the party
Socialists
represent. The splinter faction of Independent
fact when they
demonstrated their understanding of this
their victory in
employed "criollo" techniques to score
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the 1928 elections.

The refusal of the Senate Conservatives (including
the antipersonalistas after 1924)

to cooperate in the ef-

fort to pass oil legislation was a manifestation of their

determination to hinder effective Radical rule in every

way possible.

Furthermore, the blind negativism which

characterized their obstructionist tactics revealed the
Conservative's unwillingness to accept the changes in the
nation's political system introduced by the 1912 electoral

reform statute.

By ignoring the consensus demand for

some kind of oil legislation, the Conservatives were, in

effect, denying they owed any responsibility to the nation's

electorate.

It was simply another expression of the

skepticism about the popular masses which was at the heart
of oligarchic liberalism.

The persistence of this attitude meant that the Con-

cordancia of the 1930

*s

would be accompanied by a return

to the Conservative's pre-1916 political practices, and by
the continued exclusion of the lower classes from meaningful participation in the political process.

The benefic-

iary of this situation was Peron whose social and economic

policies were attuned to the psychological needs of the

nation's masses.

Those policies fostered a sense of dig-

the nationnity and a feeling of legitimate membership in

success as the
al community which was as crucial to their
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material benefits they brought to the lower classes.
Thus, the failure of Argentina's leaders to provide

adequate petroleum legislation during the Radical Period

was part of the larger failure of Argentina's political
institutions, and particularly the Radical Party, to

provide channels for the entrance of new groups into

Argentina's political system.

With the Radicals disap-

pointing performance followed by the return to the politics
of fraud and deceit under the Concordancia, many Argentines, including important sectors of the military, be-

gan to openly doubt the virtues of liberal democratic

institutions.

They came to view politics as a senseless

game in which national decency, honor, and development

were being gambled away for personal aggrandizement and
the perquisites of office.

Respect for the democratic

process reached a nadir unmatched since the time of Rosas,
and the road was open for another experiment with the

authoritarian alternative.
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PRIMARY SOURCES

Unpublished Materials
Complaints about the inaccessibility of government

documents and private papers are standard fare in studies

which deal with twentieth-century Argentine history, and
rightfully so.

Except in extraordinary cases, researchers

find official files tightly sealed, and they discover that
the papers of significant figures are in the hands of heirs

or friends whose sense of responsibility to the public

reputation of the individual involved is too often imper-

meable to pleas about setting the historical record
straight.

For the present study, a case in point are the YPF

archives which are located along with the YPF laboratories
in the town of Florencio Varela, south of the Federal Capital.

To my knowledge, they have not been opened to any

scholar, and

I

was informed by YPF's Director of Publica-

tions that the archives were for the exclusive use of govern

ment personnel.
Unconfirmed reports suggest that a good deal of material was lost in the transfer of the archives from the YPF

building in Buenos Aires to the present site in Florencio

Varela during the Peron era.

Whether this is true or not,

document used in
the location of the single unpublished YPF
the Florencio
the present study suggests that, at best,
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Varela collection is incomplete.

By accident,

I

found the

Administrative Commission's "Acta No. 831 M (October
1928)

9,

among the holdings of the Centro de Estudios Na-

cionales in Buenos Aires.

It presents a helpful 51-page

summary of YPF's activities from 1922 to 1928.
The most valuable body of unpublished material used
in preparing this study is the U.S. State Department Deci-

mal File 835, the pertinent section of which is available
<

on National Archives microfilm under the title "Records

Relating to the Internal Affairs of Argentina, 1910-1929"
(Microcopy 514, 44 rolls).

Particularly valuable are the

rolls (835.6363 series) which deal specifically with petro-

They provide the single richest source on

leum matters.

the private sector of Argentina's oil industry during the

Radical Period, and especially on the attitudes and activities of American firms.

Other rolls contain information

in Argentina
on general economic and political developments

and must be
which, although helpful, is not always accurate

handled with care.
Printed Documents
Laws, Decrees, and Resolutions
Co'digg de minen'a
Pigretti, Eduardo A. , comentador.
Buenos Aires:
y legi slacion de hidrocarburos
Sociales, 196 4.
Co operadora de ~Derecho y Ciencias
de legislacion argenti
Anales
ed.
Jero'nimo,
Remorino,
buenos Aires:
na complemente anpsTIIl?- ±211
Editorial La Ley, 1954.
.

•

.
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Ministerio de Agricultura, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales. Recopilacion de
ley_es, decretos
y resoluciones sobre materia
petrolera . Vol. I 1907 - 1933 . Buenos Aires:
a

f/

y

(

)

L.J. Rosso, 1938.

Convenient and comprehensive compilation of oil
laws, decrees, and resolutions which includes
many provincial as well as national government
measures.
Legislative Debates
Republica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, Camara de Diputados.
Diario de sesiones , anos 1907-1930
Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Congreso de la Nacion,
1907-1930.
.

Indispensable, not only for debates and copies
of legislative proposals, but for supplementary
documents often published in Diario .

Republica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, Camara de
Senadores.
Diario de sesiones , anos 1907-1930
Buenos Aires: L.J. Rosso, 1907-1930.

.

Of limited use until 192 8 when Senate first began
discussing petroleum legislation.

Reports and Publications of Executive and Legislative Bodies

Republica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, Camara de Diputados. Yacimientos petroliferos fiscales;
Antecedentes sobre su explotacion , iniciatTvas
parlamentarias , 3 Vols. Buenos Aires: Camara de
Diputados, 1924.
Contains pre-1924 legislative proposals on petroleum, but more important for the reports on the
pre-192 3 history and condition of state petroleum
exploitation by Mosconi and others which appear
in Vol. I.

comision de Industrias y Comercio. Anexo
a la orden del dia N° 66; Antecedentes de la
Comfs ion de~TndusTrTas~y comercio en el proyecto
3uenos~Aires
de ley organica del petroled
Camara de Diputados, 19 26.
,

Provides testimony of Mosconi and opinions of

^

,
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private oil firms on the Committee's
1925 bill '
along with a copy of the bill itself.
Sesiones ordinarias 1926; Orden del
dia^nura. 66.
Buenos Aires: CamlFa de~5Tp"u tados
,

Important because there is no copy of this bill
in Chamber's Diario .
Republica Argentina, Congreso Nacional, Camara de
Diputados, Division Informacion Parlamentaria,
Petroleo ; Antecedentes legislatives . Buenos
Aires: Congreso de la Nacion, 1958.
Helpful index to all occasions on which the
Chamber and the Senate discussed petroleum
matters between 1907 and July 1958.

Republica Argentina, Direccion de Comercio e Indus tria,
Direccion General de Estad^stica. Anuario de la
direccion general de estadistica correspondiente
al affo 1907 .
Vol. I." Buenos Aires: Compahia
Sudamericana de Billetes de Banco, 190 8.
,

Statistics on trade.
Anuario. . . 190 8 . Vol. I. Buenos Aires:
Compania Sudamericana de Billetes de Banco, 1909.
.

.

Anuario. . . 1909 . Vol. I. Buenos Aires:
Compania Sudamericana de Billetes de Banco, 1911.
.

Anuario. . . 1914 .
Buenos Aires: Compania
Sudamericana de Billetes de Banco, 1915.
•

.

Anuario.

. .

1916

.

Buenos Aires: L.J. Rosso,

1918.

Anales
Repilblica Argentina, Ministerio de Agricultura.
del ministerio de, agricultiira , secci^n de geo 2,
logia , mineralogia y_ mineria , Vol. VII,
Memoria de la division de minas , geologia e
hidrologia correspondiente al ano 19 10 . Buenos
Aires: Oficina Meteorologica Argentina, 1912.

Contains best official account of the 1907 oil
discovery in Comodoro Rivadavia, a copy of Law
7,059, and some comments on its application, and
a copy of the memorandum which led to the Decern-
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ber 24, 1910 creation of the Administrative
Commission to direct state developments in
Comodoro
Rivadavia.

Memoria presentada al congreso de la
naci6n, 1917 . Buenos Aires: Minis terio~de~Aqricultura, 1920.
.

Some comments from E . Hermitte on 1917 oil
strike
and on need for oil legislation.

Memoria. . .1918 .
•
de Agricultura, 1920.

Buenos Aires: Ministerio

Memoria. . . 1919
de Agricultura, 1920.

Buenos Aires: Ministerio

•

.

Direccion General de Explotacion del Petroleo de Comodoro Rivadavia.
Informe de la direccion a S.E. el senor ministro de agricultura de
la naciOn , febrero de 1916 .
Buenos Aires: Imprenta de Gmo. Kraft, 1916.
r

Summarizes condition of state oil industry just
before Yrigoyen became President. Comments on
Administrative Commission's work from 1911 to
1916, on need for money, and on positive role
private companies could play in nation's oil
industry.
Memoria^ de la direccion general de explo j
tacion de petroleo de Comodoro Rivadavia correspondiente a los alios 19 12 / 19T3 ." Buenos Aires:
CompaKia Sudamericana de Billetes de Banco, 1914

Body's first Memoria . Account of progress since
Encourages private exploitation, but
1911.
critical of alleged efforts of private capital
to monopolize oil lands.

Nota f undando su pedido de 2 .000 .000
Buenos Aires:
$m/n para proseguir los trabajos.
Of icina Meteorologica Argentina, 1911.
.

Petro'leo de Comodoro Rivadavia; Direccion
general de la explotacio'n ael~"petr6'leo' de Como r
2H~cTe"llinio ae ~T9TTT~
doro Ri vacTavTa; Acta del~
r
Buenos Aires: lmprenta~* t)e Su Conrianza", iyl3.

,
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Petroleo de Comodoro Rivadavia Memorandum j.e la direccion" general relativo a la explotacion f utura de los yacimientos de petroleo de
Comodoro Rivadavia con prograiaa de traaajos y
presupuesto de gastos , del acta del 8 de abril de
19L3.
Buenos Aires: Imprenta "De Su Conf ianza"
T913.
;

]

Plea for funding of program to raise oil production and eliminate need for imported coal.
Criticism of private investors for attempting to
monopolize oil districts,
Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Agricultura, Direccion General de Minas, Geologia e Hidrologia.
Boletm N° 12 , Serie A Minas , Instrucciones
para la presentacion y_ tramitacion de solicitudes
mmeras . Buenos Aires: Ministro de Agricultura,
(

)

1919.

Helpful guide for understanding processes indicated in title.

Memoria de ^a direccion general de^minas
hidroloqia correspondiente al ano 19 11.
aia e hidrolog
geologia
Buenos Aires: Oficina Meteorologica Argentina,
,

1913.

Contains legislative recommendations from the
Mining Bureau, along with comments on activity of
private companies and on state drilling in Salta.
Memoria. . .1912
de Agricultura, 1914.
.

.

Buenos Aires: Ministerio

Contains comments on petroleum legislation and
copy of important October 18, 1912 Ministerial
Resolution on granting of petroleum rights.
Memoria. . .1923 .
de Agricultura, 192b.
.

Buenos Aires: Ministerio

Statistics on granting of petroleum exploration
rights, 1910-1923.
;
n de petroleo en la republica
Produccio
.
miy_ otros dates
"iT^elTtina durante el ano 1926
General de Minas
neros . Buenos Aire^: Direcc
Geologia e Hidrologia, 1927.
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Hi*

*

Production figures (1924-1926) for both private
and state companies, plus statistics indicating
effect of Alvear's January 1924 decrees in cutting down on speculation in oil rights.
Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Agriculttura, Direccion General de Yacimientos Petrolifer
^iferos Fiscales.
Desarrollo de la industria potrolifera fiscal,
1907-1932.
Buenos Aires: Jacobo Peuser, 1932.
One of most valuable sources on development of
the state industry to 1932, providing year by
year narrative of progress in all areas where state
was active, along with statistical summaries of
all facets of state activity.
Sanitized and selfcongratulatory, but a convenient resumed.

Memoria de la^ explotacion del petroleo de
Coiaodoro RivadavTa cor rcspondien te al ano 1921 «"
Buenos Aires: Ferrari linos., 1923.
.

As a group, YPF's Memorias provide basically
technical, statistical information on the firm^s
There is little on the political side of
growths
the petroleum question.

Memori^ de la direccion general de yaci atfo

1922
•

Buenos Aires

Ferrari linos.
.

,

1924.

.1923.

Buenos Aires

Ferrari

.1924.

Buenos Aires

Ferrari

.1925.

Buenos Aires

Ferrari

Memoria. .1926.

Buenos Aires

Ferrari

Memoria.
1924.

linos
•

Hnos •

9

.

linos

.

• 9

.

Hnos •

9

•

Hnos •

9

•

Hnos •

9

Memoria.
1925.

Memoria.
1926.

1927.

Memoria.

.1927.

Buenos Aires: Ferrari

.1928.

Buenos Aires: Ferrari

1578.

Memoria.
1929.

Contains extensive summary of YPF's 1922-1928
activities.
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Memoria. . .1929
de Agricultura, 19 30.
•

.

Buenos Aires: Minis teri

19 30

.

Buenos Aires: N.p..
F '

YPF, 1907-1937

.

Buenos Aires: Yacimientos

Memoria.

. .

1932.

Petroliferos Fiscales, 1937.

Pamphlet published to commemorate opening of new
YPF building in Buenos Aires. Outstanding collection of photographs of YPF installations in
Comodoro Rivadavia and elsewhere. Provides useful information on price of gasoline in Federal
Capital, 1920-1935.
Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Agricultura, Explotacion Nacional del Petrdleo de Comodoro Rivadavia.
Memoria de la explotacion nacional del petroleo de Co modoro Rivadavia corrcspondiente al
afto 1918 .
Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Agricultura, 1919.

Memoria. . . 1919
de Agricultura, 1920.
.

Buenos Aires: Ministerio

.

Buenos Aires: Ministerio

Memoria. . . 1920 .
de Agricultura, 1921.
.

Helpful information on problems with labor and
with purchasing machinery which state industry
faced during war years.

Republica Argentina, Ministerio de Comercio e IndusLas fuentes
tria, Direccion Nacional de Mineria.
del petroleo argentino , 1907 - 13 diciembre 1957 - cmcuentenario del descubrimien to. de ComBuenos Aires: Direccidn Naodoro Rivadavia
cional de Mineria, 1957.
.

Most of the pamphlet deals with pre-1920 period
and particularly with work of National Bureau of
Mines in early development of petroleum resources.
Filled with excellent pictures and illustrations.
Republica Argentina, Ministerio del Interior, SubsecLas fuer^as armadas
retaria de Inf ormaciones
restituyen el imperio de la. sobcrania popular
Tomo I. Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Camara de
Diputados, 19 46.
.

.
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Part II presents national election results for
1912-19 30. Names of candidates and parties provided, making this source invaluable for identifying political affiliation of members of the
Chamber of Deputies.

Republica Argentina, Presidencia. Presidencia Alvear ,
1922-1928 . Compilacion de mensajes , leyes , decretos y_ reglamentaciones .
9 Vols.
Buenos Aires:
Pesce, 1928.
Collection of limited value for this study, containing only a few documents related to YPF in
Vol. III.

Contemporary Publications on Petroleum Matters
"La Alianza Continental," Revista Juridica y_ de Ciencias Sociales , ano XLIV (May 1927) , 84-91.

This article and the one which follows outline
the purpose and ideological orientation of the
Alianza Continental.

"Alianza Continental: A los pueblos de sur y centro
ame'rica, me'xico y las antillas," Revista Juridica
ano XLIV (Nov. 1926 - May
y_ de Ciencias Sociales
1927), 43-50.
,

Arguero, Carlos.
N.p., 1916.

Petroleos argentinos .

Buenos Aires:

Superficial survey of Argentine oil industry in
Focuses on how to increase productivity and
1916.
argues for mixed companies.
"Astra", Compania Argentina de Petroleo, et. al. Las
companias industriales ; de petroleo ante el honorable senado de la nacion. Buenos Aires: Casa
EdTtoria "Coni" , 1928.

Private companies argue against concept of state
oil monopoly, emphasizing need for private exploitation to increase domestic oil production.
comerBaldrich, Alonso. El petroleo Su importancia
petrolera.
cial, industriaT y militar Legislacion
N.d.
B"uenos Aires: Im'prenta "i^l Misionero" ,
;

;

in
Reprint of speech delivered at Centro Naval
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February 1927. Fine example of the pre-1927
oil
debate nationalist argument.
Beninson, Manuel.
"Utilizacion del combustible nacional y su importancia. Conferencia dada en
el
centro naval el 12 de octubre de 1913," Boletin
del Centro Naval. XXXI (Nov. -Dec. 1913), 489-501
.

Encouragement for the use of domestic petroleum
to replace expensive imported fuels.
Bonardi, Silvio. En defensa de la riqueza nacional
del petroleo ante la suprema cortc de la nacio n.
Buenos Aires: Rinaldi Hnos., 1928.
,

Bonardi' s brief in the 19 2 8 Supreme Court case of
Standard Oil of New Jersey vs. the Province of
Salta, and a forceful statement of the nationalist position.
"La nacionalizacio'n de las minas," Revista
Juridica y_ de Ciencias Sociales , ano XXXVII (MayAug. 1920) , 95-99.

Brief statement of the case for federalization at
a relatively early date.
Bunge, Alejandro E.
"El problema economico del petroleo," Revista de Economia Argentina , XXIV (June
1930)

,

401-436Y7

One of the most coherent and cogent statements of
the argument for continued private exploitation
and against a state oil monopoly. Bunge favored
a "constitutional" federalization of oil resources
which is not spelled out clearly.
La legislacion del petroleo, bases juridicas y economicas," Revista de Economia Argen tina, XXI (Oct. 1928), 289.

Catalano, Miguel H. Codigo de mineria . Fomen to minero
1
petroleo . Buenos Aires: N. Spinelli, 1929.
y_

Pamphlet by the Secretary of the National Bureau
of Mines which urges general reform of the Mining
Generally anti-imperialist in tone, it
Code.
calls for closer government control of all mining
activity and a state oil monopoly.
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Colombo, Luis. El petroleo argentino
y_ la necesidad
de su legislacion
Buenos Aires: Caracciolo y
Plantie, 1927.
.

Reprint of speech by President of Union Industrial
Argentina. Colombo supported federalization and
mixed companies.

Confederacion Argentina del Comercio de la Indus tria y
de la Produccion, Bolsa de Comercio.
Anteproyecto de ley de minas de petroleo . Buenos Aires:
Imprenta Muro, 1927.
Drafters included A.E. Bunge, E. Hermitte and
Carlos Velarde. Proposal for organic oil law
which rejects federalization and monopolization
while allowing mixed companies.
Fliess, Felipe.
"El petroleo y Comodoro Rivadavia,"
Boletin del Centro Naval , XXXX (Nov. -Dec. 1922)
421-446.

Contains Fliess s evaluation of his work as Chief
Administrator in Comodoro Rivadavia along with a
five-year development plan which he submitted in
1

1919.

"La economia del petroleo nacional
Gonella, Eduardo M.
M
Revista de Ciencias Econcrtucas
y su legislacion
ano XV (Sept. 1927), 1009-1032.
.

,

Presents a moderately nationalist analysis of oil
situation in Argentina and the world. Supports
federalization, but rejects state oil monopoly in
favor of closely controlled private exploitation.
La ex plotacion of icial del petroleo Su
evolucion economica y_ f inanciera . Buenos Aires:
Imprenta de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, 19 27.
.

;

Concentrates on the economic and financial evolution of YPF with brief comments on the need for
oil legislation. Recommends continued private
exploitation under tight controls along with mixed companies.
"El petroleo; Su importancia
Guaresti, Juan J v (hijo) .
Ciencias Economicas,
y legislacion," Revista de
XVII (Jan.
ano XVI (Dec. 1928) , 2581-2606, ano
1929) , 21-50.
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Two-part article by a University student which
argues for federalization and creation of monopoly mixed company.
State would also continue operations on its own to supply Armed Forces. The
content, organization and analysis of Guaresti's
work make this article a near perfect prototype of
the nationalist approach to the oil question.

Petroleo , importancia economica y_ militar .
lucna P° r su posesidn , conferencia . Buenos
Aires: Imprenta de la Universidad de Buenos Aires.
•

1927.

Hermitte, Enrique M. Cuestiones relacionadas con el
aprovechamiento de los yacimientos de petroleo de
la reptiolica argentina y_ en particular del de
Comodoro Rivadavia . Buenos Aires: Congreso Nacional de Ingenieria, 1916.

Optimistic survey of past development and future
possibilities of Argentine oil industry despite
public apathy and even hostility. Emphasizes
need for oil law and outlines his recommendations
for continued state exploitation along with regulations on private exploitation which would attract foreign capital.
.

do por
con el
trJleo
del de
1921.

El estado de la cuestion petroleo procediEl estudio de las cuestiones relacionadas
aprovechamiento de los yacimientos de pede la repablica argentina y_ en particular
Comodoro Rivadavia. Buenos Aires: N.p.,
"

Reprint of Hermitte s 1916 work along with some
new observations. Maintains no significant advances in national oil industry made since 1916
and recommends autonomous agency to direct state
exploitation. Legislative recommendations same
1

as in 1916.

Sob re legislacion del petroleo en
Hileman, Guillermo.
la republica argentina co nferencia , julio ]_ de
Buenos Aires: Imprenta La Aurora, 1927.
1927.
,

Argument against concept of state oil exploitation and for leaving the industry to private capital.

"El Intransigente".

El petroleo del norte argentino:
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Comentarios del diario " El Intransigente " de la
ciudad de Salta. Prologue by E. Mosconi. Salta:
Imprenta C. Velarde, 1928.
Collection of newspaper articles on the oil situation in Salta preceded by Mosconi* s analysis of
that situation and his recommendations for oil
legislation. A valuable source for Mosconi'
ideas.

Lagos, M. J.
La politica del petroleo ; Contribucion
al estudio .
Buenos Aires L.J. Rosso, 1922.
:

Analyzes the world oil scene, petroleum legislation in the Americas, and Argentina's need for an
oil law.
Support for federalization combined
with advantageous conditions for private exploitation to increase production.
Mendez, Jose M. EJL petroleo en la republica argentina .
Buenos Aires: N.p., 1916.

Highly critical of 1907-1915 state exploitation.
Emphasizes need for exploration and argues for
federalization, mixed companies, and liberal conditions for private investors.
"Explotacion de nuestros yacimiMoreno, Evaristo V.
entos petroliferos , " La Ingenieria ano XXI (Feb.
1, 1927) , 98-118.
,

Survey of nation's oil industry combined with
recommendations for continued state exploitation
in Comodoro Rivadavia and reform of the Mining
Code to promote private exploitation.
Mosconi, Enrique. El petroleo argentino 1922 1930 y_
la ruptura de los trusts petroliferos ingles y_
Buenos
norteamericano el l u de agosto de 1929
Aires: Ferrari Hnos., 1936.
.

Mosconi 's own account of the development of YPF
under his direction. Cohering the political as
well as the economic and technical developments,
indispensable.
it is laudatory but, nonetheless,
La batalla del petroleo; YPF y_ las empreBuenos Aires: Ediciones ProoleilTTxtr^jeras:
w«»
j
*
—
i a rt
mas Nacionales, 1957.
.

w-»i

i
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A collection of Mosconi «s writings and speeches
which highlight his contribution to national oil
development and his nationalist stance. A useful source because its reproductions are, for
tne most part, accurate.
Naon, Romulo S.
Inviolabilidad de la propiedad minera.
Buenos Aires: Editorial Muro, 1928.

Naon's brief prepared for Standard Oil of New
Jersey in the Supreme Court case of Standard vs.
the Province of Salta.
Newberry, Jorge and Justino C. Thierry.
Buenos Aires: Vaccaro, 1910.

El petroleo .

Superficial study of the petroleum industry and
the state's Comodoro Rivadavia exploitation, but
interesting for a report on an early experiment
using Comodoro Rivadavia crude oil in a locomotive.
Oneto, Ricardo. El centinela . Una campana de veinticinco anos en def eqsa del petroleo argentino y_ de
yacimientos pe trolif eros f iscales , 1915 - 1941 .
Buenos Aires : Ferrari Hnos. , 1941.

Collection of primarily newspaper articles written by Oneto on petroleum question. He established early and maintained a moderate nationalist position.
El petroleo argentino y_ la soberania nacional . Prologue by E. Mosconi." Buenos Aires:
Ferrari Hnos., 1929.
.

Copies of many of the same articles by Oneto
which appear in El centinela . Prologue by Mosconi
is especially valuable since it contains the most
lucid statement of his post-1927 position on
petroleum policy.

Petroleo de Comodoro Rivadavia . Explot acion industrial de la zona reservada al estado .
Buenos Aires: Imprenta y* Li tog rati a La Buenos
Aires", 1918.

Another collection of Oneto' s writings, again primarily newspaper articles. This group emphasizes
his support of Deputy Tomas de Veyga's 1914 legislative proposal.
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Orzabal Quintana, Arturo.
^Nuestro nacionalismo continental," Revista Juridica y de Ciencias Soci ales, ano XLIV (Nov. 1926-May 1927)
£1-5 8~.
,

Discussion of purpose and ideological orientation
of the Alianza Continental by its Argentine
President.

Provincia de Jujuy. El petroleo y_ la constitucion nacional . Jujuy: Talleres Graficos del Estado,
1926.

Presentation of the anti- federalization argument
which features comments by Governor B. Villafane
accompanied by supportive selections from several
of the nation's leading conservative lawyers.
Ramos, Eduardo A.
El petroleo en la republica argentina ; Su legislation .
Buenos Aires: Valerio
Abeledo - Libreria Juridica, 1927.

Extensive study of petroleum question in world
setting followed by specific recommendations on
Argentine situation. Argues for federalization
combined with exclusion of foreign capital.
Sanchez Sorondo, Matias G. La palabra de un patriota
sobre el problema de _la legislacion del petroleo
con un e studio- pro logo sobro los derechos ae las
Buenos Aires:
provincias por" Benjamin Villafane
Imprenta V. Dommguez, 1927.
.

Statement of Sanchez Sorondo' s support for private oil exploitation in the context of a savage
attack on oil bill passed by 19 27 Chamber of
Deputies.
Politica del petroleo La legislacion .
Buenos Aires: Agencia General de Libreria, 1923.
.

;

Reprint of a speech delivered by Sanchez Sorondo.
Presents the most comprehensive statement of nis
"open doors" policy toward foreign capital.
"Fomento de la explotacion de], yaciVelarde, Carlos.
miento de Comodoro Rivadavia," La Ingenieria ano
XVIII (July 16, 1914), 223-228.
,

Comments on geological formations and crude oil
production in Comodoro Rivadavia. Partisan of

. ,
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private investment to expand production.
Las roinas de petro'leo en la legislacion
argentina . Buenos Aires: Casa Editor a "Coni"
1922.
•

Velarde had held positions as a mining authority
with governments of Peru and Argentina. Most
valuable section of this work for the present
study is an extensive and lucid discussion of the
procedures for obtaining petroleum exploration
and exploitation rights.
Zucal, Manuel.
"La explotacion fiscal de Comodoro Rivadavia," La Ingenierra , ano XXVII (Jan. 1923)
16-21.

Discussion of some of the administrative and
labor problems which hindered state industry's
development during Yrigoyen's first term. Written by man who had worked in Comodoro Rivadavia.
afio

"Legislacion petrolifera, " La Ingenieria ,
XXV (Oct. 1. 1921), 308-317.

Emphasizes need for an oil law and rejects both
mixed companies and a state monopoly in favor of
continued state and private exploitation, each on
their own.

Memoirs
Coca, Joaquin. El contubernio ; Memorias de un diputado obrero. Buenos Aires: Claridad, 1930.
Coca, an Orthodox Socialist, served in Chamber,
1924-1928. His memoirs are informative on the
inner workings of the Socialist Party and on the
general line up of pro and anti-Yrigoyen forces
in the Chamber.

Columba, Ramon. El congreso que yo he visto.
Buenos Aires: N.p., 1948-1949.

2

Vols.

Vol. I deals with years 1914-1933. There is nothing specifically on petroleum matters, but Columba s remarks aid in understanding the figures who
served in Congress. The numerous cartoons are
delightful.
1
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Golds traj, Manuel.
Sophos, 19 57.

Anos £ errores.

Buenos Aires:

The first one hundred plus pages present a
fairly
balanced picture of Argentina's 1916-1930 politics
by a man who was Alvear's chief political secretary from 1931 to 1941.
Deals with strengths and
weaknesses of both Alvear. and Yrigoyen.

Ibarguren, Carlos. La historia que he vivido.
Aires: Peuser, 1955.

Buenos

Memoir of a significant public figure and historian which sometimes treats the Radical Period in
great detail from viewpoint of a conservative
nationalist.
Pinedo, Federico. En tiempos de la republica . Vol. I.
Buenos Aires: Editorial Mundo Forense, 19 46.
This memoir serves as an introduction to a collection of Pinedo' s writings from the years 19121943.
Strongly anti-Yrigoyen, Pinedo' s comments
are more valuable for the study of the Socialist
Party than for this study of petroleum policy.
Repetto, Nicolas. Mi paso por la pol/tica , de Roca -a
Yrigoyen . Buenos Aires: Santiago Rueda Editor,
1956.

Observations of a man who was not only one of
most capable men in Argentine public life, but
who was also interested in the question of oil
legislation.
Repetto' s comments consistently
show an anti-Yrigoyen bias.

Collections of Speeches and Messages
Comite Universitario Radical, Junta Central. El pctroleo argentine Ciclo de conferencias en pro de
su nacionalizacion y_ explotacion por el estado.
Buenos Aires: Talleres '"Capano" , 19 30.
,

Reprints of a series of more than twenty addresses
delivered, in most cases, by University students
and favoring the Yrigoyenist petroleum policy.
They were originally broadcast over the radio
during late 1928 and early 1929.
Mosconi, Enrique. Dichos y hechos 1904 1938 .
Aires: Libreria "El Ateneo" , l9J8T^
,

Buenos

s
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Collection of Mosconi's speeches, some of which
deal with petroleum and many of which do not.
This collection must be used carefully because
the selections are not all accurately identified
terms of dates and places.

m

Yrigoyen, Hipolito. Pueblo y gobierno .
2nd. ed. 12
Vols. Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1956.

These volumes, despite the obvious pro-Yrigoyen
orientation, are an invaluable source of both
primary and secondary material on Yrigoyen and
the Radical Period.
The volumes of immediate
importance for the present study include: Vol.
IV which includes Roberto Etchepareborda*
Yrigoyen y_ el congreso , a valuable aid for determining the strength of political parties in Congress from 1916 to 1930; Vol. XI which is Arturo
Frondizi's Petroleo y_ politica (see description
below) ; and Vol. XII which includes a collection
of comments by Yrigoyen on petroleum gathered
from his speeches.

Radical Party Campaign Literature
Amado, Isias R.
"Contribucion para la redaccion de un
programa de partido," Re vista Argentina de Ciencias Politicas , XII (May 1916), 91-110.

Account of Amado' s attempt along with others to
get Radical Party to adopt an explicit platform
for the 1916 election.
Bianco, Jose. La doctrina radical .
L. J. Rosso, 1927.

Buenos Aires:

This selection along with those which follow are
of little direct value for the study of the oil
Rather they present evidence of the Yrigoissue.
yenist Radicals tendency to avoid concrete issue
statements at election time and glorify Yrigoyen.
Etkin, Alberto M. Bosque jo de una historia y_ doctrine
Buenos Aires: El
de la union civica radical .
Ateneo, 1928.
Flotta, M.S. El h ombre de man ana .
Pagano Hnos., N.d.

Giordano, Gabriel.

El h ombre cumbre

Buenos Aires:

y_

su obra de

g_o-
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bierno.
1928.

Buenos Aires: Edi tores M. Rocca y aa.,

Mendoza Dumas, Ricardo.
Hipolito Yrigoyen .

Docencia democr^tica del Dr.
Buenos Aires: Imprenta Lopez,

19 28*

This selection does deal with petroleum in the
final chapter where the author praises the concepts of federalization and monopolization.

Oyhanarte, Horacio B. El hombre Hipolito Yrigoyen
apostle de la democracia . 20 til ed. Buenos Aires
Claridad, 1945.
;

t

Originally published as a campaign biography in
1916.

SECONDARY SOURCES

General Studies
Acaderaia Nacional de Historia.
contempora'nea , 1862-1930 .

Historia argentina
Buenos Aires:
3 Vols.

El Ateneo, 1963-1966.

These three volumes follow the pattern of the
Academy's major multivolume work in that the various contributions are uneven in their quality.
Section in Vol. Ill on mining and petroleum by
Jose A. Craviotto is one of the best in this
study on economic history. His account is detailed and complete though almost strictly narrative.

Alexander, Robert. The Peron Era .
Univ. Press, 1951.

New York: Columbia

Still a valuable account of the early Peron years.
.
"

An Introduction to Argentina .

New York:

Praeger,T969.
Argentine
A useful introduction to contemporary
for
history which emphasizes the political causes
economic stagnation and the military's intervention in politics.

Blanksten, George I.

Peron 's Argentina.

Chicago: Univ
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of Chicago Press, 1953.

An admirably objective account of Peron's rise to
power written by a political scientist.
Ferns, Henry S.

Argentina .

New York: Praeger, 1969.

An adequate synthesis which is weak on the colonial period and concentrates on the twentieth century.
Highly critical of Argentina's "mindless"
performance in the 19 20's and of the Radicals
whom he views as political "outs" who wanted in.
Palacio, Ernesto. Historia de la argentina.
3rd ed.
Buenos Aires: A. Pena Lillo, 1960.
2 Vols.

A Rosista synthesis which simply reinterprets old
rather than supplies new evidence. Weak on the
Radical Period to which he devotes less than 35
pages in Vol. II.
Pendle, George. Argentina .
Univ. Press, 1963.

3rd ed.

New York: Oxford

A sound, conventional, political-economic survey
accompanied by a series of useful statistical
appendices.
Revolucion y_ contrarevolucion
Ramos, Jorge Abelardo.
Buenos Aires:
2 Vols.
3rd ed.
en la argentina.
Plus Ultra, 1965.

Challenging Marxist interpretation, perhaps the
best of its genre. Ramos accords the Radical
Period major and sympathetic treatment in his
second volume.
Rennie, Ysabel. The Argentine Republic .
Macmillan, 19 45.

New York:

While not recent, Rennie' s account of 19th century
development and the rise of Peron remains a provocative and highly readable study.
Romero, Jose Luis. A History of Argentine Political
Intro7 and trans. t»y inomas r. ncbann.
Thought.
Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1963.

A basic and important interpretive essay which
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covers the major political and economic themes in
Argentine development.
Scobie, James R. Argentina ; A City and a Nation .
ed.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 197X

2nd

The best one-volume synthesis in existence.
Scobie concentrates on social and economic themes
with a subordinated political narrative. The text
is heavily weighted toward the nineteenth century
and is followed by a detailed political chronology, a superb bibliographic essay, and some helpful statistical material.

Whitaker, Arthur P. Argentina .
J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

Englewood Cliffs, N.

Essentially a narrative political survey in which
economic developments are not forgotten. Major
emphasis placed on the twentie^ century and on
themes of nationalism and Peron. Whitaker'
selected and annotated bibliography is useful.
Publications Relating to Petroleum
Abeijon, Asencio.
"Las primeras huelgas petroleras ,"
Comodoro
in Medio siglo de petroleo arqentino.
Rivadavia: Editorial "El Rivadavia", 1957, 41-43.

Discussion of the causes and development of the
1917 petroleum strike in the Comodoro Rivadavia
fields by a long-time resident of the area.
Bunge, Agusto. La guerra del petroleo en la argenBuenos Aires: "La Graf ica" , 1933."
tina.

Polemic which arose out of contracts signed between Standard Oil of New Jersey and the Province
of Salta in early 1933. Bunge' s attack on Standard and certain provincial authorities carries
him back into Salta oil disputes of the 1920 's.
"50 anos de petroleo argentine" Revista del Club YPF
No. XXII (Oct. -Dec. 1957, Edicidn extraordinaria,
Bodas de Oro) , 23-59.

Uneven and superficial survey of oil developments
from 1907 to 1930, but useful for a detailed description of the 190 7 discovery in Comodoro Rivadavia and for a list of all members of all the
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administrative bodies which directed state oil
exploitation from 1907 to 1957.
Diaz Araujo, Enrique.
"La explotacion del petroleo en
iMendoza en el,siglo XIX," Re vista de la Junta de
Estudios Historicos de Mendoza, 2nd eVoca, No.T
(1968), 121-154.

Examines early history of oil development in Andean area of Argentina, focusing on the Compania
Mendocina de Petroleo which was created with
Argentine capital in 1886.
Diaz Goitia, Jose J. La riqueza petrolffera argentina
en peligro . Buenos Aires: Editorial Tor, 19 36.

A detailed examination of Argentine petroleum development from 190 7 to 1934 which consists mostly
of long quotes and statistics drawn from government publications. Glorifies YPF's accomplishments under Mosconi and warns that in 1931-1934
period the state industry was retrogressing while
private exploitation was spurting ahead.

Frondizi, Arturo. Petroleo y_ politica . Vol. XI of
Pueblo y_ gobierno, Hip6lito Yrrgoyen. 2nd ed.
Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 1956.
12 Vols.

Frondizi presents the classic nationalist interpretation of Argentina's petroleum history, emphasizing the need for state exploitation and
warning against the dangers of foreign oil capiEven with this bias, Frondizi' s account is
tal.
the best available secondary account of Argentine
oil development. It is comprehensive, readable,
and supplemented by a wealth of statistics.
.

Petroleo

y_

nacion .

Buenos Aires: Tran-

sicioh, 1963.

Frondizi s attempt to justify the fact that his
oil policy as President did not concur with his
position as outlined in Petroleo y_ politica .
1

Gonzalez, Carlos EmeVito. Energia y soberania; Introduccion al estudio econ6niico r juridico de las
fuentes naturales~"de energia . Buenos Aires:
Gure, 19 BIT

Work deals principally with petroleum in the
1950' s and the author strongly supports Frondizi 's
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pre-presidential policy. Interesting for this
study because the author's comments on issues like
federalization and foreign investment are carbon
copies of the nationalist position in the 1920's.
Gonzalez, Julio V. Nacionalizacion del petroleo.
Buenos Aires: "El Ateneo" , 19 47.

Gonzalez was a Socialist Deputy in the 1930's,
and his work deals with contracts signed between
YPF and private firms in 1936-19 37. He presents
a nationalist interpretation in a brief historical survey of the Argentine petroleum industry.

Importacion de combustibles y_ lubricantes
Nafta y_ ea."
rnings
Reimpresion del No~I 160, BoTetm de In-"
f ormaciones Petroleras .
Buenos Aires: R. Canals,
.

1938.

The best compilation of statistics on fuel importation for the years 1918-1936.

Kaplan, Marcos.
argentine1957.

(

Economia
1939-1956

y_
)

.

politica del petroleo
Buenos Aires Praxis
:

Primarily concerned with Peron's "failure" with
oil development, Kaplan provides brief background
survey on the period from 190 7 to 19 39. Polemical
and superficial, his comments illuminate the position of the self-styled revolutionary left in the
late 1950' s.
Krause, Emma y Amalia. La casualidad y_ el petroleo de
Comodoro Rivadavia Contnbucion al e studio del
descubrimiento del petroleo fiscal segun constancias oticiales . Buenos Aires: N.p., 1943.
;

,

Pamphlet written by two children of the man who
was in charge of the division of the National
Bureau of Mines which was responsible for the
uncondrilling that struck oil in 1907. Presents
vincing argument that discovery was result of does
scientific exploration and not accident, but
between
include copies of telegrams exchanged
Comodoro Rivadavia and Buenos Aires immediately
after the discovery.
un fundador para YPF .
Guillermo Kraft, 1958.
.

Buenos Aires:
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Reiteration of thesis described above, along
with discussion of their father's (Julio Krause)
contributions to national oil development.
Lopez Zavaleta, P. Javier. El petroleo argentine
Conside raciones re fe rentes a una adecuada legislacion . Buenos Aires: L.J. Rosso, 1931.

Argues that federalization as passed by the 1927
Chamber was unconstitutional and suggests it
should be accomplished by provinces voluntarily
handing over their oil deposits to national government, and presents case for mixed companies
over a state monopoly.
Morixe, Horacio. Regimen legal del petroleo .
Aires: Editorial "La Facultad"", 1934.

Buenos

A compilation of lectures by an expert in mining
law, this work presents a fairly balanced and
judicious review of the world and Argentine oil
scene in the mid-19 30' s. Touching on all phases
of the petroleum industry, the author analyzes
the past legislative proposals on oil as well as
those before Congress in 19 33.
Mozo, Sadi H. E_l petroleo argenti.no en el siglo XIX .
Bahia Blanca: Martinez, Rodriquez y cia. , 1950.
.

A worthwhile account of petroleum developments in
nineteenth century that concentrates on Salta
and Jujuy.
Mozo, Sadi H. and Jayne Bermejo. Argentina petrolera
Buenos
1943 Legis lacion , te'cnica , estadistica .
Aires: "Cultura" , 19 43.
;

With Bermejo writing the technical sections and
Mozo those relating to legal aspects of oil, the
two present a useful handbook on the Argentine
petroleum industry. The uninitiated will find
the technical material explained and illustrated
in an easily understood manner.
Rumbo, Eduardo I. Petroleo y vasallaje ; Cay rne de
vaca y carnero contra "carbon Mas petroleo .
Buenos" Aires: Hecnos e Ideas, l'35Tl

A National Deputy during the Peronist period,
Rumbo is highly critical of the government's

,
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handling of Argentina's oil resources from
190 7
to 19 30.
In the fifth of his text which he devotes to these years, Rumbo places heavy emphasis
upon the conflict between American and British
interests in Argentina, but, unfortunately, his
comments rely on logic rather than evidence.
Silenzi de Stagni, Adolf o. El petr<4>leo argentine
2nd. ed. Buenos Aires: Coleccion Problemas
Nacionales, 1955.
This is the printed version of the famous history
class conducted by Silenzi de Stagni in May 1955
when he ^criticized Peron's oil policy, maintaining Peron had seriously weakened YPF and strength
ened the position of foreign companies. The
first two editions of this work were published
clandes tine ly

Politics, Economics, Labor and Foreign Relations
Baily, Samuel L. Labor , Nationalism , and Politics in
Argentina . New Brunswick, N. J. Rutgers Univ.
Press, 1967.
:

While he focuses on the post-19 30 period, Baily
analyzes Yrigoyen's relations with labor and the
struggles within the labor movement during the
Radical Period.
Bosch, Mariano G. Historia del partido radical , la
UCR , 1891-1930 . Buenos Aires: L.J. Rosso, 19 31.

An anti-Yrigoyen diatribe which concentrates almost exclusively on pre-1916 period. Argues unconvincingly that passage of Saenz PeHa law was
accompanied by a tacit understanding with Yrigoyen that he would not seek the presidency in
1916.
4 Vols.
Bunge, Alejandro E. La economia argentina .
Buenos Aires: Cia. Impresora Argentina, 1928v
1930.

Economic history and analysis in the nineteenth
century liberal tradition. Bunge analyzes Argentina's contemporary economic problems and provides a mountain of statistics which were a
product, in part, of his one-time position as the
Director of the National Bureau of Statistics.
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Canton, Dario.

El parlamento argentino en epoca s de
Buenos Aires: Instituto
4_6.
Torcuato di Telia, 19 66.

A leading Argentine sociologist, Canton provides
a well conceived analysis of the Argentine Con-

gress during three crucial years using questionaire data on selected characteristics of the
Congressmen. Most interesting chapter analyzes
why the increasing democratization of politics
and economic expansion have failed to produce political stability.

Castagno, Antonio. Los partidos politicos argentinos
Analisis de los antecedentes de regimen legal .
Buenos Aires: Roque Depalma, 19 59.

;

Political science study of relationship between
political parties and democracy with bulk of the
text consisting of projects for reforming the law
on political parties which had been made since
1922.
Author emphasizes role of schools and political parties in developing civic responsibility
in Argentina.
Diaz Alejandro, Carlos F. Essay on the Economic History
New Haven: Yale Univ.
of the Argentine Republic .
Press, 1970.

Perhaps the most important work on Argentine economic history published in recent years. The
author offers two general essays analyzing economic development since 1860 with the dividing line
at 1930, and fiye essays on specific facets of
Diaz Alejandro is primarily concernthe subject.
ed with the modern period, but he makes valuable
contributions to the understanding of the pre1930 period as well, particularly concerning the
absence of industrial development.
Dorfman, Adolf o. Evolucion de la economia industrial
argentina . Buenos Aires: Editorial "Radio Revista", 1939.

A textbook style account of Argentine industrial
development which has long remained standard due

to lack of material on the history of industry in

Argentina.
Ferrer, Aldo.

The Argentine Economy .

Trans, by Mar-
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jory M. Urquidi.
Press, 1967.

Berkeley: Univ. of Calif.

Historical analysis of the Argentine economy
tracing its evolution through four stages oeginning in the sixteenth century, placing heavy emphasis on the post- 19 30 period. A good starting
point for the study of Argentine economic
history.
Galletti, Alfredo. La politica y_ los partidos .
Buenos Aires and Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura
Economica, 1961.
One of the best of the many attempts to analyze
Argentina's chronic political instability.
Galletti, a moderate socialist, argues old liberal
structure must be completely shed in favor of a
"humanistic socialism" which would combine personal liberty, social justice and state planning.

McGann, Thomas F. Argentina , the United States and
Camthe Inter- American System , 1880-1914 .
bridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957.
,

Of value for the present study for McGann' s opening chapters provide one of the best descriptions
of the "Generation of 1880" available anywhere.

Mazo, Gabriel del. Breve historia del radicalismo .
Buenos Aires: Coepla, 19 64.

Brief and superficial, but with the advantage of
presenting del Mazo's ideas on the entire sweep
of Radicalism in one volume.
El radicalismo ; Ensayo sob re su historia
doctrina . Tomo I. Desde los origines nasta
a conqui"sta de la republica representativa y_
primer gobierno radical . Buenos Aires: Ediciones
Gure, 1957.
.

Covers Yrigoyen's first presidency as well as thu
background of Radicalism. A sympathetic treatment
it
by the most influential of Radical historians,
of the
is indispensable for the study of any facet
Radical Period, but must be treated as a defense
as pure
of Radicalism and Yrigoyen rather than
history.
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T

£i radicalising

doctrina, 1922-1952 .
Raigal, 1955.

—

Notas sob re su historia v
Buenos Aires: Edit orial
;

Of Del Mazo's many works, this is the most valuable for the present study. Despite the dates
in title, it covers Yrigoyen's first term as well.
Valuable not only for the Radical interpretation
of these years, but for the detail the author
supplies, particularly in terms of personal identifications.

Melo, Carlos. Los partidos politicos argentinos . 3rd
ed.
Cordoba: Univ. Nacional de Cordoba, 1964.

Helpful as an introductory survey covering span
from early national period through the Frondizi
years, but too brief. Covers the Radical Period
in less than three pages.

Ortiz, Ricardo M.
"El aspecto economico-social de la
crisis de 1930," Re vista de Historia No. 3 (ler
trimestre, 1958), 41-72.
,

Analysis of the economic factors involved in the
1930 overthrow of Yrigoyen, emphasizing the alleged cooperation between imperialist interests
and domestic sectors tied to the imperialists.
•

1930 .
1955.

Historia economica de la argentina 1850 Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal,
2 Vols.
,

The standard Marxist interpretation of pre-19 30
economic development.

Peterson, Harold F. Argentina and the United States
1910-1960 . New York: University Publishers, 196 4.
,

Author's treatment of petroleum in the 1920' s is
cursory and concentrates on the American reaction
to the threat of petroleum federalization.
Peterson's extensive bibliography is valuable for
any Argentine topic.
Portnoy, Leopoldo. Ana'lisis critico de la economia .
Buenos Aires and Mexico City: FondVcTe Cultura
Economica, 1961.

Study concentrates on the post-19 30 period and
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searches for the reasons behind
Argentina's post1945 economic stagnation. Author argues
the industrial interests of the Littoral
area are linked to the agricultural and cattle
sectors of the
economy, and all pursue economic
policies
aggrevate Argentina's economic dependence. that
Answer, he maintains, lies in basic
structural
changes

POtaS

A
^SSBL and Politics in Argentina,
?Q,R°?o5c
1928-1945 ; ;
Yrigoyen to PerjnT^tanfoFd Y Stanford
Univ. Press, 1969.
Study characterized by meticulous research and
detailed narrative. Author rejects theorizing
about the military's role in politics and demonstrates the importance of personal motivations
and relationships in determining the political
attitudes and actions of the officer corps. An
introductory chapter makes clear Yrigoyen 's partial responsibility for bringing the military
into politics.

Puiggro'sj, Rodolfo.

Historia critica de los partidos
politicos argentinos . "4th ed. Tomo II. £1 Yrioyenismo . 2nd. ed. Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez,
963*;

A major and detailed Marxist examination of the
Radical Period characterized by sympathetic treatment of Yrigoyen combined with insightful suggestions about Yrigoyen 's weaknesses and those of
the Radical movement as a whole.
Scobie, James R.
Revolution on the Pampas A Social
History of Argentine Wheat , 1869 - 1910 . Austin:
Univ. of Texas Press, 1964.
:

One of the few outstanding works on nineteenth
century rural economic and social history. Scobie
argues the agricultural immigrant made possible
the urban middle class political revolution from
which the immigrants, in return, received no
benefits.
Smith, Peter. Politics and Beef in Argentina .
York: Columbia univTHPress , T9~69~T

New

Study features use of social science concepts and
methodology to delineate and analyze activity of

J
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gr ° UpS ln
beef industry from 1900 to
£r a
n °f
Radical Pe od sometimes
MnLr by
?
K
hindered
failure
to take into account fully
the split in Radical Party ranks.

ft5

T

Snow, Peter G.

^

Argentine Radicalism The History and
Doctrine of the Radical civic Uni3nT
Iowa C ityT
^
Univ. of Iowa Press, 1965^
i

Provides an adequate introduction to the
subject,
not definitive. Au thor's treatment of the
1920 s is brief and superficial and not without
factual inaccuracies.
Solberg, Carl., Immigration and Nationalism
Argentina
and Chile , 1890 - 1914 . Austin: Univ. of Teles'
Press, 19 70.
;

A comparative study of the relationship between

the immigrant flow and the rise of nationalism in
both countries. Solberg' s research highlighted
by extensive use of literary sources.

Tornquist and Co. , Ernesto. Business Conditions in
the Argentine .
Report 143 (Dec. 30, 1918).
Provides statistics on coal importation during
the WW I years.
Tulchin, Joseph S.
"The Argentine Economy During the
First World War," The Review of the River Plate
Vol. CXLVII, No. 3750 (June 19, 1970), 901-903,
No. 3751 (June 30, 1970), 965-967, Vol. CXLVIII,
No. 3752 (July 10, 1970), 44-46.
,

An examination of why Argentina's WW I experience
produced no basic change in the nation's pattern
of economic development, and, in fact, exacerbated
the nation's dependence on industrialized powers.

Biographical Studies and Reference Works

Abad de Santillan, Diego, ed. Gran enciclopedia arBuenos Aires: Ediar, 1956qentina .
8 Vols.
1963.

Massive work contains valuable biographical
sketches of many key historical figures.
Galvez, Manuel.

Vida de Hipolito Yrigoyen

;

El h ombre
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§§i E||te£iQ.

4th ed.

Buenos Aires: Editorial

While completely uncritical ,and disturbing
for its
lack of factual material, Galvez's
portrayal of
Yrigoyen as an introvert is interesting
and sometimes enlightening reading.
"General Alonso Baldrich," Estrategia, No.
Dec. 1969), 135-136.

(Nov ' -

4

K

A brief eulogy which provides biographical data.

Guevara Labal, Carlos. El general ingeniero Enrique
Mosconi; Una vida consagrada a la patria . Buenos
Aires: A. Riera & cia. , 1941.
,

El general ingeniero Enrique Mosconi;
Una vida consagrada a la patria segunda parte .
Buenos Aires: Juan Ferrotti, 19 46.
,

,

These two volumes present admiring portrait of
Mosconi by a man who worked for Mosconi in 1920

's.

Hombres del dia, 1917 El diccionario biografico argentine) .
Buenos Aires: Casa Editoria Sociedad Inteligencia Sudamericana, N.d.
:

Includes living public figures in all fields.
Larra, Raul. Mosconi General del petroleo .
Aires: Editorial Futuro, 1957.
:

Buenos

While strongly over balanced in Mosconi' s favor
and blatantly anti-imperialist in tone, Larra'
is the only attempt at a biography of this leading petroleum figure. Provides excellent detail
on Mosconi' s background and on his work with YPF
reflecting the fact that Larra had access to at
least some of Mosconi 's papers.
Luna, Felix.
1958.

Alvear .

Buenos Aires: Libros Argentinos,

The best existing biography of Alvear. Luna enjoyed use of part of Alvear' s personal papers.
Unfortunately, Luna skims much of Alvear 's pre1931 career and concentrates on his subsequent
emergence as the Radical Party's chief spokesman.

s
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Yrigoyen ; El templario de la libertad.
Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal,~T954\
Though eulogistic and largely uncritical, this is
the best single account of Yrigoyen' s life. Features a superb account of the political atmosphere and the developing crisis during Yrigoyen'
second term.
Parker, William B. Argentines To-day. 2 Vols.
New
York: Hispanic Society of America, 1920.

Helpful biographical sketches of over 400 living
Argentine leaders from all walks of life.
Piccirilli, Ricardo, Francisco L. Romay, and Leoncio
Gianello.
Diccionario his tori co argentine 6
Vols.
Buenos Aires: Ediciones Historical Argentinas, 1954.

Excellent for persons dead by 1954.
Quie'n es guien en la argentina ; Biografias contemporaneous, aho 1939 ." Buenos Aires: Kraft, 1939.

Since this source covers only living Argentines,
this early edition is particularly useful for
figures active during the Radical Period.

Rodriguez, Carlos J. Yrigoyen Su revolucion politica
v_ social .
Buenos Aires: La Facultad, 19 43.
:

Eulogistic account which concentrates heavily on
the pre-1916 period.
Santander, Silvano. Yrigoyen .
ial La Fragua, 1965.

Buenos Aires: Editor-

Written by a journalist who interviewed Yrigoyen
after the latter 's fall in 1930, this eulogy
covers selected incidents in Yrigoyen 's life and
provides information on the major issues which
arose during Yrigoyen 's presidencies.
Torres, Arturo. Elpidio Gonzalez Biograf la de una
conducta . Buenos Aires: Editorial Raigal, 19 51.
:

Superficial and uncritical but still informative
and the only thing available on this leading
Radical politician.
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argentinos.
Vols.
^iJ|J£^es
Ediciones A. Fossati, 1960.
3

Buenos Aires:

The work of over thirty collaborators,
this
source presents detailed historical biographies
of 140 prominent Argentines, living and
dead.
Yrigoyen is not included.
Yaben, Jacinto R.
as.
5 Vols.
1938-1940.

Biografias argentinas y sudamericanBuenos Aires: Ediciones Metropolis,

Not the most useful source for the present work
since it concentrates on military and naval
figures and on late nineteenth century personages.
Specialized Bibliographic Aids
Baytich, S.A. Latin America A Bibliographic Guide to
Economy , History , Law Politics , and Society .
Coral Gables: Univ. of Miami Press, 1961.
:

,

"Bibliografia sobre el petrojeo, 1865-1925, " Bole tin
de Informaciones Petroliferas , Yacimientos e Industrias , arfo II, No. 12 (Aug. 1925), 1129-1140,
No. 13 (Sept. 1925), 1243-1254, No. 14 (Oct.
1925), 1357-1368, No. 15 (Nov. 1925), 1539-1551.

Compiled on the basis of publications from all
over the world held then by the libraries of the
Ministry of Agriculture, the Bureau of Mines and
YPF.
It covers all aspects of the petroleum industry, but is organized chronologically and,
therefore, is a bit unwieldy.
Harrison, John P. Guide to Materials on Latin America
Washington: National
in the National Archives .
Archives , 1961.

Harvard University, Bureau for Economic Research in
Latin America. The Economic Literature of Latin
America . 2 Vols. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press,
1935-1936.
Union Civica Radical, Comite de la Provinciate Buenos
Aires, Comision de Cultura. Bibliografia para el
Buenos Aires: Talleres
e studio del radica^ismo .
Graficos~"del Comite de la Provincia de Buenos
Aires de la Union Civica Radical, 19 52.
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More valuable for the general study of
Radicalism
than for the issue of petroleum in particular.
Universida,d de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Ciencias
Economicas. Revista de Ciencias EconoWas 1913
,
19_29_, clasific acion general , autores- materialesT"
preparado por Carlos E. Daverl^ Buenos Aires:
Imprenta de la Universidad, 19 30.

An author and subject index to this review from
its first appearance in 1913 down to 1929.

NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Newspapers
Newspapers provided a particularly rewarding
sources for the preparation of this study, supplying detail on the flow of events and statements
of attitude and policy by all groups interested
in the petroleum issue.
All the following are
Buenos Aires papers, and, with the exception of
the two Independent Socialist publications, La
Libertad and Critica y_ Accion they are available in Buenos Aires libraries. The Independent
Socialist newspapers are difficult to locate. The
Biblioteca Obrera Juan, B. Justo in Buenos Aires
has some issues of Critica y_ Accion for 19271929, and I was fortunate enough to be accorded
access to a private collection of La Libertad ,
1928-1930.
Of the papers listed below, microfilming has made La Epoca La Vanguardia La Prensa
and La Nacion available Tn some United States libraries.
,

,

La Accion , 1922-1930
La Argentina , 1929-1930

Critica

v_

Accion , 1927-1929

La E poca , 1916-1930
La Libertad , 1928-1930

La Nacion, 1916-1923, 1926-1930

La Prensa, 1916-1930

,

,
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La Razon , 1917, 1919, 1923-1924, 1927-1928
La Vanguardia , 1916-1930

Periodicals

Boletin de Inf ormaciones Petroliferas
Industrias , 1924 :r19'65l
:

;

Yacimientos e
~~

Monthly review initiated by YPF in September 1924.
In 19 34 the title was, shortened to Boletin de
Informaciones Petroliferas and un in te rr up ted~publication continued until April 1950 when it was
suspended until April 1958. Provides information and statistics on all phases of the oil industry, particularly in Argentina.
La Ingenieria , 1907-1930.

Bimonthly publication of
Ingenieros. Most of the
troleum are of technical
something appears on the

the Centro Nacional de
articles referring to pe-

nature, but infrequently
political side of the

issue.

El Petroleo Argentine 1923-1924.
This publication and the one which follows present
the views of the private sector of Argentina's oil
industry. Both are difficult to locate in any
quantity, although some issues of both are included in the microfilmed diplomatic reports from
Buenos Aires.

Petroleo

y_

Minas, 1921-1922.
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